Research & Commentary Results

This article first appeared in The National Interest.

In Iraq, the Islamic State (ISIS) is no longer on the offensive. That is particularly true on the Kurdish front in the north where the ISIS onslaught is now contained.

The Iraqi Kurdish military, the Peshmerga, proved to have the capability to repel the extremist Sunni fighters from ISIS and to hang on to recaptured territory. They have done so largely without many resources or support from West.

Egyptian President Abdul-Fattah el-Sisi is no Zionist, as senior Israeli interlocutors like to point out, but his vision of state sovereignty and Egyptian national security often closely aligns with the interests of Israel. When Sinai’s Ansar Beit al-Maqdis, Egypt’s most lethal jihadi group, recently pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, perhaps the most interesting response was the non-response by the governments of Egypt and Israel. From the view of both, the origins and ideologies of Islamist groups are all the same.

There’s an expression in Israel along the lines of “people are scrupulously honest with pollsters, then they get into the voting booth and lie like hell.” It is important to bear this chestnut in mind as one scans survey returns regarding prospects for the major parties in the upcoming elections.

2014 Annual Conference:   Banquet  |  Conference  |  Luncheon

2014 Annual Conference:   Banquet  |  Conference  |  Luncheon

2014 Annual Conference:   Banquet  |  Conference  |  Luncheon

This paper is part of an MEI scholar series, titled “Obama’s Legacy in the Middle East: Passing the Baton in 2017.” Click here to view the full project, or navigate using the table of contents to the right.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has gone through a number of different phases in its long history. It is possible—though only time will tell—that a new phase is beginning now, but not a particularly hopeful one.[1]

Historians and anthropologists have focused on Muslim networks of scholars, merchants, and pilgrims that connect the Middle East with Southeast Asia. Especially with respect to the study of Islam in Indonesia, where political scientists and anthropologists approach Islam largely in terms of national politics and local cultures, this burgeoning body of literature on global Muslim networks offers both ethnographic insights into actual practices and an historical appreciation for the longue durée. The importance of this scholarship notwithstanding, much of this work focuses on formal networks of migration, trade, learning, and pilgrimage. In this respect, the cultural and political work of Islam has been largely confined to the study of either Muslim scholars or lay Muslims who participate in trade, travel, study, and migration. Here I shift the focus to a religious diplomacy tour that connected Muslims with states, citizen-believers, and global politics.

This paper is part of an MEI scholar series, titled “Obama’s Legacy in the Middle East: Passing the Baton in 2017.” Click here to view the full project, or navigate using the table of contents to the right.

This summer’s war between Israel and Hamas, like the previous rounds — Operation Cast Lead in 2008-2009 and Operation Pillar of Cloud in 2012 — exacted a terrible cost not only in human lives (more than 2,100 Palestinians and 73 Israelis[1]) but also in the wholesale destruction of Gaza’s infrastructure.  The Palestinian Authority estimates reconstruction and rehabilitation costs of the recent conflict to exceed $4 billion, more than two times Gaza’s GNP.[2]

In his speech on September 10 President Obama characterized the Islamic State (ISIS) as a terrorist group.[1] There were clear political benefits to using this label, not the least of which was to facilitate the formation of a broad-based military coalition against the organization.

The following is the written testimony prepared and delivered by Amb (ret) Robert S. Ford for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing held on September 17, 2014. Click here to watch video of the full hearing (Amb. Ford’s testimony begins at the 3 hours and 26 minutes mark).

This article was first published by The National Interest.

The conventional wisdom in Washington is that Tehran regards Sunni-jihadist movements as ideologically incompatible rivals. This is not surprising, as the bulk of Sunni-jihadist literature makes it clear that Shia-majority Iran is considered to be the embodiment of apostasy. To most Sunni jihadists, including those from ISIS, Iran is an archenemy surpassing both Israel and the United States.