This article was co-written by Sarkawt Shamsulddin, co-founder of the Kurdish Policy Foundation. It was first published on CNN.
This op-ed was first published in the New York Daily News.
The United States might not have had a strategy for battling ISIS last week, but it does now. The NATO summit in Wales produced one. It reflects President Obama’s instincts and his ability to corral fractious allies.
It also says nothing about the use of force by the United States.
In the last three years, Egypt’s economic position has deteriorated dramatically. Domestic and external deficits have increased, causing public debt to grow sharply, external reserves to fall, investment to shrink, and inflation to increase. In the process, growth decelerated, unemployment rose, income distribution worsened, and the medium term economic outlook became clouded.
Although power cuts are hardly new in Egypt, no Egyptian government has tackled the problem seriously and transparently. After the January 25, 2011 uprising, Egyptians had less patience with the failures of state services and demanded change.
On August 9, 2014, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt began another chapter in its besieged political life. The highest administrative court in Egypt, the Supreme Administrative Court, dissolved the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Court also liquidated all of the FJP’s assets in an effort to quash any further political ambitions and activities that the Brotherhood might have in Egypt. The ruling—a calculated move conducted prior to upcoming parliamentary elections, scheduled for later this year—was an attempt
Within four months of the military’s ouster of Mohamed Morsi, one of the icons of liberalism serving in the new cabinet, Ziad Bahaa-Eldin, admitted to CNN that those who called for political reconciliation, like himself, were alienated by the political mood, where the very concept of reconciliation has become “a dirty word” in Egypt.
Read the full article on CNN.
American airstrikes might be needed in Syria, but that would not be the most important tactic for success, nor would more material aid to the rebels be sufficient to contain the Islamic State over the long term. As in Iraq, there has to be a political angle as well.
Several weeks ago an Islamist and jihadist alliance led by Ansar al-Sharia–a group with ties to Islamic State (formerly ISIS)–took control of Benghazi and declared an “Islamic Emirate.” A few days ago, an Islamist alliance took control of Tripoli’s main airport. These developments have come as a shock to the Egyptian government, which considers an Islamic state on Egypt’s 720-mile long western border an immediate threat to Egypt’s national security. This helps explain Egypt’s alleged role in recent airstrikes inside Libya coordinated with the United Arab Emirates.
The outlines of a US strategy to roll back ISIS, or the ‘Islamic State’ as it styles itself, in Iraq have become relatively clear, even if success is uncertain.
Alexandria, like Cairo, is a mismanaged city with little to offer by way of basic services, much less cultural activities. But unlike Egypt’s insular, desert capital, it is a Mediterranean city, cooler, less polluted or crowded than Cairo (with just six million inhabitants), no longer a cosmopolitan hub but open to the world in material and other ways. There are signs here of a trend toward “social transformation”—a focus on the immediate surroundings, the city itself, to explore and expand its possibilities.
If it manages to overcome some rather formidable obstacles, Egypt’s much touted “mega project of the century”—the Suez Canal Corridor Project (SCCP)—has the potential to transform the country into a world-class center for trade and industry.
As voters headed for the polling stations in late May to elect a president for the second time since Hosni Mubarak’s 2011 ouster, the interim authority announced the state budget for the 2014 financial year. The budget included austerity measures that were sure to be painful for ordinary Egyptians, and the timing of the announcement suggests that the interim authority wanted to shield the new president from responsibility.
The enormous costs exacted on Palestinians in Gaza by Israel’s Operation Protective Edge have sparked a rocky rehabilitation of Egyptian attitudes toward Palestinians among Egypt’s political class and the public at large. Consequently, the Sisi government may see the merits of moderating the hardline approach to Gaza that has characterized Egypt’s polices since the ousting of President Mohammad Morsi one year ago.
Discussions between Egypt and Other Concerned Parties
