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Netanyahu shapes the battlefield — but for peace or large-scale escalation?

Paul Salem
Vice President for International Engagement

Paul Salem
  • The killing of Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran and the killing of a Hezbollah senior commander in Beirut could be designed to allow Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to declare some victories and move toward winding down the war in Gaza, or they may signal his intentions to escalate the conflict and possibly drag the US into a wider regional contest with Iran and Hezbollah.

  • Iran and Hezbollah are now under tremendous pressure to respond in kind, which would set off a massive escalatory spiral; to see off this risk, diplomats must engage in immediate crisis management, followed by real de-escalation.

Following the July 31 killing of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran and the July 30 killing of Hezbollah commander Fuad Shukr in Beirut, there has been much speculation about Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s strategy, coalescing around two possible explanations for the action:

  1. Assassinate leaders of Hamas and Hezbollah (with maybe a few more operations to follow), and hit both Tehran and Beirut, to show toughness to the Israeli public and prepare the ground for declaring victory and ending the war in Gaza from a position of strength; or,
  2. Escalate dramatically against Hezbollah and Iran in order to trigger a larger war and enable large-scale Israeli action against Hezbollah in Lebanon, including a limited ground invasion; and also trigger a retaliation and escalation with Iran, which would force the US — as happened in April — to join the military effort against Iran alongside Israel.

It is unclear whether any of these attacks were discussed or coordinated with Washington during Netanyahu’s visit last week. Whatever Netanyahu’s intentions or American foreknowledge, US domestic politics may well have informed Israel’s decision to hit both Beirut and Tehran.

Netanyahu was given a hero’s welcome in Congress and has a lame-duck ally in President Joe Biden. Vice President Kamala Harris will not be much of an ally if she is elected president, given the position she has staked out on the Gaza conflict. Former President Donald Trump has made clear in the past months that he urges Netanyahu to get the war over quickly, and he probably made the point to him during their recent meeting that he, Trump, does not want the war to be ongoing if and when he assumes office in January 2025. Netanyahu might recognize that he has the next few months to settle his scores with Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran, and he likely feels that the US has no option but to stand with him once the rockets start flying.

Iran and Hezbollah will be all but forced to retaliate for these latest attacks, and it is hard to imagine that they would aim at anything but a high-value target in Tel Aviv to demonstrate symmetry after attacks in Tehran and Beirut. That would result in automatic and major escalation.

In response, diplomats must engage in immediate and effective crisis management, followed by real de-escalation. This conflict could get much bigger and much wider very quickly, with implications for more countries in the region as well as the global economy.

Follow: @paul_salem

For Israelis, a surprising development, followed by a tense waiting period and an opportunity for strategic reassessment

Nimrod Goren
Senior Fellow for Israeli Affairs

Nimrod Goren
  • While the attack on a Hezbollah commander in Beirut was within the range of reasonable popular expectations following the strike on Majdal Shams, having it followed so swiftly by another major attack, against a Hamas leader and in Tehran, was beyond what people anticipated.

  • While many Israelis yearn for decisive action that will enable those displaced to return to their homes in the north, there is widespread concern over the prospect of a full-fledged war with Hezbollah, which might have devastating consequences.

The assassination of Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh came as a surprising piece of morning news for Israelis on July 31. Since the deadly attack on Majdal Shams on July 27, Israel was deliberating how best to retaliate against Hezbollah, and the general public was awaiting developments on the country's northern front.

This is not the first time in these long months of war in which there has been a tense waiting period between an attack and a counter-attack. The same thing happened around the exchange of strikes between Israel and Iran in April 2024.

While the attack on Hezbollah commander Fuad Shukr in Beirut on July 30 — for which Israel quickly claimed responsibility — was within the range of reasonable popular expectations, having it followed so swiftly by another major attack, against a Hamas leader and in Tehran, was beyond what people anticipated.

The public surprise was more about the timing of Haniyeh's assassination, which was likely impacted by his being outside of Qatar and Turkey, where Israel does not want to carry out such an attack, than about the principle of Israel targeting him.

Israel has publicly committed to going after each Hamas operative or leader who was involved in the Oct. 7 attack, Haniyeh included, even if it takes a long time. Israel responded in a similar way to the massacre of its athletes at the 1972 Olympics by the Palestinian Black September terror group, and also to Nazi war criminals in the early years of its existence as a state. This modality is well ingrained in the Israeli mindset.

