Research & Commentary Results

In mid-October, five years after it was expelled from most of eastern Syria as ISIS swept in, the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) returned to much of the northeast as part of a deal between the Syrian Democratic Forces and Damascus struck just days after Turkey launched an offensive against the region. By examining the distribution and make-up of units sent to the northeast we can better understand the strength of the SAA in the region and the current state of its broader deployments across the country.

China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has been a powerful driver of the development of existing and new Eurasian rail routes. A web of competing and complementary rail lines has begun to form across the Eurasian landmass. Railway cargo service between China and Europe has fast become a compelling “middle option” — cheaper than air and faster than sea.

The role of cybersecurity in the future of geopolitics in the Middle East and the surrounding regions will have much to do with individual state and enterprise preparedness. With cyber threats a growing source of interstate tension, governments must take measures to increase national cyber preparedness that are tailored to their vulnerabilities and cyber ecosystems. Israel and Estonia are examples of states that prove this rule. Despite their relatively small size, both have demonstrated an exceptional capacity to deter or defend against cyber aggression from their much larger, more aggressive neighbors.

Turkey’s relations with its Western allies are at an all-time low while its partnership with Russia is flourishing. Since Russia began delivery of its S-400 advanced aerial defense system in July, questions have abounded about Turkey’s future in the NATO alliance. Such concerns are not baseless. Turkey-Russia ties have never been closer. The two countries cooperate closely not only on energy and trade but also in the defense sector. But fears of a Turkish withdrawal from the alliance overlook the continued tension between Ankara and Moscow, which makes NATO an indispensable partner for Turkey.

East Ghouta is perhaps the darkest example of renewed Assad regime rule over former opposition territory. 18 months after the regime recaptured the area, its security forces and intelligence apparatus continue to terrorize Syrians there. Night-time raids on homes, mass arrests, and forced disappearances are common occurrences across the region. Intelligence forces assert themselves in every aspect of daily life, especially at the ubiquitous checkpoints where personnel extort residents for bribes when they pass, subjecting them to security checks that can lead to civilians either being arrested on the spot or conscripted into military service. In addition, residents of East Ghouta are facing a humanitarian crisis amid a total lack of basic services, from sewage to schools and hospitals, and the basic pillars of the local economy remain in total disrepair.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is set to meet with his U.S. counterpart, Donald Trump, in Washington on Wednesday. While there are doubtless other items for discussion on the agenda, at the top of the list is, at least on Turkey’s side, Syria — or more specifically, what U.S. policy is and should be in Syria.

Pakistan’s capital, Islamabad, has been paralyzed in recent days by supporters of Maulana Fazlur Rehman and his Jamiat-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI-F), a well-entrenched Islamist party. The protestors are seeking the resignation of the military-backed Prime Minister Imran Khan and fresh elections, and the demonstration has emerged as an existential problem for Khan.

With the fall of the Berlin Wall 30 years ago, ties between Western and Eastern Europe were renewed. In the same period, another wall crumbled — between the Middle East and the former Soviet states. And yet, to this day, U.S. national security institutions continue to view these two regions through a Cold War lens, separating how they are handled. This approach needs to change; integrating research and policy toward the Middle East and the bordering states of the former Soviet Union would improve analytical understanding and help identify new policy options.

If the Syrian Constitutional Committee does not address the oppressive security and military apparatus, which are the primary root causes of the Syrian crisis, then its work will not actually effect change in Syria — and so far, reforms of those two sectors are not yet on the table.

The Trump administration inherited a number of complex problems in the Syrian file from its predecessors in the White House. In dealing with the Syrian crisis, the Obama administration had three main priorities: not disturbing Iran in Syria during the process of nuclear negotiations, working with Russia toward a ceasefire in various parts of Syria (without trusting that Russia could deliver or should have the upper hand), and, most importantly, carrying out a limited military intervention in the northeast to defeat ISIS — an issue it considered separately from the Syrian crisis.

Damascus’ position is marginally stronger, and it is unlikely to concede anything of substance in Geneva despite continued American control of Deir ez-Zor’s oilfields.

Had America’s posture in Syria not been so uncertain, and if President Trump had not effectively green-lighted a Turkish incursion into the northeast, we would have a much better chance of capitalizing on Baghdadi’s death.

Russia is clear in its policy toward northeastern Syria: The future of the region will be determined through talks between the representatives of the Kurds, who traditionally live in the area, and Damascus.

While there is probably zero chance Prime Minister Khan will step down, efforts will persist in trying to delegitimize those in power because this is what Pakistan’s opposition parties seem best programmed to do.

The launch of Turkey’s military incursion into northern Syria on Oct. 9 represents an existential threat for the Autonomous Administration in Northeast Syria (AANES) and Kurdish parties in Syria as a whole, prompting Kurdish political factions, both within Syria and abroad, to reevaluate their survival strategies and alliances. This report explores the various political factions within the Kurdish coalitions in Syria as they functioned under the AANES and the major rifts between them. Even under these dire circumstances Kurdish political factions in Syria have responded to the Turkish invasion independently.