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Jean-Pierre Cassarino holds a professorship at the Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies (RSCAS/European University Institute, Florence) where he directs the Return migration and Development Platform (http://rsc.eui.eu/RDP/). He is also research associate at the Tunis-based Institut de Recherche sur le Maghreb Contemporain (IRMC). Since the mid-1990s, he has published extensively on international migration, particularly on return migration and has carried out numerous field surveys investigating returnees’ manifold patterns of reintegration. Selected publications include: (ed.) Unbalanced Reciprocities: Cooperation on Readmission in the Euro-Mediterranean Area, The Middle East Institute Press, Washington, 2010; (ed.) “Conditions of Modern Return Migrants”, International Journal on Multicultural Societies, Vol. 10, Issue 2, UNESCO, Paris, 2008; (ed.) Return Migrants to the Maghreb Countries: Reintegration and development challenges, RSCAS, European University Institute, Florence, 2008; Tunisian New Entrepreneurs and their Past Experiences of Migration in Europe: Networks, Resource Mobilisation, and Hidden Disaffection. Ashgate Publishers, Aldershot, 2000. Email: [email protected]
For now, Tehran’s bottom-line objective in Iraq is for the Americans to stop urging Baghdad to cut Iran loose.
The protests are a reminder to the new PM that anger is real and has not dissipated.
The big question is, what is Baghdad expected to concede in return for Trump’s investment?
Saying that Moscow is having a change of heart at this very moment, let alone is willing to publicly broadcast this to Damascus, may be a bit premature.
COVID-19 poses immense humanitarian, economic, social and political challenges for the world. However, the threat is especially serious for those affected by ongoing or protracted conflicts. Despite United Nations Secretary General António Guterres appealing for a global ceasefire, there are many conflicts which are not at the forefront of international attention but remain extremely vulnerable to COVID-19. Among them are ongoing and protracted conflicts in the Black Sea and South Caucasus regions.
Despite an unprecedented global slump, this is hardly an ideal time to cut into social spending.
A perceived lessening of the U.S. security umbrella would leave the Saudis far more vulnerable regionally and could force additional policy adjustments.
During his visit to Israel this week, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo is slated to give Netanyahu the green light.
This is only the latest flashpoint in a series of social media disinformation campaigns targeting Qatar.
The central bank has depleted its reserves dramatically by funding state bank interventions in defense of the lira.
On April 30, roughly a week after the Southern Transitional Council (STC) declared self-administration in Aden, a military confrontation broke out on the remote Yemeni island of Socotra between members of the STC and government forces. After just a few days, the situation was diffused when the island’s governor and the STC asked the Saudis to intervene. Although an agreement was reached quickly, it is likely to be fragile because the causes of the conflict are not entirely local. The island of Socotra is simply too important to multiple international players that are not willing to let it easily slip outside their sphere of influence.
The best way to describe the Trump administration’s decision to remove Patriot missile defense systems from Saudi Arabia is by highlighting its military irrelevance and political significance.
A few hours before Ramadan’s pre-fasting suhoor meal on April 25, the Southern Transitional Council (STC), a UAE-sponsored regional secessionist movement, abruptly announced self-administration in Yemen’s South and a state of emergency.
For too long, Washington has been an accomplice of the rampant corruption in Lebanon, choosing to look the other way as it deals with officials known to be implicated in various corrupt schemes.
