The Taliban’s military and diplomatic strategies are intended to work in tandem, one leveraging the other. Each has as its ultimate goal the Taliban’s recovery of an emirate lost in 2001.
How the current twin crises of the global coronavirus pandemic and economic collapse will affect the GCC governments remains an open question.
The spread of the virus, unease about a cease-fire, peace talks, and the American withdrawal leave the Afghan people gripped with a heightened sense of uncertainty.
The growing U.S. strategic reliance on India has fomented closer bilateral ties between China and Pakistan, straining the U.S.-Pakistan relationship.
The lifting of lockdown restrictions could lead to a spike in cases for which the country is ill prepared.
There was no other way to end the political logjam in conflict-ridden Afghanistan than to make current President Ashraf Ghani and the outgoing Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah agree to share power. The deal announced on May 17 has been widely welcomed by the international community because the political tensions between the two rivals were viewed as one of the major hurdles to the advancement of an intra-Afghan reconciliation process. The political jockeying in Kabul is far from the only impediment to reconciliation though and there are deeper obstacles to the peace process.
The U.S.’s willingness to grant wide berth to the Taliban has effectively given them license to continue a campaign of violence.
To help prevent a U.S.-Iran war in their neighborhood, the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council have called for diplomacy. They have reached out to Iranian officials to de-escalate. And they have provided Tehran with humanitarian assistance to deal with the coronavirus pandemic.
What is the future of legitimacy in Yemen? The question of what would happen if President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi were to die has been an unspoken concern for the past several years. It is important to address the question of legitimacy after Hadi because the constitutional rules on how to transfer his authority to a successor and how to avoid a presidential vacuum are impractical given the ongoing conflict.
While COVID-19 and historically low oil prices are disrupting the Gulf’s political economy, the pandemic has demonstrated the region’s tech resilience.
A perceived lessening of the U.S. security umbrella would leave the Saudis far more vulnerable regionally and could force additional policy adjustments.
This is only the latest flashpoint in a series of social media disinformation campaigns targeting Qatar.
On April 30, roughly a week after the Southern Transitional Council (STC) declared self-administration in Aden, a military confrontation broke out on the remote Yemeni island of Socotra between members of the STC and government forces. After just a few days, the situation was diffused when the island’s governor and the STC asked the Saudis to intervene. Although an agreement was reached quickly, it is likely to be fragile because the causes of the conflict are not entirely local. The island of Socotra is simply too important to multiple international players that are not willing to let it easily slip outside their sphere of influence.
A few hours before Ramadan’s pre-fasting suhoor meal on April 25, the Southern Transitional Council (STC), a UAE-sponsored regional secessionist movement, abruptly announced self-administration in Yemen’s South and a state of emergency.
Rather than seeing the spreading virus as a common enemy, the Taliban seem to be viewing the health crisis as opening new military opportunities.