Francisco Serrano

The rivalry pitting Rabat against Algiers has been intensifying for years. But there are increasing risks that the political and economic competition between the two North African neighbors will accelerate into new and more challenging directions.

As Russia’s war on Ukraine keeps oil and gas prices high, Algeria’s regime is replenishing its financial reserves after years of depleting them. This renewed budgetary space will make it easier for the government to deal with any hint of popular discontent. But rather than going back to splurging on new salary increases or other forms of accelerated rent distribution as it has done in the past, the regime seems to be adopting a more cautious approach this time around.

This year was already expected to pose challenges for Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. Inflationary pressures have been driving up the price of goods since the fourth quarter of 2021. Persistent unemployment, worsened by the COVID-19 pandemic, aggravated social discontent. Now, as winter turns to spring, socio-economic stability in the Maghreb is being imperiled by the conflict in Ukraine and insufficient rainfall at home.

The scene was a familiar one, even if the scale was not. On May 17 and 18, thousands of migrants entered Ceuta, one of two Spanish enclaves in North Africa that border Morocco. The record flow of irregular migrants surpassed 12,000 people over the course of two days. The Spanish authorities quickly understood that this surge in migration was about more than the usual human desperation that has driven large numbers of people over fences and across water in an effort to enter Europe in recent years. Morocco, troubled over Madrid’s stance on its territorial claims over the Western Sahara, decided to retaliate.

Abdelmadjid Tebboune’s rise to the presidency was supposed to bring a degree of predictability to Algeria’s military rulers. But since he was pronounced the winner of the presidential election in December 2019, the regime has entered a new phase of uncertainty. The COVID-19 pandemic, continued dissent, political volatility, and deepening economic malaise have affected the ruling oligarchy’s calculations. Two years after the start of Algeria’s popular uprising, known as the Hirak movement, the country is stuck in the same impasse it has faced since 2019.

Alongside a stalled economy and a messy political transition, the decade since the 2011 revolution has left Tunisia with an intermittent yet ferocious terrorism problem. The frequency of terrorist attacks highlights the dangers posed by an uncertain political environment, widespread economic problems, and regional instability. But the fact that they have become less deadly over time also seems to underline the improvements that successive governments have made to Tunisia’s security apparatus.

Tunisia seems to have avoided the worst of the first phase of the global coronavirus crisis. And yet whatever the final tally of the pandemic might be, its consequences will only add to a host of existing problems that have beset the North African country in recent years, including political instability, a stalled economy, security threats, and financial woes.

Following the resignation of 82-year-old President Abdelaziz Bouteflika in early April after weeks of mass demonstrations, the dispute between Algerian protesters and the country’s entrenched power structure has entered a new phase. The protest movement has viewed Bouteflika’s peaceful removal as an initial victory in the longer struggle to overhaul Algeria’s political edifice. But any attempt to fundamentally change the governance system and introduce a new relationship between rulers and ruled is likely to quickly come up against the will of established power-brokers, especially the military, and the ongoing dispute has the potential to escalate into violence.