2019 marks the eighth year since the beginning of the Arab uprisings in 2011. One might also mention that it’s been 16 years since the invasion of Iraq, and 18 years since the 9/11 attacks and the escalation of the war on terror. This brief review of 2019 will look at three levels: the domestic, regional, and international.
At the domestic level, one can point to five uprisings, four ongoing civil wars, and three key elections.
Five uprisings
The five uprisings are those in Algeria, Sudan, Lebanon, Iraq, and Iran. The drivers in all five cases are remarkably similar: a young generation rising up against a corrupt and repressive ruling class that has failed to deliver on economic development, job creation, and government services. In that way these six uprisings are similar to the others that previously impacted Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Syria, Yemen, and Bahrain.
Of the current five, only Sudan has embarked on a proper, although precarious, transition. In Algeria, the ruling order is trying to reassert itself through a presidential election. In Iran, the uprising has united the various government or regime factions behind a policy of extreme repression and absolutely no political concessions — a playbook that it developed and refined in Syria. In Iraq and Lebanon, the dynamic has significant similarities. The two countries had parliamentary elections and government formation in 2018, and in the two countries, the population gave up early on both. In Iraq and Lebanon the new generation has forged a new identity for itself based on national unity, rejecting sectarianism, and reinforcing basic civic values, in opposition to a corrupt and sectarian ruling class. In both countries the revolution has imposed itself as a new player on the political scene, impacting the formation and policies of the next government, and focusing on the organizing of new, perhaps early, parliamentary elections.
The new governments in Iraq and Lebanon will face the challenge of responding to domestic and international pressure to curb corruption and implement long overdue governance and economic reforms that will enable the countries to avoid further socio-economic decline and return to the path of sustainable growth. And in the two countries, the revolutionary generation faces the promise and the challenge of turning the historic revolutionary moment into a sustainable political movement that can participate in government and win parliamentary elections.
Four civil wars
None of the four civil wars in the region saw an end in 2019. But the most progress was made in Yemen where an agreement was reached between the Hadi government and the Southern Transitional Council, and where talks between the Saudis and the Houthis have led to a dramatic de-escalation of attacks from both sides. There is hope that Yemen might be moving at least toward a sustainable long-term ceasefire, which would positively impact the humanitarian crisis, until a full political resolution can be found.
The war in Libya has seen the most relative escalation, especially after Russia sent hundreds of special forces there in support of General Khalifa Hifter — who already has the support of Egypt and the UAE. The general is moving against Tripoli, with only Turkey mentioning the possibility of sending forces to support the internationally recognized government there. The civil war in Libya might see dramatic escalation in the weeks ahead with acute humanitarian consequences. But if Vladimir Putin’s calculations are correct, Russia might enable Hifter to achieve victory in key parts of Libya, giving Russia a major presence in North Africa like it has in the Levant via Syria.
Russian attempts to make political progress on ending the conflict in Syria through supposed negotiations over a future constitution have remained a side show. The major developments occurred in northeastern Syria, where President Trump abandoned America’s Kurdish allies and green-lighted a Turkish incursion. The Turkish incursion dealt a powerful blow to the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), created a long-lasting Turkish buffer zone, and enabled the Syrian regime to redeploy into Kurdish zones of the northeast. The regime, with Russian support, stepped up attacks on the northwestern province of Idlib, causing acute human suffering, but they have not attempted a full-scale move to take back the province.
In Afghanistan, the main dynamic has been the high-level negotiations between the U.S. and the Taliban. At several points during the second half of the year the talks appeared on the verge of success, only to fall back again. In any case, even if the talks do come through, the resultant agreement will only provide a fig leaf for an American withdrawal, but will likely do nothing to end the civil war in Afghanistan.
Three key elections
These were in Turkey, Tunisia, and Israel. In Turkey, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan twice lost key municipal elections in major cities. The electoral losses were a political warning sign to Erdogan, and might indicate the beginning of the eclipse of his two-decade-long dominance of Turkish leadership — although his ride into the sunset could still take a few years. Elections — as well as indictments — also seemed to indicate the end of the 25-year dominance of Benjamin Netanyahu over Israeli politics; although in his perhaps quicker ride into the sunset he might still take some dramatic steps, in collusion with President Trump, that may include the annexation of large parts of the West Bank. The third key election was in Tunisia, where that country continued its impressive democratic transition with the election of a constitutional law professor to the presidency — and this despite ongoing acute economic difficulties and repeated jihadist threats inside the country.
Regional dynamics: Turkey, Iran, Israel, and the GCC
The Turkish incursion into northeastern Syria — and the U.S. president’s apparent green-lighting of that move — altered the status quo in that part of Syria. It dealt a staggering blow to Kurdish dreams of having a large Kurdish controlled and deeply autonomous Rojava zone in northeastern Syria. It dealt an equally staggering blow to U.S. credibility in the region as President Trump threw the Kurds under the Turkish bus. And finally, it empowered the Assad regime — and its allies Iran and Russia — as the Kurds turned to the regime looking for a compromise, and the regime was able to send troops back to the region that it had been chased out of years before.
