The U.S.-Iraq Strategic Dialogue that will be launched this week provides an opportunity for the two sides to put their relations, as Iraqi President Dr. Barham Salih said last April, “in the right context.”
The impact of COVID-19 on Iran-linked forces in Syria has provided Russia with an opportunity to expand its influence through its proxy forces, particularly in eastern Syria, as Iranian and pro-Iranian forces redeploy elsewhere in the country.
Since 2017, Iran has seen several waves of protests rooted in political, social, and, most importantly, economic grievances. In light of COVID and the post-pandemic fallout, there is every indication that unrest will continue to grow, and even accelerate. Until now, the regime’s coercive apparatus has had both the capacity and the willingness of its members to successfully suppress anti-regime unrest. But has COVID-19 changed this balance? What impact, if any, has the pandemic had on the regime’s security capacity?
As Lebanese protesters look to advance the systemic reforms they seek and contend with an entrenched ruling elite with little incentive to change, they can draw on their Algerian peers’ successes and shortcomings.
Quickly attributing or blaming a country for a cyber incident without technical analysis, proof, and government officials willing to go on record only inflames an already tense situation.
Iran is currently facing an incredibly unlucky alignment of pressure sources that are interrelated and will force the regime to engage in risky or experimental behavior, most likely in 2020. The COVID-19 epidemic simply exacerbates the combined challenges of a regime squeezed by an international sanctions network and a restive population reaching a breaking point with economic hardship. A continued acceptance of the status quo is untenable; thus, the regime will likely begin to undertake various initiatives in the coming months, more likely military than diplomatic in nature, that could force the United States to ease the isolation of the country.
Far from his native Tehran in bucolic West Vancouver, Parviz Tanavoli, the 83-year-old “father of modern Iranian sculpture,” contemplates the fate of his homeland. “My heart breaks when I see what is happening in Iran now,” says the renowned artist, who divides his time between a life of relative obscurity on Canada’s Pacific coast, and Tehran, where he is referred to simply as “Master Tanavoli.”
In Khamenei’s mind, the total neutralization of the ‘moderate’ camp is the best legacy he can leave behind.
To help prevent a U.S.-Iran war in their neighborhood, the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council have called for diplomacy. They have reached out to Iranian officials to de-escalate. And they have provided Tehran with humanitarian assistance to deal with the coronavirus pandemic.
Unfortunately, many distinguished Arab writers are unknown to the majority of Iranian readers and their works are not available in Persian. Arab literature has largely been neglected in the Iranian literary translation market.
Six scholars from across MEI take a closer look at the challenges facing Iraq’s new prime minister, from the protest movement and Baghdad-Erbil relations to the balancing act between Washington and Tehran.
Washington must decide if it will grant concessions that al-Kadhimi can use to convince Tehran to accept a sustained U.S. military presence.
For now, Tehran’s bottom-line objective in Iraq is for the Americans to stop urging Baghdad to cut Iran loose.
For too long, Washington has been an accomplice of the rampant corruption in Lebanon, choosing to look the other way as it deals with officials known to be implicated in various corrupt schemes.
Iran’s once promising reformist movement is in a death spiral. It is not because the idea of reform has lost its appeal.