The situation in the Red Sea is not getting better

For decades, the free flow of commerce and navigation in the Middle East was a central national security interest of the United States. Iran challenged this interest almost immediately after the revolutionary government came to power in 1979. Iranian actions at that time led to US responses like Operation Earnest Will, which brought together an array of joint military and civilian resources to successfully reflag and escort Kuwaiti tankers under threat from Iranian attacks in 1987 and 1988 — preserving the free flow of Gulf oil that was critical to our economy at the time.

During my tour as the commander (2016-2019) of US Central Command (CENTCOM), our naval ships were harassed by Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps fast boats dozens of times every month. But our forces’ demonstrated readiness to protect themselves, coupled with an effective public information campaign, brought the situation back under control. In October 2016, when the Iranian-backed Yemeni Houthis attacked USS Mason in the Red Sea, we decisively struck back against the group’s radar and missile sites. While those direct attacks stopped, the Houthis and Iran saw an opportunity for an asymmetric challenge — an opportunity they are exploiting today.

Since October 2023, US naval forces have been in combat against Iranian-supported Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, the Bab el-Mandab Strait, and the Gulf of Aden. According to Military Times, so far in July 2024, US forces (and partners) have destroyed two surface-to-air missiles, 22 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), nine sea-based surface drones, and three radar sites in Yemen or the Red Sea. Our naval forces are fighting intensely, given that the Houthis can launch their weapons at any time against any target, requiring the US Navy to maintain exceptional surveillance and readiness and often forcing responses measured in minutes and seconds.

On Saturday, an attack by a Houthi UAV, which hit an apartment building in Tel Aviv, was met with a significant counter-response the following day by the Israeli Defense Forces against the port of Hodeidah — a critical entry point handling supplies for the Houthis but also humanitarian aid for the people of Yemen. When combined with the continuing ability of the Houthis to generate attacks in the Red Sea, their drone strike against Tel Aviv was an unambiguous indication that our efforts to deter Iran and the Houthis are not working.

It must be recognized that we are no longer preserving a once vital US national security interest. The damage to commerce and navigation was almost immediate when the Houthis started their attacks on international shipping last fall. In the first three months after their activities commenced, the daily volume of goods transiting the Suez Canal and the Red Sea dropped from 565,000 twenty-foot equivalent container units (TEU) to 91,400 TEU. Shipping costs per container from the North American east coast went from about $2,500 to over $6,700 per container. Maritime transit around the Cape of Good Hope now adds 10-14 days to a vessel’s journey. None of this is changing and is in danger of becoming “normalized.”

Beyond all this, it could get worse. It is worth considering how the character of Houthi operations could change if, for example, Russia supplied them with advanced technology — like hypersonic weapons or artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities — rather than just anti-ship missiles, as some reports indicate. Whether we like it or not, the Russian-Houthi relationship is a symptom of great power competition, and how we move forward in our efforts to preserve a long-standing, vital national interest in this strategic theater is being closely watched by our adversaries and competitors.

Along with many others, I have written and spoken on this topic frequently since the start of the Gaza war. Let me reiterate three key areas where we should focus our efforts now to blunt the Houthis, hold Iran accountable, and restore this crucial national interest.

First, our strategic messaging must switch from “preventing the expansion of the current conflict” to “restoring freedom of commerce and navigation.” While I appreciate the reasoning behind our messaging to date, it is principally defensive. It conveys a reluctance to do what is necessary to preserve a vital national security interest.

Second, there is a need for a more holistic approach to the Houthis. Indeed, the US Armed Forces must have the authority and resources to blunt, disrupt, and destroy Houthi military capabilities. However, as we have seen in many other areas, there are limits to what missiles, jets, destroyers, and even boots on the ground can achieve. It is now time to more fully examine ways that the broader US government can help deny the Houthis the means and resources that are enabling their continued attacks in the Red Sea. Developing a comprehensive strategy and plan to restore freedom of commerce and navigation is necessary.

Finally, with a more comprehensive strategy and plan, we must double down on building more substantial international consensus and support to stop the Houthis’ malign activities as well as return to a more stabilized environment. Bahrain stands alone among regional nations in supporting Operation Prosperity Guardian — our international military effort in the Red Sea. We need more commitment not only in the region but globally as well. A new global focus must expand the military component but, more importantly, go beyond the current military operations and fully leverage the diplomatic, economic, and informational elements of power.

The current situation is not only intolerable — it is unsustainable. It is time to recognize that the Houthis, with strong and persistent support from Iran, are in a position to hold not only the US but virtually the entire global system hostage. A disruption of commerce and navigation is a situation we could see attempted in other locations, and we must demonstrate that the payoff for pursuing this approach does not outweigh the costs imposed. Our men and women in uniform are doing their part — but we must immediately bring all our resources to bear.

Gen. (ret.) Joseph L. Votel is the former US Central Command and US Special Operations Command Commanding General. He is a Distinguished Fellow in National Security at the Middle East Institute.

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