This individual is a guest contributor. MEI is not able to assist with contact requests.
Tokyo’s long-standing, quiet diplomacy has built trust Washington lacks.
Lebanon is currently facing an unprecedented constitutional crisis that, if left to simmer, will further worsen the country’s numerous predicaments. Three decades after the Ta’if Agreement that ended the 1975-90 war, officials and warlords failed to implement a real reconciliation that could usher in civil order in a country known for its intrinsic vulnerabilities. Although a diverse society, Lebanon has always suffered from inherent political contradictions and currently agonizes over — among other calamities — major constitutional and political crises that, even though they are engulfed by crumbling socio-economic conditions, remain far more threatening than most imagine. How can the Lebanese put an end to such ongoing deterioration? And can Lebanon’s “business-political” class resolve some of the many crises confronting the country?
Right now, Afghanistan is on the cusp of an economic collapse, not some Chinese investment bonanza. Its immediate challenges are existential. And until economic, political, and security conditions stabilize, and legal and regulatory frameworks for investments are in place, Afghanistan’s connectivity and mineral wealth dreams will remain just that.
Though aware of the weaknesses of the former Afghan government, none of the Central Asian governments seemed prepared for the rapidity and decisiveness of the Taliban victory. Not unreasonably, Central Asians fear that it will spur the growth of regional terrorism and extremism, either through direct Taliban sponsorship or inspiration. The five Central Asian states backed the anti-Taliban opposition in the 1990s and then the U.S.-led NATO military campaign in Afghanistan after 2001. Presently, the Central Asian governments are eschewing policies that could antagonize the new regime while looking for indications whether the Taliban have genuinely turned over a new leaf and renounced international terrorism. If they have, then some Central Asian countries seem open to economic and perhaps other cooperation. If not, Central Asians will likely rely on Russia for enhanced security support.
:أسئلة الحلقة ما هو وضع التشكيل الحكومي في لبنان اليوم؟ أزمة الكهرباء ومحاولات حزب الله والولايات المتحدة احتكار المواد والأدوية في لبنان — إبراهيم الأصيل كريس أبي ناصيف
Ebrahim Raisi, the eighth president of Iran, has taken over at a time when the Islamic Republic is facing a series of major potential crises. Over the next several decades, these crises could have consequences that will not only affect Iran itself, but may reverberate across the region as well. This article will address the 13 crises facing Raisi’s government and Iranian society more broadly.
After decades of soul searching to define itself as a state, Egypt is building its own civilization-state and seeks to join an emerging club of nations that center historical and cultural tradition in their policy and governance structures and reject the West’s cultural dominance. The civilization-state is the prism through which Western capitals should view and understand Egypt’s domestic and foreign policy moves.
In the June 2021 elections, the Iranian presidency was handed to Ebrahim Raisi on a silver platter. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei made sure the election process was engineered, down to the smallest detail, for a shoo-in Raisi victory. For Raisi, this is something of a double-edged sword. At a minimum, it means policy continuity in Tehran, including in the realm of hybrid military-economic affairs. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) will not only continue to have a free hand to shape Iran’s military and regional agenda, but it will also return to center-stage as far as economic planning is concerned. The same thing happened during the government of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad; he too gave the IRGC an free hand — a decision that he later came to regret. Raisi has no choice though. His political fortunes rest on continued support from Khamenei and the IRGC. Don’t expect him to unveil any trailblazing policies anytime soon.
مدير برنامج لبنان
The viability of Eastern Mediterranean natural gas resources has long been a source of debate for reasons including cost considerations, market demand, and regional geopolitical tensions. The past couple of years have further complicated the debate, introducing new questions about the role of these resources in supporting post-pandemic economic recovery or helping more advanced markets achieve net-zero policies by replacing coal and other fuel sources (a particularly relevant topic of debate given Europe and Asia are key export targets for East Med gas).
It took the Taliban just three and a half months to undermine a 20-year international effort to build a competent Afghan military. The Afghanistan National Army (ANA) collapsed once it was clear the U.S. was pulling out ground troops and ceasing air support operations after two decades of training and sustainment that cost the American taxpayer approximately $83 billion. When required to stand alone, against a Taliban force, the ANA failed unequivocally. Building the ANA as a mirror image of the U.S. military was strategically and operationally flawed. If they are designed to fight like the U.S. but cannot fight in the absence of U.S. forces, they are ineffective. What lessons should we learn from this and how could our approach be different in the future?
