Alex Vatanka is a Senior Fellow at the Middle East Institute. He specializes in Middle Eastern regional security affairs with a particular focus on Iran. He was formerly a Senior Analyst at Jane’s Information Group in London. Alex is also a Senior Fellow in Middle East Studies at the US Air Force Special Operations School (USAFSOS) at Hurlburt Field and teaches as an Adjunct Professor at DISAS at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base. He has testified before the US Congress and lectured widely for both governmental and commercial audiences, including the US Departments of State and Defense, US intelligence agencies, and a list of international corporations.
Born in Tehran, he holds a BA in Political Science (Sheffield University, UK), and an MA in International Relations (Essex University, UK), and is fluent in Farsi and Danish. He is the author of two books: The Battle of the Ayatollahs in Iran: The United States, Foreign Policy and Political Rivalry Since 1979 (2021) and Iran and Pakistan: Security, Diplomacy, and American Influence (2015).
He has also written chapters for a number of books, including Authoritarianism Goes Global (2016); Handbook on Contemporary Pakistan (2017); Russia in the Middle East (2018), Winning the Battle, Losing the War: Addressing the Drivers Fueling Armed Non-state Actors and Extremist Groups (2020); Global, Regional and Local Dynamics in the Yemen Crisis (2020); Routledge Handbook of Counterterrorism and Irregular Warfare Operations (2021); and Understanding New Proxy Wars (2022). He is presently working on his third book, Iran’s Arab Strategy: Defending the Homeland or Exporting Khomeinism?
Education
B.A. in Political Science at Sheffield University; M.A. in International Relations at Essex University
Languages
Farsi, Danish
Countries of Expertise
Iran
Issues of Expertise
Iran domestic and foreign affairs, Iranian military and security forces, Iran-US relations, Political Islam in Middle East
Two weeks ahead of critical elections, President Hassan Rouhani can boast of achieving two of his key election pledges from 2013: He secured a groundbreaking diplomatic nuclear deal with world powers and has removed crippling sanctions on the country. Rouhani should, therefore, feel confident ahead of the Feb. 26 vote and see himself as well on course to winning re-election in 2017.
Why Pakistan Is the Biggest Winner in the Iranian-Saudi Dispute
Saudi Arabia is back, knocking on Pakistan’s door. Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir and King Salman bin Abdulaziz al-Saud’s son and deputy crown prince, Mohammad bin Salman, arrived separately in the early days of the new year to persuade Islamabad to join hands with Riyadh in confronting regional security threats. That is, the Saudis want Pakistan’s support against Iran.
Saudi Arabia’s execution of prominent Shi’a cleric, Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr, is a gift in disguise to Iran’s hardliners seeking to undermine President Hassan Rouhani’s administration, and rally support ahead of key elections in February.
Although Saudi officials have insisted Iran is interfering in its internal affairs with its vociferous condemnation of the execution, Iranians, particularly the hardliners, saw the act as a direct provocation.
Critics of the July 14 nuclear deal with Iran railed against it on the grounds that it would embolden what they argue is Tehran’s destabilizing behavior in the Middle East. The reasoning goes like this: lifting sanctions gives Iran access to tens of billions of dollars that will flow to fund disruptive activities and lets Iran freely pursue its regional ambitions without fear of reprisals.
Russian President Vladimir Putin made waves leading into the UN General Assembly with new military deployments to Syria and an accord with Iran and the Iraqi government, signaling the formation of something like an alternate coalition combating ISIS. The sudden moves serve as a wakeup call not only for the United States and its allies, but also for Iran. The Russian actions are not enough to lead the Iranians to openly second-guess their support for Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad, but they are bound to raise tough questions among officials in Tehran.
Looking to capitalize on the momentum from the July 14 nuclear deal, the moderate government of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani is now seeking ways to reduce tensions with its regional rivals, particularly Saudi Arabia. This is no small task. Not only must Rouhani convince his domestic critics that mending ties with their arch rival is in Iran’s interest, but he must also get a read on Riyadh’s new leader, King Salman, and the ruling elite.
In the United States the nuclear deal with Iran has become a political football of historic proportions, but that hasn’t been the case in Iran. Why not? Most likely it is because for Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, there is no viable alternative to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). It’s a choice between a deal with the world community or more isolation and economic pain, as well as the social-political uncertainty at home that could come with it.
Iran Nuclear Deal: A Platform for Future Cooperation?
MEI interviewed Senior Fellow Alex Vatanka about the historic nuclear agreement between Iran and the P5+1 that was reached on July 14, 2015, and how it may impact regional dynamics and the long-term relationship between Iran and the West.
As the June 30 deadline for a nuclear deal between Iran and the P5+1 approaches, the world is eagerly following the fortunes of political moderate figures in Tehran. Can the Cabinet of President Hassan Rouhani overcome any last-minute roadblocks put up by hardliners in either Tehran or in Washington? One member of Rouhani’s cabinet, Minister of Petroleum Bijan Namdar Zangeneh, is arguably more vested than anyone else in hoping for a positive result from the talks. …
Beyond Sanctions: The Factional Nuclear Split in Tehran
As the world awaits the outcome of the June 30 deadline for a deal between Tehran and the P5+1, the Iranians continue to weigh their options. While the nature of the nuclear debate in Tehran is not as rowdy as the one in Washington, it still features competition between two distinct worldviews about Iran’s place in the world, namely whether the deal should ultimately result in closer relations with the United States.
Relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia have always been thorny, but rarely has the state of affairs been as venomous as it is today.
Tehran and Riyadh each point to the other as the main reason for much of the turmoil in the Middle East. In its most recent incarnation, the Iranian-Saudi conflict by proxy has reached Yemen in a spiral that both sides portray as climatic.