A sense of accomplishment and satisfaction prevailed in Israel when the news from Beirut and Tehran broke. The attacks reminded Israelis of their country’s military achievements of the past, characterized by precise, surprising, far-reaching, courageous, and successful actions — the exact opposite of the failures associated with Oct. 7, and so distant from current domestic realities in light of the rise of the far-right.

But now the coin is about to flip. Israelis are entering yet another waiting period to see how Hezbollah — and maybe other “Axis of Resistance” actors as well — will respond, and what might come next. While many Israelis yearn for decisive action that will restore calm and enable those displaced to return to their homes in the north, there is widespread concern over the prospect of a full-fledged war with Hezbollah, which might have devastating consequences.

Targeted assassinations do not necessarily alter the strategic trajectory of events, although the recent ones will probably have a long-term impact. To benefit strategically from recent military achievements, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu should now change course — from a position of strength — and seal the hostage release and cease-fire deal that a majority of Israelis want.

However, taking into account Netanyahu's actions and messages during these past few months, it is unlikely that reaching such a deal is at the top of his agenda. In any case, the Haniyeh assassination will probably halt negotiations further, until the anticipated retaliatory cycle concludes. This will give the international community some time to reflect on why a deal has not been reached so far, and what can be done differently and better going forward.

In addition to the support that Israel's allies will provide it to counter any forthcoming attack by the Iran-led Axis of Resistance, they should also chart new diplomatic pathways to end the war in Gaza and diffuse Israel-Hezbollah tensions. President Joe Biden has committed to doing so in his remaining months in office, and it is a task that is becoming more urgent by the day.

Follow: @GorenNimrod

Israel pushes for all-out escalation with Haniyeh killing

Khaled Elgindy
Senior Fellow, Director of Program on Palestine and Palestinian-Israeli Affairs

Khaled Elgindy
  • Assassinating Hamas’s political leader in the Iranian capital only hours after taking out Hezbollah’s #2 in Beirut seems like a calculated decision to escalate on all three fronts simultaneously: Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran.

  • Ismail Haniyeh’s assassination is a significant — though likely not fatal — blow to Hamas, but it’s hard to see how the negotiations over a cease-fire and hostage release deal will recover from this.

Apart from the man-made famine, mass killing, and almost total destruction of Gaza, the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh may be the biggest development in the war thus far, with far reaching implications for Gaza and the region. Assassinating Hamas’s political leader in the Iranian capital only hours after taking out Hezbollah’s #2 in Beirut seems like a calculated decision to escalate on all three fronts simultaneously: Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran. If nothing else, these developments should put to rest the notion that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is interested in a cease-fire and hostage release deal or that he seeks to avoid all-out regional war. From Hamas’s perspective, Haniyeh’s assassination is a significant — though likely not fatal — blow to the group. Hamas has survived previous assassinations by Israel, and it will almost certainly survive this one. On the other hand, it’s hard to see how the cease-fire negotiations taking place under US/Egyptian/Qatari auspices will recover from this. As Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani recently stated, “how can mediation succeed when one party assassinates the negotiator on the other side?"

The question now is how the United States will respond to this latest crisis. According to Secretary of State Antony Blinken, the United States was not informed of the operation beforehand, which is a major embarrassment for the administration and is likely to further strain the already rocky relationship between Netanyahu and the Biden administration. The fact that the Israelis would leave Washington in the dark on a major operation with such far-reaching implications for the entire region, despite the billions in military aid provided by the US and the virtually unconditional support the administration has provided throughout the war, raises serious questions about the nature of the special relationship as well as whether Netanyahu may be trying to force the hand of a weakened, lame-duck US president. Moreover, it also casts further doubt on the effectiveness of Biden’s “bear hug” approach with Israel, which not only has failed to contain the war or prevent escalation but could ultimately draw the US into a broader conflict in the region, particularly with Iran.

Follow: @elgindy_

For Tehran, Haniyeh assassination raises major questions about Israeli infiltration

Alex Vatanka
Director of Iran Program and Senior Fellow, Black Sea Program

Alex Vatanka
  • Before Iran does anything to retaliate for the killing of Ismail Haniyeh, it first needs to answer one central question: Just how badly has Israel infiltrated the Iranian intelligence and security services?

  • The Haniyeh assassination points to an Israeli operational capability that surely means that no target — including top Iranian regime figures — is out of Mossad’s reach. 

