The mismanaged politics of Iran’s coronavirus crisis
In dealing with the coronavirus epidemic, Iran’s crisis management has been all over the map.
In dealing with the coronavirus epidemic, Iran’s crisis management has been all over the map.
The sheer density of protracted conflicts in the Black Sea region makes it particularly exposed to the geopolitical ambitions of regional and global powers. The rapid militarization in Russia-controlled territories in recent years has only added fuel to the fire, dramatically increasing security concerns and underscoring the need for the West and its allies in the region to address the so-called frozen conflicts.
The Islamic Revolution of 1979 fundamentally transformed U.S.-Iran relations from a special relationship into an adversarial one. However, this has not prevented American presidents of both parties, from Ronald Reagan to Barack Obama, from reaching out to Tehran in the hope of a potential détente. There are many ideological, political, and economic factors behind the inability of Washington and Tehran to normalize their relations over the past four decades. One that has received little attention, however, is the cycle of U.S.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan typically never misses an opportunity to appear in front of the cameras. But after the airstrike last week that killed dozens of Turkish soldiers in Syria’s Idlib Province, he was unusually quiet. The local governor of the south-eastern Turkish province of Hatay, just across the border from Idlib, did the talking instead, providing information to the outraged public about Turkey’s worst day in the Syrian conflict so far. As the death toll rose, so did the public anger.
The scale of Turkey’s intervention will have shaken Moscow and the losses incurred by pro-regime forces are serious and will further strain a Syrian Army that was already overstretched.
Moscow’s restraint suggests that President Putin will accept a Turkish slap to his credibility as an ally to the Syrian government.
Turkey is running out of options in Idlib Province and in Syria. Aggressively taking on a task that is beyond its capabilities, the government in Ankara now is faced with doubling down on a high-risk gamble, hoping someone, somewhere will believe its bluff, or saving Turkey and the area from worse destruction. There are two things the U.S could do, working together with the EU, NATO, and the UN.
The death of at least 33 Turkish soldiers and wounding of 60 more in Syria’s Idlib on Thursday night was a game-changing development. The crisis there and its effects represent an existential threat to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and for now, it appears likely that Turkey will remain alone in dealing with the crisis. That presents us with two possible scenarios, both bleak. If the world wants to avoid a true nightmare from becoming reality, it needs to wake up and get engaged.
The results of Iran’s recent elections and preparations for the succession of Ayatollah Khamenei as supreme leader could mean that the topic of replacing Iran’s presidential system with a parliamentary one may very well be up for discussion again.
A low voter turnout at the weekend will be the latest indication that ordinary Iranians are just not happy with the regime in Tehran
This year could mark a turning point in the European Union’s relations with the countries of the MENA region. If the EU is to realize the objectives laid out in its 2016 global foreign and security policy strategy and become a major world power, it has to be more proactive and creative, especially in the Middle East.
The sense in Tehran is that Khamenei has decided the Islamic Republic can only survive if the entire regime is in the hands of the hardliners.
The eastern Mediterranean has become an increasingly important focus for Turkey’s foreign and security policy, but the interlocking of new issues like energy politics and sovereignty rights with old problems like Cyprus has created significant challenges for Ankara.
Over the past 14 months, there have been moments when it seemed like progress was being made toward de-escalation in Yemen, but there have also been significant setbacks as well. Peace efforts thus far have been largely fragmented and frail, and two primary lessons from the past failures have become clear.
The April 2019 Israeli elections between incumbent Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his competitor Benny Gantz were fraught with tension even before external entities got involved. But when Israel’s internal security service, Shin Bet, revealed that suspected Iranian cyber actors had accessed Gantz’s mobile phone, there was yet another issue to contend with, albeit one not specific only to Israeli elections: interference.