The Coming Debate Over the US Military Presence in the Gulf

The war with Iran is hardly over, but the debate over the shape and nature of the post-conflict American posture in the Gulf region is just beginning. Undoubtedly, how the war ends will affect how the United States adjusts its role. While this debate is still in its early stages, something of a conventional wisdom is already developing in policy circles that could seriously compromise American influence in the Middle East. It is increasingly assumed by many observers that the US military presence in the Gulf states, exposed to significant damage by Iran in the current war, has outlived its usefulness. Either American forces need to be redeployed further away from Iran, in Jordan, Israel, and western Saudi Arabia, or they should leave the region completely for an “over-the-horizon” presence that will reduce their exposure to Iranian attack and lessen Washington’s involvement in the tortuous politics of the Middle East. The advantages of these proposed redeployments are seen as obvious; their potential costs are underplayed or ignored. Coming on the heels of the recent withdrawals of much smaller deployments in Syria and Iraq, such proposals provide more proof for those who urge, believe in, or worry about an American “withdrawal” from the Gulf and even the Middle East as a whole. They go too far. Rather than accepting the inevitability of such a withdrawal, a better option would be a prudent reconsideration of the US basing structure in the Gulf, engaged in jointly with the Gulf states that continue to want to host and support the American presence.

The emerging conventional wisdom on the US troop presence is dramatically presented by the cover story in the September 26 edition of The Economist, “When America Walks Away”— not “If America Walks Away.” And in an August 6 article for Foreign Affairs, still the ultimate expression of mainstream domestic debate on international issues, former Obama and Biden administration foreign policy official Michael Fuchs calls for a complete withdrawal of the American military from the region. Other versions of this position are not as dramatic, urging not complete withdrawal but a redeployment to safer positions. Dana Stroul, who served as deputy assistant secretary of defense for the Middle East in the Biden administration, argued in the July/August issue of Foreign Affairs for a western redeployment in the region, away from the Persian Gulf. The New York Times reported on October 7 that “inside the Pentagon there is little interest in rebuilding” the Gulf bases damaged by Iranian attacks, positing that “they will be moved farther away, if Congress grants the funding.”

This emerging consensus that the United States neither will nor should maintain its presence in the Gulf was brought home to me during a webinar in which I participated at the University of Maryland in late September. Both the moderator and one of my fellow panelists, respected Middle East experts and frequent commentators on US policy in the region, spoke as if it were inevitable that one of the consequences of the 2026 Iran war would be the end of the exposed American military position in the Gulf.

This conventional wisdom train is picking up speed, but its roll needs to be seriously slowed. There is no question that the American military bases and facilities in the Gulf states have been severely damaged by Iran in this war. They cannot be reconstructed on the old model. But the assumptions underlying the arguments for either withdrawal or redeployment are questionable, and the consequences of such moves are largely underplayed or ignored.

What the Gulf States Actually Want

A prominent assumption in the arguments for withdrawal or redeployment is that the Gulf states themselves have lost confidence in the United States and probably do not want US forces to stick around. These bases just turn their countries into targets and drag them into conflicts of which they do not want to be a part. There are voices in the Gulf that make this kind of assertion. However, it is not one repeated by any of the Gulf governments. The leaders of those countries certainly resent the lack of consultation from the Trump administration before the war and worry about American reliability going forward. However, none of them has called for the kind of divorce that would be implied by their asking the United States military to leave their countries. On the contrary, their reliance on their American security relationships has been highlighted by the war. They have continued, even during the war, to deepen their security ties to Washington and call for more American help, as Saudi Arabia has done with the Houthis.

That said, many of the Gulf states are simultaneously seeking other security partners or new modi vivendi with old rivals in order to build resilience into their strategies and as insurance against a possible American withdrawal. Saudi Arabia has joined with Turkey and Pakistan in the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement, a security pact whose reach and implications remain unclear. The United Arab Emirates is doubling down on its military and political ties to Israel. Oman has expressed willingness to cooperate with Iran in the management of the Strait of Hormuz, and other Gulf states, including Qatar and the UAE, have also reached out to Iran even as the war continues. None of these moves, however, is a replacement for the core security relationship each Gulf state has with the US. They are not asking Washington to leave. On the contrary, they want the Americans to stay.