Just a few days before the July 31 assassination of Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, the outgoing Iranian Intelligence Minister Esmail Khatib was asked in a television interview what his greatest successes were. He surely must regret his answer now. He proudly proclaimed that the “dismantlement of the Mossad network in Iran” was his crowning achievement. That clearly has not happened. The Israeli intelligence service has not taken credit for the strike that killed Haniyeh but that’s standard Israeli practice for operations in Iran. 

Going forward, there is much speculation about what the assassination might mean. Is this the moment where Iran finally unchains its regional proxy network of militant groups, from Hezbollah to the Houthis and other Arab militant groups in between, to throw everything it has at Israel? Would that be the start of a regional war that sucks the Americans and others into a broader conflict with the potential to be more destructive than anything the Middle East has seen before? 

Only time will tell but surely before Iran does anything to retaliate it first needs to answer one central question: Just how badly has Israel infiltrated the Iranian intelligence and security services? With this level of uncertainty around Mossad’s infiltration of the regime, officials in Tehran would have good grounds to first do some house-cleaning before taking any major action against Israel.

Surely part of Mossad’s rationale for this strike is to change minds in Tehran. The service has a long track record of assassinating enemies of Israel, and Haniyeh was certainly on the hit list. But to assassinate him in Tehran, reportedly in a compound that is under the control of the Revolutionary Guards, and to do so a day after the inauguration of Iran’s new president when Tehran was on a high security alert, speaks volumes about Mossad’s long reach. This is not news to the Iranians. Another Iranian intelligence minister, Ali Younesi, put it this way in 2021 when speaking about Mossad’s infiltration: “Officials in Iran need to worry about their lives.” The intelligence and the ability needed to strike Haniyeh points to an operational capability that surely means that no target — including top Iranian regime figures — is out of Mossad’s reach. 

Will the regime’s top leadership in Tehran change course on Israel, for self-preservation if nothing else? That is highly unlikely, at least in terms of official policy. Enmity toward Israel is the most sacred pillar of the Islamic Republic. And while Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s vow of revenge can only mean there will be some kind of response from Tehran and its proxies, the regime surely first has to pause and reassess before making any serious new commitments to the fight against Israel.

Follow: @AlexVatanka

With the Haniyeh assassination, Netanyahu fulfills his hopes and dashes Biden’s

Gerald M. Feierstein
Director, Arabian Peninsula Affairs Program, and Distinguished Sr. Fellow on U.S. Diplomacy

Gerald M. Feierstein
  • The killing of Ismail Haniyeh has dashed the prospects of a Gaza cease-fire and hostage release deal for the foreseeable future.

  • The Israeli attack on Iranian territory strengthens Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and has significant implications for both President Joe Biden and Vice President Kamala Harris.

The brazen Israeli strike that killed Ismail Haniyeh on July 31 while he visited Tehran for the inauguration of the new Iranian president undoubtedly dashed any prospect of a successful conclusion to ongoing Gaza cease-fire and hostage release talks for the foreseeable future. By doing so, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu advanced his key project to safeguard his political future. In particular, the killing:

  • Strengthens Hamas’s militant wing at the expense of its political leadership and ensures that the Gaza conflict will continue;
  • Humiliates Iran, increasing the likelihood that Iran and its proxies will step up their attacks on Israel; and
  • Coupled with the July 30 attack on Beirut’s suburbs targeting senior Hezbollah commander Fuad Shukr, increases pressure on Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah to respond more aggressively to Israeli operations, raising the possibility of a more violent confrontation on Israel’s northern border.

Coming days after Netanyahu’s visit to Washington, the elimination of Haniyeh also embarrasses President Joe Biden, who has declared that ending the Gaza conflict is one of, if not the highest, of his priorities for the remainder of his term in office. The administration cannot be in the position of condemning the attack. After all, Haniyeh has been, since 2018, on the US Specially Designated Global Terrorist List, cited by the State Department as a “proponent of armed struggle, including against civilians.” But for all the reasons noted above, the administration will be concerned that the risks of an all-out regional conflict have increased substantially, bringing with it the possibility that the US will be dragged into the conflict militarily.

Similarly, the attack poses a dilemma for Vice President Kamala Harris as she works to build a winning coalition for her presidential campaign. Like the president, she will certainly see the need to reiterate US support for Israeli self-defense. But, as she did in her meeting with Netanyahu, she will also need to express concern for the implications for Palestinians, including the likely increased death and destruction in Gaza that the attack will bring. How she balances the two competing requirements will have an impact on her election prospects going forward as well as on her conduct of US foreign and defense policies in the Middle East should she be elected.

Photo: Handout photo by the Iranian Presidency via Getty Images


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