Attiya Ahmad

Political manipulation of cultural heritage is a powerful tool in the armory of soft power. Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad understands this well, as does Russia’s President Vladimir Putin and Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

Over the next few days, European Union leaders will meet to discuss potential sanctions against Turkey based on Ankara’s aggressive energy claims against EU members Greece and Cyprus. Conflicting interests within the EU itself will likely preclude the bloc from actually imposing sanctions. But at the core of the recent crisis between Greece and Turkey lies a dangerous ideological model—not a mere dispute over energy resources.

On September 15, President Trump presided over a ceremony on the South Lawn of the White House where Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel and the foreign ministers of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain, Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan and Abdullatif Al Zayani, respectively, signed a general declaration of principles, called “The Abraham Accords.” Numerous analysts have focused on the regional impact of the normalization of relations between Israel and these two Gulf Arab countries. However, this development has worldwide geopolitical implications — including for China.

The ongoing intra-Afghan talks confirm, without a doubt, that the Taliban is negotiating from a position of remarkable strength. After being overthrown by the military of the world’s sole superpower two decades ago, the Taliban’s resurgence is a perfect example of what happens when a counterinsurgency campaign fails to eliminate its target’s safe havens. The Doha negotiations have also underlined the ugly reality of the Afghan conflict — that firepower alone cannot crush an insurgency when its narrative has some resonance with the local people.

The agreement with Iran could end up being the first major foray of many that gave Beijing a long reach into the Middle East at the expense of the United States, and even Russia.

This week’s briefing on recent news and upcoming events in the region featuring Marvin G. Weinbaum, Charles Lister, Hafsa Halawa, Bilal Y. Saab, Anthony Elghossain, and Michael Sexton.

Essentially what we are witnessing is a struggle by two sets of international coalitions to control the mediation process.

Energy transition is the shift from burning fossil fuels for electricity, heating, cooking, or transportation, to low carbon generation such as nuclear facilities or wind and solar power plants. For all countries, the energy transition process is laborious and raises challenging financial and social concerns. But this process comes with additional geopolitical dilemmas in a region such as the Black Sea basin.

Understanding President Donald J. Trump’s position on Iran over the two remaining months until the November election is no feat for the fainthearted. Depending on the source to which one subscribes, Trump is either provoking conflict with Iran or working a secret back channel to secure a deal, both variables purportedly intended to support his election prospects. So which is it? Or can it be both?

Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have initiated a process that, if it comes to fruition, will bring about the normalization of relations between the two countries. The broader geostrategic challenges that the agreement could pose for Israel and the UAE have not been part of the public discourse, however, and any balanced treatment requires a discussion of those aspects as well.

In an Aug. 13 tweet, U.S. President Donald Trump celebrated the Israeli-Emirati accord to normalize relations as a “HUGE breakthrough.” Israel’s integration into the region has been a goal of U.S. and Israeli foreign policy for decades, and the mid-August announcement was the first major official step in that direction in over 25 years. But is this really a game changer for Israel’s strategy in the Middle East?

Foreign fighters have played a major role in Syria’s ongoing conflict, with a presence in the country that numbered in the tens of thousands at its peak. One of the most mythologized sources of foreign recruits has been Chechnya, the once-separatist province of Russia’s North Caucasus that was reconquered by the Russian army in the early 2000s. Several thousand Chechen fighters traveled to Syria to fight in various opposition and Islamist factions, where their battlefield prowess made them a prized commodity among Syrian rebel militants.

Since the inception of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013, China has substantially expanded its political, legal, trade, economic, educational, scientific, and cultural presence in the Black Sea region. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has pursued various initiatives with the littoral states to open new markets for Chinese goods, acquire local industries through loans and investments, and most importantly build infrastructure connecting China with Europe and the Middle East via the Black Sea.

The latest figures from the Pentagon indicate that the total number of COVID-19 cases among members of the U.S. military has topped 60,000 since the onset of the pandemic. COVID-19 and other similar outbreaks could become an increasingly important consideration in the calculus of future military deployments. They could add impetus to the Pentagon’s development of lethal autonomous weapons or at least be cited as a perfect reason to do so. This could, in turn, have significant implications for the future of both U.S. military operations in the Middle East and the U.S. military presence in the region.

A great deal of the literature on China’s relations with the Middle East engages the subject through geopolitical analyses that are based mainly, if not exclusively on Western sources and perspectives. This article draws on the work of scholars and thinkers in China’s leading government and party-linked think tanks and foreign policy institutions to shed light on China’s interests and approach to the region — a “competition without confrontation” approach centered on the development of relationships with a select number of key Middle Eastern states that can serve as “strategic fulcrums” (战略支点) for building Chinese influence.