In two months’ time, Syria’s crisis will turn 10 years old — a grim milestone for what has been the most deadly and destructive civil conflict in recent history.
The mixed messages and pendulum swings in U.S. Gulf policy in recent years are rooted in and have further fueled deep questioning and a largely unresolved debate within the United States about America’s role in the region, and indeed in the world. Like the U.S., relations between the GCC and Iran are locked in confrontation. Breaking this impasse requires decisive U.S. reengagement in Gulf affairs led by vigorous, sustained diplomacy that promotes intra-GCC reconciliation and supports efforts aimed at tempering the Saudi-Iran strategic rivalry.
Now is the time for a political reset in Yemen — and the United States must play an important role. This role must include encouraging all sides toward a more inclusive political process that reduces violence and raises Yemeni and international voices, and moves toward specific and achievable objectives over time. Solutions that purport to be either speedy or simple are, in fact, quite dangerous. To that point, the current administration’s consideration of designating Ansar Allah (the Houthi movement) as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO) will not help advance the United States or the other various participants in this conflict toward a durable strategic settlement.
The assassination of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, the most important figure in Iran’s nuclear program, in late November 2020 is a major failure for Iran’s intelligence services. Despite all the secrecy and the emphasis on protecting Fakhrizadeh, however, he was still assassinated in the Absard area, about 70 km from Tehran, on Nov. 27. Why was he killed despite such a high level of protection, and what effect will his death have on the Iranian regime’s intelligence and security structures?
In our final episode of the year, host Alistair Taylor interviews several MEI scholars on the key events that transpired across the Middle East in 2020 including in Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan, and they discuss US defense and diplomatic strategy in region as the as the transition to the Biden administration gets underway. Guests include Paul Salem, Bilal Saab, Randa Slim, and Marvin Weinbaum.
Alongside a stalled economy and a messy political transition, the decade since the 2011 revolution has left Tunisia with an intermittent yet ferocious terrorism problem. The frequency of terrorist attacks highlights the dangers posed by an uncertain political environment, widespread economic problems, and regional instability. But the fact that they have become less deadly over time also seems to underline the improvements that successive governments have made to Tunisia’s security apparatus.
When looking at a map of all artillery and airstrikes in the period from November 2019 through November 2020, first, it is quite clear that the majority of attack are carried out by either Syrian, Russia, or pro-government forces across the northwest of the country, save for northern Aleppo, where the Turkish military is more active.
Now in its sixth year, the war in Yemen shows no signs of abating. The country faces what is widely considered the world’s worst humanitarian crisis — a situation that has only been exacerbated by the global coronavirus pandemic. As a new administration prepares to take over in Washington, it is a natural time to assess U.S. policy toward the country. We asked 9 experts to provide their perspective and answer the following question: How should the Biden administration approach Yemen?
For someone who’s on the record strongly supporting Michèle Flournoy, the former under secretary of defense for policy in the Obama administration, to serve as President-elect Joe Biden’s secretary of defense, I don’t believe the choice of Lloyd Austin is as troubling as many portray it to be. He’s an impeccable and loyal public servant who will bring a wealth of relevant experience to the job. He is more than qualified. And he enjoys the full trust of Biden, which is indispensable.
In recent years of the Syrian crisis, the reluctance of NATO states to take decisive action to secure their interests and protect Syrian lives has had drastic repercussions in both Syria and the wider region. Where NATO members have shown indecisiveness and a refusal to engage, their geopolitical rivals, Iran and Russia, have seized the moment and cemented their influence. However, as the regime is challenged by a crippling economic crisis, a new U.S. administration may offer an opening for the U.S. and its NATO allies to develop a collective approach in Syria that will secure their interests and bolster regional security.
Iranian military advisers and pro-Iran foreign proxy groups are present from Yemen and Iraq to Syria and Lebanon. Tens of thousands of armed men operating across the Middle East look to Tehran for guidance and patronage. This sort of sway has made Iran into a regional power broker — at least in the Arab world. But Tehran’s deep ideological and financial investments in Arab states have come at the expense of neglecting Iranian interests closer to home.
Through its Belt and Road Initiative, China seeks to play a larger role in the Black Sea region. China has been wooing littoral states in hopes of securing new markets for its goods and investing in infrastructure projects. But some worry that there is more to Chinese actions in the region than meets the eye. The worry is that China will increase its political and diplomatic clout in a region that is considered vital for Russian interests and create tension between Moscow and Washington. Despite the uneasiness in the West about China’s increasing presence in the Black Sea, there is not enough focus on the issue in the scholarly debates in Western capitals. The MEI’s Frontier Europe Initiative aims to contribute to the debate on the role of China in the Black Sea. We hope the articles in this report will help to address several important unaddressed questions.
In 2018, Assad’s Syrian government forces, with Russian support, managed to regain control of opposition-held areas in Daraa. Russia has emerged as the primary power broker by arranging agreements between the rebels and the regime, which, in turn, has allowed the rebels to keep some of their arms under the banner of the Russian-formed Eighth Brigade. Nevertheless, since 2018, the tight-knit tribal networks in Daraa have functioned as a nucleus for the continuation of the uprising against the Assad regime. The same tribal attributes that create interconnectedness among the people of Daraa, however, also render them susceptible to the regime’s strategy of pitting clans against each other and leveraging the resulting strife to justify the use of force with the goal of asserting full control.
Lebanon has a coastline of 120 nautical miles (NM) along the eastern Mediterranean and an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) that encompasses an area of 5000 square nautical miles (SNM). While this wide expanse presents many opportunities, it also represents a pressing security challenge for the Lebanese Navy and the region in general.