No Safe Haven to the West

It is certainly true that a westward regional deployment — out of the Gulf states to locations in Jordan, Israel, or western Saudi Arabia — would be somewhat safer. More flight time for Iranian missiles and drones provides a better chance of interception. However, the evidence of this war is that such a move is hardly a solution to exposure to attacks. Iran and its allies have been able to strike American bases in Jordan and Saudi Arabia, the American embassy in Riyadh, and energy facilities in western and southern Saudi Arabia, including the East-West Pipeline, which is essential for Saudi oil exports. Iran suffered more from its missile exchanges with Israel between 2024 and 2026 but was still able to hit Israeli targets. It even allegedly managed a drone attack on Egypt’s Damietta Port that damaged two ships loading natural gas. Redeployment to the west is no guarantee of safety for US personnel and equipment.

The Price of Leaving

It is foolish to think that the United States can maintain the same level of influence in the Gulf countries if its bases in those countries are shuttered. No matter how many times officials in Washington and local embassies reassure Gulf partners of ongoing American commitment, without real skin in the game no one in the region — friend or foe — will believe those words. Gulf leaders and citizens have come to understand that when the United States seeks to truly deepen a security relationship, it demonstrates that resolve with a physical military presence, as it does in Europe, South Korea, and Japan. The construction of the American basing system around the Persian Gulf after the 1990-91 Gulf War became tangible evidence of Washington’s long-term commitment to security there. The message sent by closing it down will be heard loud and clear.

The consequences of withdrawal or redeployment should not be minimized. Iran, already emboldened by its successes in this war, will be even more likely to use the threat of attack on its Arab neighbors to extract concessions from them. The smaller Gulf states, unable to defend themselves, will have to seek Iranian goodwill. Even Saudi Arabia, big enough to have the resources and geographic depth to match Iran at some levels, will be less likely to stand up to Tehran. Having to placate Iran will affect Gulf states’ decision-making not only on security issues but on oil policy and regional diplomacy as well. Expanding the Abraham Accords to other Gulf countries? Highly unlikely absent an American security umbrella. Reduced American influence in the region could also increase the chances that Saudi Arabia will more seriously pursue its own nuclear weapons program, particularly if Iran redoubles its own commitment to its nuclear program.

Rebuild, Don’t Retreat

There is an alternative to withdrawal or redeployment away from the Gulf. Washington should initiate a wide-ranging dialogue with its Gulf state partners about what a continued military presence should look like. There are already interesting and important interventions to this effect in the think-tank world. Smaller, harder, and better defended bases that can be activated in times of crisis make more sense than the large power-projection facilities that were easy targets for Iran. Dispersal of important storage facilities is also necessary. The location of the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain, where it can be bottled up or denied access through closure of the Strait of Hormuz, will have to be rethought. An alternative home port in Oman, outside the Persian Gulf, could be considered. The Gulf states, unlike Israel or Jordan, could be expected to contribute financially to this rebuilt, more resilient American presence, but only if they are full partners in the planning.

Commitment and Deterrence, Not Regime Change

Along with this rethinking of its military presence in the Gulf, Washington also needs to seriously consider just what the purpose of that presence should be. The regime-change wars that began in 2001 in Afghanistan, continued with Iraq in 2003, and culminated in the current war with Iran were all failures, even when they looked like immediate successes. Today, the United States needs to refocus on the goal for which those bases were originally intended back in the 1990s: to assure a regional status quo that protects the free flow of energy from the Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula to the world. US presence should be to demonstrate commitment to the security of the Gulf and deter adversaries from disrupting energy flows, not threaten them with regime-change wars that lead them, as we see in the current war, to abandon all restraint and attack the very energy lifelines we should be securing. Commitment and deterrence, not regime change, are the foundation on which Gulf partners will be much more likely to cooperate in the rebuilding of the US basing structure.

A refocus on commitment, deterrence, and protection of energy flows is also a necessary step to restoring bipartisan support for America’s regional military presence. The divisions and inconsistencies in domestic politics are more likely to force a decision to withdraw from the Gulf region than any regional pressures. A limited definition of America’s regional goals undergirded the bipartisan consensus on Gulf military presence through Democratic and Republican administrations from 1991 until recently. Therefore, a clear restatement of that original purpose, coupled with a rejection of attempts to force regime change that have eroded that consensus, is needed to provide both the international and the domestic support for a rebuilt and resilient military presence in an area of the world that remains vital to the world economy and American prosperity.

Gregory Gause III is an Associate Fellow at the Middle East Institute and Professor Emeritus of International Affairs at the Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University.

Photo by Senior Chief Petty Officer Amanda Dunford via US CENTCOM

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