Sara Sadek is an affiliated researcher and coordinator at the Center for Migration and Refugee Studies (CMRS) at the American University in Cairo. She obtained an MA in Refugee Studies from the University of East London. Since 2005, she has worked on various research projects on Iraqi and Sudanese communities in Egypt, contributing to a report on Iraqis in Egypt and recently producing a paper on challenges of integration for Iraqis in Arab states for the Henry L. Stimson Center’s forthcoming volume Transnational Challenges.
To get Washington’s Gulf partners on board, Biden needs an actual strategy for protecting them and ways to make them contribute to it.
In Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan, coverage of negotiations around the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) has tended to consistently be in the news over the past few years. The events of the last few weeks, however, have easily pushed GERD talks to the side. On Nov. 4, 2020, Ethiopian federal government forces started pounding the Tigray region, one of 10 semiautonomous regions in the country, after Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed accused the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) of attacking a federal base. Relations had been disintegrating after Abiy cancelled elections, due to COVID, that would have marked the end of his term. While most of Ethiopia’s ethnic minorities took umbrage, the TPLF went a step further by holding their own elections, the results of which were declared null and void by the federal government.
From the U.S. and the U.K. to Iraq and Syria, the way countries are handling the repatriation and prosecution of accused ISIS members echoes the policies that drove their citizens to seek a utopian Islamic State in the first place. Not only are the policies that pushed people to start joining the group in 2013 continuing, but in many cases they have increased in both scale and scope. While the current repatriation and prosecution policies are arguably counterproductive, they may also be fueling future terrorist activity and support for radical anti-government groups. To reduce the chances of such negative consequences, foreign governments must switch gears and adopt an entirely different approach before it is too late.
In mid-January the press reported that the United Arab Emirates (UAE) will soon participate in a joint military exercise with the United States, Canada, Slovakia, Spain, Cyprus, and Israel. While Israel’s inclusion is certainly newsworthy, it is also quite significant that the drill will take place in and be coordinated by Greece. This is just the latest step in a long process of engagement between Athens and Abu Dhabi.
America’s foreign policy needs a diversity of faith to face changing 21st century realities.
Washington must acknowledge that it can’t build a state.
Turkey’s efforts to strike a different tone were apparent on Jan. 25 in Istanbul, when Greek and Turkish officials resumed talks after a five-year gap to calm tensions in the Aegean and Mediterranean. The fact that the parties met is welcome news after the two came to the brink of war recently over offshore energy exploitation rights, but no one expected a breakthrough. The tensions between the two countries have a long history and the issues dividing Athens and Ankara are too deep to bridge.
With the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco signing normalisation agreements with Israel last year, the road to Israel’s integration into Centcom was paved.
Given the host of challenges that Algeria currently faces and consistent with past efforts to diversify its foreign relations, Algeria could seek to deepen its relationship with China — a rising global power with deep pockets and an expanding footprint in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region and a country with which Algeria has already established a comprehensive strategic partnership. Yet, even under a scenario in which Beijing answers the call, it should not be assumed that the scale and contours of Chinese engagement will fundamentally change, will consist mainly of predatory economic activities and malign influences, or can rescue Algeria from structural problems of its own making.
خلال جلسة مجلس الأمن الدولي، التابع للأُمم المُتحدة، والتي انعقدت في 20 يناير 2021، وصف المبعوث الأممي لسوريا، غيير بيدرسِن، ما يحدث في سوريا من انهيار اقتصادي، ومُعاناة إنسانية، وركود للعملية السياسية، على أنه “تسونامي بطيء يجتاح الآن جميع أنحاء سوريا”؛ ما جذب اهتماما أصبح نادرا بشأن الوضع في سوريا.
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Marvin G. Weinbaum
Director, Afghanistan and Pakistan Studies
“أوضحت شهادة بلينكن أن نهج إدارة بايدن تجاه الشرق الأوسط سيكون إلى حد كبير عودة إلى الأوضاع الطبيعية”.
Should nothing change, the loss of cross-border aid access and the absence of cross-line mechanisms to northern Syria could potentially leave over 4.5 million civilians without assistance — a humanitarian catastrophe of unprecedented proportions.
Because of football’s popularity, there is significant involvement by regime insiders. The Revolutionary Guards’ transition from barracks to boardrooms began back in the mid-1990s, when they took on management roles in some of the country’s most high-profile sports. Sports were not high on the agenda for the revolutionaries who overthrew the Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in 1979, but as sports has grown in popularity and in profitability, it has become increasingly politicized. Over the past two decades, most sports clubs and related bodies have been taken over by political or security-military organizations, with former Revolutionary Guards holding the top positions.
