Fatima Sadiqi

This is a capstone paper for a series of MEI scholar articles titled “The Middle East and the 2016 Presidential Elections.”

In a stunning electoral comeback that has surprised everyone, including its own legislators, Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) captured almost 50 percent of the votes, but well over 50 percent of parliamentary seats, in Sunday’s elections. There are many lingering questions. Considering that even the pro-government pollsters did not foresee such a victory, many have asked whether the elections were free and fair. If so, how did the AKP manage to reverse its electoral fortunes in just five months in a country that has been mired in chaos and violence during that time?

Read the full article at The National Interest.

Critics of the July 14 nuclear deal with Iran railed against it on the grounds that it would embolden what they argue is Tehran’s destabilizing behavior in the Middle East. The reasoning goes like this: lifting sanctions gives Iran access to tens of billions of dollars that will flow to fund disruptive activities and lets Iran freely pursue its regional ambitions without fear of reprisals.

The Turkish electorate is going to the polls on Sunday for the second time in just over five months. After 13 years in power, the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) failed to secure enough votes in June to form a majority government. In the hope another vote could deliver a parliamentary majority to his party, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan called for snap elections. But polls indicate that Erdogan might not get what he wants.

As Secretary of State John Kerry seeks to launch a new peace effort on Syria, he needs to be careful about the goals he sets and the language he uses. Getting the fundamentals wrong at the outset might scuttle the process or could ensure that whatever deal results will crumble under pressure.  It will then lead to more warfare and a worsening of the refugee crisis. Moreover, it would preclude us from securing our strategic goal of mobilizing more Syrians to contain and eventually expel terrorists from Syria.

In the past ten days Egypt held a first round of parliamentary elections, announced renewed loan talks with the IMF, experienced new clashes with militants in the Sinai, and joined multinational talks to end the war in Syria. These headlines provide current glimpses into the country’s complex and challenging political, economic and security trajectories.

Sunni-Shi’i relations have not always been conflict-ridden nor was sectarianism a strong political force in modern Muslim politics until relatively recently. What factors contributed to this change? In this essay, the author argues that the national context is essential for understanding sectarian conflict in the Middle East today.

Read the full Issue Brief published by the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center.

President Barack Obama has notoriously disparaged the moderate opposition as “farmers or dentists or maybe some radio reporters who didn’t have a lot of experience fighting.” The key question about the Syrian opposition is not whether it can fight — in fact many of its cadres are former Syrian army soldiers — but whether it can govern.

Formal organizations can be easily studied, but they alone will not bring about democratization: the conceptual history of civil society scholarship in the Middle East is testament to this. We must instead peer into hidden spaces of resistance not captured by the formal sector.

A recent United Nations report warned that the Gaza Strip might become “uninhabitable” by 2020 for its 1.8 million residents.[1] Serious changes must be implemented as soon as possible to reverse the coastal enclave’s de-development.