Marie Abdi

The death of President Ebrahim Raisi serves as a stark reminder of the pervasive instability within the Iranian system of government and its potential repercussions for the future of the Islamic Republic.

The results of the March 1 election for Iran’s Assembly of Experts hold great importance for understanding how the regime is preparing for the selection of the next supreme leader. The major responsibility of this 88-member body is to designate Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s successor, either after his death or if he becomes incapable of fulfilling his responsibilities.

In discussions on Iran’s future in a post-Khamenei era, one crucial player in the transition to a new supreme leader is often overlooked: the inner circle surrounding Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, primarily operating within the framework of the Office of the Supreme Leader.

The IRGC and the clerical establishment are Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s most significant instruments of power. This piece explores the relative influence of these two entities throughout the Khamenei era and beyond, with a particular focus on the potential changes that might occur to their position and standing after the conclusion of his leadership.

On March 1, 2024, the Islamic Republic of Iran will hold elections for the sixth term of the Assembly of Experts. The major responsibility of this 88-member body is to designate the future supreme leader after the current leader’s death or when he becomes incapable of fulfilling the position’s responsibilities. What role might the Assembly play in a future succession process?

When discussing the recent deal between Tehran and Washington to release five American prisoners in exchange for Iran gaining access to $6 billion in seized assets in South Korea, Iranian officials use a specific key phrase: “honorable diplomacy.” According to Iranian officials, “honorable diplomacy” means dealing with America and Europe from a position of strength. They claim that, even after the brutal suppression of the 2022 protests, they have successfully used their leverage with foreign adversaries to win unexpected concessions — a claim that, while potentially exaggerated, points to an unprecedented series of developments in recent months.

When the Iranian government faces intense Western criticism, such as over its brutal suppression of the protest movement and its recent executions, it frequently resorts to specific actions, one of which is hostage-taking. Nevertheless, perhaps the most important “hostage” Tehran counts on to influence the positions of Western powers is not their imprisoned citizens, but rather Iran’s nuclear program.

The Islamic Republic’s authorities have learned that they don’t need to take Washington’s reactions to internal oppressions very seriously. Presumably, in their view, as long as the Biden administration maintains even the slightest hope for a new nuclear deal with Tehran, it will not take any tough actions vis-à-vis Iran’s domestic policies.

هذا هو الجزء الأخير من سلسلة مكونة من ثلاثة أجزاء

عندما توفي آية الله روح الله الخميني، مؤسس جمهورية إيران الإسلامية، عن عمر يناهز 89 عامًا، تمتع هو والنظام الذي أسسه بدعم معظم رجال الدين رفيعي المستوى في البلاد.

لكن خليفته، المرشد الأعلى آية الله علي خامنئي، البالغ من العمر 82 عامًا، يواجه وضعًا مختلفًا للغاية. فمن الواضح أن معظم كبار رجال الدين لا يؤيدونه، وقد تسبب “انحراف” الجيل الجديد من رجال الدين في مخاوف متزايدة داخل النظام.

تكوين المراجع الدينية

هذا هو الجزء الثاني من سلسلة مكونة من ثلاثة أجزاء

في السنوات الأخيرة، نُشِرت العديد من التحليلات حول النفوذ المتزايد للحرس الثوري الإسلامي داخل النظام الإيراني. لا شك أنه في العقدين الماضيين، ازدادت قوة الحرس الثوري في المجالات السياسية والاقتصادية والأمنية بشكل كبير، ومع تزايد عدد الشخصيات العسكرية أو العسكرية السابقة في إدارة الرئيس الإيراني الجديد، إبراهيم رئيسي، لا يتوقع سوى أن يتجه نفوذ الحرس الثوري نحو مزيد من التوسع.

When Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran, died at the age of 89, he and the regime he established enjoyed the support of most of the country’s high-ranking clerics. His successor, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, aged 82, faces a very different situation, however. Most senior clerics apparently do not support him, and the “deviation” of the new generation of clerics has caused growing concerns within the regime.

In recent years, numerous analyses have been published on the increasing influence of the IRGC within the Iranian regime. Nevertheless, the rise in the power of the military should not overshadow the fact that in the Islamic Republic, not only the paramount position of supreme leader, but also many other key roles are held exclusively by clerics. Moreover, many of these clerics, including the highest-ranking ones, must be appointed by the supreme leader. This system was designed to ensure the loyalty of key officials, but over time has given rise to growing concerns over the reliability of the next generation of clerics and the transfer of power.

هذا هو الجزء الأول من سلسلة مكونة من ثلاثة أجزاء

منذ البداية، عرَّفت جمهورية إيران الإسلامية نفسها على أنها دولة دينية يتمتع فيها رجال الدين بمكانة مميزة. ومع ذلك، لم تتمكن السلطات قط من إخفاء مخاوفها المستمرة بشأن ما تعتبره فجوة متنامية بين أفكار العديد من رجال الدين الإيرانيين ووجهات نظر المرشد الأعلى لإيران.

The Islamic Republic of Iran, from the very beginning, has defined itself as a religious state, in which the clergy enjoy a privileged status. Nevertheless, the authorities have never managed to hide their fears over what they see as a growing gap between the ideas of many Iranian clerics and the views of Iran’s supreme leader. 

Due to his divergent views on Iran’s international and regional policies, Hossein Amirabdollahian had various disagreements with then-Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif while serving as deputy foreign minister beginning in 2011, and these ultimately led to his removal from the post in June 2016. The official reason announced for the change was Amirabdollahian’s appointment as Iran’s new ambassador to Oman, although he refused to accept the position.