Iran and the U.S. were on a collision course as soon as President Donald Trump arrived at the White House in January 2017.
Jordan is bracing for protracted cyber insecurity. Since 2010, the Hashemite Kingdom has rolled out a raft of policies to manage digital vulnerabilities. In keeping with its proactive approach to cybersecurity, Amman is taking additional measures to inoculate the kingdom against digital ailments, including, most recently, the adoption of the 2019 Cybersecurity Law.
Absent international pressure, the Iran-backed Houthis have no reason to stop expanding
The 2018 National Defense Strategy shapes the way the U.S. military competes with state and non-state adversaries. It specifically calls for improvements in partner force operations (PFO) — especially counter-terrorism (CT) — so that regional partners can keep up CT pressure while America’s special operators shift focus to help the nation gain and maintain an advantage over the near-peer competitors of Russia and China.
Over the past several weeks geopolitical experts have been talking a lot about what the surprise U.S. drone attack on Iranian Gen. Qassem Soleimani, head of the IRGC – Quds Force, on Jan. 3 means for the Middle East and relations between the major powers. What has received considerably less attention, however, is what Soleimani’s killing means for the South Caucasus, a region whose small size belies its strategic importance.
However unsurmountable geopolitical crises may seem today, it will be domestic protests that determine the social and economic landscape in the Middle East in the coming years.
As neighboring regions, the South Caucasus and the Middle East are inextricably intertwined — so much so that the former is sometimes even considered part of the Greater Middle East. While geographical proximity is the strongest driver of interconnectivity between the two regions, geopolitics, business ties, and energy interests also link countries from the South Caucasus and the Middle East and form the basis for important bilateral and regional relationships.
In the immediate aftermath of the assassination of Gen. Qassem Soleimani, head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps – Quds Force, on Jan. 3, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei warned the U.S. of Iran’s “harsh revenge.” There has been much speculation around the timing, location, and the type (or form) of Iran’s promised revenge. Amin Mohseni-Cheraghlou takes a closer look at the impact of the widely discussed strategy of blocking the Strait of Hormuz.
On Jan. 5, shortly after Qassem Soleimani was assassinated in Iraq by an American drone strike, Tehran announced that it would no longer remain committed to the enrichment restrictions laid out under the 2015 nuclear deal. Even though European diplomats have rushed to assuage Iranian concerns about the possible resumption of international sanctions, Tehran perceives this as an extension of the U.S. “maximum pressure” campaign and is very unlikely to back down or substantially change its defiant behavior — domestically promoted as a counterpolicy of “maximum resistance” — even if punitive UNSC resolutions against it are reinstated.
The U.S. assassination of Iranian Gen. Qassem Soleimani came as a seismic shock to the Middle East, not least to the embattled political system in Damascus that has reaped the benefits of Iran’s military involvement across the region. While his death will be a severe blow, it will not necessarily translate into a decline in Iran’s influence or military presence in Syria. Soleimani’s army of militias and supporters will outlast him, possibly by decades.
Although Moscow continues to reap the benefits of its Syrian campaign, it is increasingly faced with diminishing returns. Despite its greater geopolitical involvement in the country, the Kremlin has so far failed to extract major economic dividends and may soon face increased competition from Tehran. With Syria’s future clouded in uncertainty and the unresolved issue of the Idlib region hanging like the sword of Damocles over any potential political settlement, Russia is now trying to bring the Libyan conflict into the equation as well.
Following the recent escalation in U.S.-Iran tensions, the threat of Iranian cyberattacks is likely to intensify in the near to medium term. There are three possible fronts where Iran might look to carry out cyber operations: targeting the energy infrastructure of America’s Gulf allies; deploying malware against U.S. private sector companies; and launching disinformation campaigns that would aim to influence public opinion in both the Middle East and the U.S.
In the aftermath of the Berlin conference, there is little sign that Hifter is backing off on his efforts to take Tripoli by force.
The Berlin Conference on Libya will be a crucial test of whether Europe can act on its ambitions.
18 years after CIA and U.S. special operations elements touched down in Afghanistan to pursue al-Qaeda and topple the Taliban, ongoing, incremental troop reductions reveal the smoke and mirrors manner in which the U.S. is withdrawing from the conflict in lieu of a negotiated settlement.