Last week, representatives from around 70 countries convened in Paris to pledge nearly $1 billion in aid for Lebanon, including approximately $740 million for humanitarian support and $200 million for the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). Spearheading this initiative, France sought to position itself as a longstanding friend of Lebanon. However, the absence of US Secretary of State Antony Blinken served as a reminder that while France may aim to champion Lebanon on the global stage, it is Washington, not Paris, that ultimately wields the leverage necessary to shape the country’s future — leverage it has yet to use.
By sending a lower-level delegation, the United States delivered a pointed message. Despite France’s display of empathy for the suffering caused by the humanitarian crisis unfolding in Lebanon, achieving a political solution that can secure lasting change will require more than providing aid. The US alone wields sufficient leverage to influence Israel, which currently controls the escalation ladder, to accept a political solution over a military one. Washington is also uniquely positioned to compel Iran, Hezbollah’s patron, to concede that Lebanon can no longer serve as its frontline against Israel. This is not to suggest that France has no role to play; rather, it highlights that while France can join a broad coalition that includes regional partners to galvanize global support, only the US can seal the deal to end this war. But to do so, Washington needs to actually commit to a Lebanon policy.
France and the US should work together to summon the political will needed to craft and implement a lasting political solution — one that can effectively safeguard against future wars between Israel and Lebanon. While differences between the two remain, a pragmatic path forward involves directing their joint diplomatic efforts toward addressing the demands of a majority of the Lebanese people for a functioning democratic state that can disentangle Lebanon from regional conflict and serve as a credible partner — a partner they used to have in 2006 but simply do not today.
Under President Emmanuel Macron, France’s approach to Lebanon has eroded much of its historic support. By treating Hezbollah's security dominion as an unchangeable status quo rather than confronting it, Macron has undermined Lebanon’s sovereignty and weakened France’s influence. This policy also ignored the potential regional security risks that are now unfolding as Hezbollah has been allowed to batter the Lebanese state into failure, transforming the country into a strategic base for the Axis of Resistance.
Despite these setbacks, French policy toward Lebanon appears fixed on containment rather than comprehensive solutions. For effective cooperation to secure the very difficult task of advancing a viable political solution to end this war, both Washington and Paris must tackle Lebanon’s core problems head-on. France is currently advocating for a cease-fire, having previously proposed a three-week truce in September that was quickly rejected by the conflict’s stakeholders. France seems to be operating under a playbook similar to the one used in 2006, calling for the full implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1701 and increased support for the LAF and the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to enforce it. The European Union’s foreign policy chief, Josep Borrell, echoed this sentiment, asserting, “Let’s not reinvent the wheel. We have to make it work.”
Yet from Washington’s perspective, that wheel has never turned. Nearly two decades of failed attempts at stabilization demonstrate that more of the same will not secure Lebanon’s future, it will only reproduce the same failed dynamics that have persisted since 2006.
Both France and the EU are correct in emphasizing that military action will not bring lasting security. Israel’s 1982 invasion illustrates this point: while tactical — even decisive — victories may be achievable against groups like the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) then or Hezbollah today, such military interventions ultimately create vacuums that external actors, particularly Iran and Syria, effectively exploit to find a way back in. The fragility of the Lebanese state and fluctuating international support have historically enabled these powers to assert their influence.
At the same time, the post-2006 landscape highlights the unsustainability of turning a blind eye to the existence of Hezbollah’s arms. Only one year after UNSCR 1701 was adopted, six peacekeepers were killed in a targeted explosion. By 2008, Hezbollah's military takeover of Beirut effectively killed the prospects of any implementation of the resolution. The lesson from 2006, which is especially relevant today, is clear: as long as the Lebanese government remains beholden to Hezbollah, the terms of any agreement will not be enforced, setting the stage for an unending cycle of conflict. And the uncomfortable truth diplomats must reckon with is that an independent state cannot exist while Hezbollah keeps its arms. The consequences of ignoring this after 2006 were not just the loss of Lebanon as a viable state and partner but also the creation of conditions that enabled Hezbollah to commit mass atrocities against Syrians and Palestinians with impunity and train the Iranian proxies that today make up the so-called Unity of the Fronts.
France has yet to offer a plan for implementing UNSCR 1701, much less a framework for how the wheel could turn while Hezbollah remains armed. Pledges from Hezbollah to comply, after nearly two decades of demonstrating a clear commitment to undermining 1701, must not be taken at face value. French Armed Forces Minister Sébastien Lecornu’s unfounded warning of an “imminent civil war” evades the central fact that Hezbollah’s unchecked arsenal and the failure of international diplomacy that prioritizes stabilization over resolution have already dragged Lebanon into a catastrophic war. It is Hezbollah’s arms — not its disarmament — that hold Lebanon hostage, pushing it toward endless war and state failure.
The disarmament of Hezbollah is not just a requirement for Lebanon's survival; it is the linchpin of any credible political solution to end this war. But it must be achieved through a locally driven, legitimate process backed by broad and committed international support, not one simply aimed at securing Israeli security interests.
Washington and Paris need not reinvent the wheel; they must finally follow through on their commitment to UNSCR 1559, which, echoing the Taif Accords, calls for the disarmament of all militias in Lebanon.
In a world at war, it is tempting for diplomats in Europe and the US to avoid dealing with Lebanon. But political alternatives to war do not materialize from loud, empty calls for decades-old UN resolutions; they must be forged with intention and resolve. Europe is right to insist that there is no military solution that ends in lasting security. Washington, too, must present a credible political strategy that can both stop a major Israeli invasion and pull Lebanon free from the security dominion of Hezbollah and Iran. Half-hearted calls for a cease-fire will fail to stop those pursuing maximalist military victories, as we have seen over the past year. While bolstering the strength of UNIFIL or expanding the size of the LAF can contribute positively, the effectiveness of these organizations hinges on the underlying credibility of the Lebanese state. In no uncertain terms, any political solution must prioritize the establishment of a legitimate Lebanese government that reflects the will of its people — one capable of ensuring that Lebanon and Israel never go to war again.
This shared vision for a stable, sovereign Lebanon must echo the strategic unity demonstrated when the US and France rallied in support of the Lebanese people and the Lebanese state through UNSCR 1559 and 1701.
Fadi Nicholas Nassar is the US-Lebanon Fellow at the Middle East Institute in Washington, DC, and an assistant professor in political science and international affairs and director of the Institute for Social Justice and Conflict Resolution at the Lebanese American University.
Photo by ALAIN JOCARD/POOL/AFP via Getty Images
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