Coronavirus and the civil wars in the Middle East
Although press coverage may have shifted almost totally to the worsening global pandemic, the conflicts in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Libya are anything but frozen.
Although press coverage may have shifted almost totally to the worsening global pandemic, the conflicts in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Libya are anything but frozen.
In active threat zones, the capacity to launch major operations will likely be constrained for at least several months once the virus begins its inevitable surge.
In retaliation for an airstrike that killed 33 Turkish soldiers at the end of February, Ankara launched “Operation Spring Shield” (OSS) against the Syrian regime and the pro-Iranian militias supporting it. Despite being unable to rely on its fleet of F-16s due to Russia’s control of the Syrian airspace over Idlib, Turkey managed to successfully wipe out a large portion of Assad’s army in the area within just a couple of days by making innovative use of drones.
Democrats ought to build a moral firewall around Syria policy, establishing a framework for understanding the Syrian conflict and debating policy options.
Amid an unprecedented political, economic, and financial crisis and the emergence of a new threat from the global coronavirus pandemic, Lebanon needs all the help it can get. The U.S. has long been an important source of assistance, and yet, as conversations with officials in both Beirut and Washington make clear, the argument for halting U.S. aid to Lebanon seems to be gaining ground.
In the face of Algeria’s Hirak protest movement, the response of the EU so far has been measured, and it is notable that the EU’s calls for democratic reform are framed in economic terms that emphasize the benefits of greater economic integration between the states of the Maghreb. What opportunities do the ongoing changes in Algeria present for enhancing economic integration in the long term?
The outbreak of a Russian-Saudi oil price war earlier this month might offer some comfort to Iran, a country which has in recent years become unnerved by the increasingly close ties between Moscow and Riyadh. However, it is premature to see an Iranian geopolitical win emerging from the Russian-Saudi spat, and history should give Tehran plenty of reservations about Moscow’s ability to deliver on its economic promises to Iran. While Iran and Russia will likely continue to pay lip-service to the idea of an economic partnership, each side will remain preoccupied with larger concerns. This is a tale of unfulfilled economic potential.
Economies around the world are being battered by two “black swan” events at the same time: the COVID-19 virus and the oil price war between Russia and Saudi Arabia. Naturally, the countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) are also affected, although each in different ways. Those that are net users of energy, which could have benefitted substantially from the vastly lower energy prices, are getting hit hard by COVID-19, while oil and gas producers are suffering from an all-out oil price war made worse by the steep decline in worldwide demand caused by the pandemic.
Just a week after Houthi rebels took control of al-Hazm, the capital of al-Jawf Province, on March 1, UN Special Envoy for Yemen Martin Griffiths paid an unprecedented, one-day visit to the Houthis’ likely next target, oil-and-gas-rich Marib, reiterating the urgent need for de-escalation.
This was an inauspicious start for a plan that from the outset was riddled with holes.
In changing the balance of power on the ground and forcing hostilities to a stalemate, Turkey’s military intervention in Idlib had produced its desired effect. On March 5, Vladimir Putin and Erdogan sat together for six hours and announced to the world a comprehensive cease-fire and the establishment of a secure corridor spanning six kilometers on the north and south sides of the M4 highway.
As Syria’s war reaches its ninth anniversary, Russian and U.S. soldiers are increasingly finding themselves face to face — quite literally — in the country’s northeast. A spate of confrontations over the last two months has opened questions about the fate of Syria’s north in the coming year.
Washington’s foreign relations in the Middle East are often characterized by ebb and flow, tracking the region’s dynamic politics. But when it comes to Iraq, this ebb and flow is especially turbulent, and the country’s energy sector has been thrown under the spotlight as Washington presses Baghdad to take swift action to ensure its “energy independence” from Iran.
After Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan hammered out a deal with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin on March 5 to bring an end to the fighting in Idlib in northwestern Syria, he said he was hopeful that the two countries could extend their cooperation to Libya.
The United States has missed a valuable opportunity to use its influence in Iraq to encourage the government to implement the reforms Iraqi protesters have been demanding over the past six months and push back on Iran.