Recalibrating U.S. Policy in Post-Sykes-Picot Era
This paper is part of a MEI scholar series titled “The Middle East and the 2016 Presidential Elections.”
This paper is part of a MEI scholar series titled “The Middle East and the 2016 Presidential Elections.”
Abstract
Introduction
Prior to the 2011 revolution, Egypt’s surprisingly independent and assertive judiciary had gained recognition among scholars, political opposition figures, and many in the NGO community for strength and activism in defense of democratic values and political rights.[1] As Nathan Brown wrote in 2008:
Jordan is yet to react publicly to a fresh land assault by Syrian regime forces, backed by Hezbollah and Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps fighters, against rebel-held towns in southern Syria.
This essay discusses the various barriers that inhibit local communities in densely populated, poor quarters in Cairo from taking action in order to improve the provision of basic services and the overall conditions in these neighborhoods.
Roughly five decades since the Soviet foray into the Middle East vis-à-vis the Czech arms deal with Egypt in September 1955, Russia is reasserting its influence in Egypt. The deal marked the beginning of a brief period that saw Moscow serve as the primary military supplier for a number of regional countries that formed an ‘anti-imperialist front’, such as Egypt, Iraq, and Syria.
Despite its preferences, the United States is quietly increasing and modifying its military deployment in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula in response to the growing threat posed by ISIS.
Mr. Secretary,
No one has worked harder than you to find a way to bring all sides together to stop the Syrian civil war and muster more international action against the Islamic State. But as a former colleague, let me caution that without some major adjustments in its approach to the Syrian peace talks in Vienna, the Obama administration is headed down another dead end.
The Ceasefire Challenge
This article was first published in The Hoover Institution’s The Caravan.
Daesh or ISIS does not represent an existential threat to any state except Syria and Iraq. It occupies and controls ungoverned space in the region between Iraq and Syria and in parts of northern Africa; and its self-proclaimed Caliphate has benefited from the seizure of some income producing assets in these areas. Daesh depends on the dynamism of success and expansion, both of which have been in short supply of late.
On the rooftop of a three-story brick building tucked inside a dusty alley of ‘Izbat al-Nasr, a poor and informal neighborhood southeast of Cairo, Leila Hussein crouches, tending to the basil and rocket she grows. The incessant cackling of geese, chickens, and pigeons emanating from the roof of a similarly run-down, red brick structure opposite the street gives an eerie, rural soundtrack to her meticulous work.
The shooting down of a Russian SU-24 by Turkey on November 24 has ratcheted the Syrian crisis to a new level of urgency. This escalation, combined with the horrific attacks in Paris and the security situation still unfolding across Europe, is understandably dominating the news cycle. Amidst this tumult, however, the results of the Vienna Summit of November 14 have been largely buried. In truth, the downing of the Russian fighter and the massacre in Paris underscore the importance of looking again at what came out of the Vienna talks and what steps the U.S.
The Egyptian state today faces one acute crisis after the other. To be fair, the Egyptian military cannot be held responsible for creating these crises. However, it is unlikely that Egypt will be able to resolve them unless and until the armed forces divests itself of the power and the privileges associated with the immense economic power and privileges it has accumulated.
This article was first published on The World Post.
Under the pall cast by the horrific terrorist attacks in Paris, the U.S., Russia and other world powers met in Vienna Saturday and agreed on a timetable for a political process in Syria. However, the principles and steps they set conjure a sense of déjà vu.
This piece was co-authored by Chester Crocker, the James R. Schlesinger Professor of Strategic Studies at Georgetown University’s Walsh School of Foreign Service. Read the full article at The National Interest.