Read MEI’s weekly briefing featuring expert analysis of key regional developments for the week ahead.
China’s response to the Syrian refugee crisis should be viewed within the broader context of its evolving approach to humanitarian aid and its overall involvement and objectives in the Syrian conflict.
Six years ago, the Syrian regime conquered the southern province of Daraa, popularly known by millions of Syrians as the “cradle of the revolution.” That military victory represented a pivotal moment for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. After all, it was the last time the regime captured a sizable swath of opposition territory, and in doing so in July 2018, its impunity was laid bare for all the world to see. On paper, Daraa had been designated a “de-escalation zone” after months of intensive international diplomacy in which the United States had played a central role.
On July 16, CENTCOM announced that after six months of 2024, “ISIS is on pace to more than double” the number of attacks in Syria and Iraq it claimed in 2023. But the reality is far worse than this statement suggested because the data represents only a fraction of ISIS’s actual attacks in Syria and Iraq.
Read MEI’s weekly briefing featuring expert analysis of key regional developments for the week ahead.
Despite their popular nature, the protests in northwestern Syria, sparked by racist attacks on Syrians over the border in Turkey, have exposed the rifts and divisions between various opposition factions. Bilal Samir explores the positions of the major military groups in Turkish-controlled areas and assesses how closely they align with Turkey’s policy.
The Syrian regime recently announced that it had arrested over 2,000 people in Damascus on drug-related charges during the first half of 2024. However, the relatively small amount of drugs confiscated suggests the regime is focusing on arresting users and street-level pushers rather than going after the major producers and traffickers. This highlights how the Syrian regime manipulates drug crackdowns to serve multiple agendas while ensuring the flow of illicit drugs continues uninterrupted.
Read MEI’s weekly briefing featuring expert analysis of key regional developments for the week ahead.
Read MEI’s weekly briefing featuring expert analysis of key regional developments for the week ahead.
As the world focuses on Israel’s war in Gaza, northwest Syria is undergoing a significant political upheaval that could lead to major instability. For the last three months, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, an armed Sunni Islamist group that governs more 4.5 million people in the Idlib region, has been facing widespread protests.
In recent weeks, the southern Syrian province of Sweida has seen a series of kidnappings targeting regime military officers. Unlike the financially motivated incidents common in the region, these abductions, which occurred on April 2 and 25, stand out because they targeted individuals based on their affiliation with the regime of Bashar al-Assad rather than their personal identities. Reports suggest that Sweida residents orchestrated the abductions as a way of negotiating the release of relatives detained by the regime.
Read MEI’s weekly briefing featuring expert analysis of key regional developments for the week ahead.
The month of April saw a series of unprecedented escalations in the long-simmering Iranian-Israeli conflict, with both countries launching missile and drone attacks against the other’s territory for the first time in history.
In the wake of these strikes, what will be the impact on the regional security and political environment going forward, what is needed to stabilize the new rules of the game, and how can US diplomacy help to facilitate that process? MEI has asked its experts to weigh in.
In a significant and surprising turn of events, on the evening of April 5, a prominent Iraqi leader in the Syrian Sunni Islamist group Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, Maysar bin Ali al-Juburi, also known as Abu Maria al-Qahtani, was reportedly killed in an attack in Idlib’s northern countryside.
Six months since the October 7 Hamas attacks on Israel and subsequent outbreak of war in Gaza, the deadly and devastating conflict looks no closer to concluding. Is it still possible to achieve a sustainable cessation of hostilities and restart the conflict-resolution process? To get there, what are the incentives and disincentives that could be constructed for the two main combatants, Israel and Hamas?