Iranian direct and proxy escalation in and around the Gulf region was a main dynamic between May and September of the year. It steadily ratcheted up, starting with fairly minor attacks on Gulf shipping, and escalating to a drone and cruise missile attack on Aramco that temporarily knocked half of its production capacity offline. Iran signaled clearly in April that it would seek means of escalation in retaliation for the U.S. maximum economic pressure campaign; its escalation is intended to pressure the U.S. president to offer Iran much needed economic relief.
As a result of threats and attacks on Saudi and the UAE, both countries have greatly moderated their position toward Iran, perhaps removing them for now from the Iranian potential target list. In December, the escalation has shifted to attacks in Iraq, by Iraqi militia close to Iran, on U.S. forces in that country. So far President Trump has chosen not to retaliate militarily, but has maintained and indeed intensified the maximum economic pressure campaign. During the summer and early fall he appeared open to talks and perhaps a limited deal with Iran, in order to avoid escalation that could impact his reelection campaign; but after the apparent success of the maximum pressure campaign in fanning the flames of revolt in Iran, as well as in Iraq and Lebanon, the appetite to give Iran relief has grown considerably less.
The Israel-Palestine conflict remained a trigger point, with conflict erupting twice between Israel and armed groups in Gaza, in May and November. The siege of Gaza continues for the 12th year now, with two million people trapped in horrendous conditions, and cease-fires only marking the months between recurring outbreaks of violence. The already moribund peace process received a deeper burial, with the U.S. recognizing Israel’s annexation of the Syrian Golan Heights, and declaring that illegal Israeli settlements on the West Bank would no longer be considered illegal by the U.S., opening the way for potential Israeli annexation of much of the West Bank with promised U.S. support. The mysterious U.S. “deal of the century” remained more of a rumor than a reality.
On the positive side, 2019 has seen an attempt at reconciliation within the GCC and a general moderating of foreign policy from Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. The moderation of policy can be seen in multiple arenas: the UAE’s withdrawal of forces from Yemen, Riyadh’s progress in talks with the Houthis and the brokering of a deal between the Hadi government and the Southern Transitional Council, as well as clear efforts to de-escalate and attempt reconciliation with Qatar. The causes of this moderation are numerous, including realizations that: (a) the confrontational policies of the past three years have borne little fruit; (b) President Trump actually doesn’t have their back in most instances; and (c) major escalation with Iran would cost the Gulf region — and their countries and economies in particular — dearly.
International: Russia, China, and the US administration
Russia has continued to make progress in the Middle East. It made further gains in Syria, with Trump’s abandonment of the Kurds and the regime’s expansion into the northeast. Putin has also moved troops into Libya, and is backing General Hifter in his critical assault on Tripoli. Putin could end up creating a winning side in Libya that will provide a major foothold for Russia in North Africa and the southern Mediterranean. Russia has also been making overtures to Lebanon, hoping to gain more influence there. The country to watch is Iraq: Iran is escalating its proxy pressure on the U.S. there. Given Trump’s preferences, it is quite possible that the U.S. will eventually exit from Iraq, and that Russia might be encouraged by its partner Iran to provide air power and other critical assistance. Putin is indeed rebuilding a powerful position for Russia both in the Levant and in North Africa.
China has continued to play the long game, emphasizing energy and trade relations, and providing loans and investment for long-term physical and virtual infrastructure in the region. While the U.S. and Russia grab the headlines of regional geopolitics, China is steadily weaving the Middle East into the Chinese-centric Eurasian colossus.
It was another turbulent year for U.S. policy. Trump continues to be on a different page than most of his advisors, and indeed he switched out national security advisors in the middle of the year apparently to avoid a military escalation with Iran. In Syria, Trump surprised and defied his advisors by abandoning America’s Kurdish allies and green-lighting a Turkish incursion into northeastern Syria. In Libya, he has openly favored General Hifter although his administration’s official position is in support of the Government of National Accord in Tripoli, which Hifter is trying to overthrow. On Iran, he has maintained the maximum pressure campaign but resisted advice to retaliate militarily against Iranian attacks on a U.S. drone, and U.S. allies in the Gulf. He appeared open to making a deal in September, probably over the objections of his hawkish advisors, but has since moved away from that readiness as the maximum pressure campaign seems to be paying dividends. In the episodes of escalation between Iran and America’s Gulf allies, Trump also made it abundantly clear to those Gulf partners that their security was their responsibility, and that the U.S. would not retaliate on their behalf; but that he was willing and eager to provide more U.S. military presence for coordinated defense and deterrence, and provide or sell more military equipment. It was a rude wake-up call for Gulf partners who thought they had a solid and bellicose ally in Trump.
In Afghanistan, the president has continued to look for a way out of that 18-year- old war, and has encouraged U.S.-Taliban talks. Those talks seemed close to fruition a couple of times this year, but have not yet come to a conclusion. On Israel-Palestine, as mentioned above, the U.S. administration gave the Israel-Palestine peace process a deeper burial. Whether the impending end of Netanyahu’s 25-year leadership in Israel and the rise of Benny Gantz will provide any new pathway forward for the conjoined, conflicted Israeli-Palestinian twins has yet to be seen.
All in all, it’s been another turbulent year in the Middle East without resolution of key drivers of its continued instability.
Paul Salem is the president of MEI. The views expressed in this article are his own.
Photo by ANWAR AMRO/AFP via Getty Images
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