Iran’s nuclear messaging campaign

Iran’s missile attack on Israel on Oct. 1, 2024, marked a significant escalation in the ongoing regional tensions. This assault, reportedly involving 180 missiles, was the Islamic Republic of Iran’s largest yet against Israel, targeting military and security sites in retaliation for Israeli assassinations of leaders of Hamas and Hezbollah in Tehran and Beirut. Iranian officials framed the attack as an act of self-defense, warning that further Israeli actions could provoke even stronger retaliation from Tehran.

This barrage, along with the missile and drone attack on April 13, raises important questions about Iran’s deterrent power. While Iran demonstrated its capacity to launch large-scale missile strikes, Israel’s robust missile-defense systems, supported by American assets in theater, reduced the impact of the attack. This highlights a complex balance of deterrence: while Iran can inflict damage, Israel’s defensive and retaliatory capabilities — backed by overwhelming resources from the United States and its Western and regional allies — seem to limit Iran’s ability to shift the strategic balance decisively.

Deterrence between rationality and miscalculation

This conflict is not purely about military capacities but about who appears less deterred and more determined, where perceptions of weakness may carry significant weight. In this context, Iran’s missile capabilities are a show of force, but they do not conclusively alter the deterrence dynamics between the two countries. Both sides retain significant retaliatory capacity, including nuclear options. Game theory suggests that the actor willing to go further or behave most irrationally gains an advantage, a dynamic encapsulated in the so-called Madman Theory — where bluffing, risking escalation, or acting unpredictably are calculated tactics.

This conflict is therefore defined by a delicate balance of deterrence. In strategic terms, both Iran and Israel are engaged in a contest to determine who is less deterred by the risks of escalation. As former Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon stated: deterrence is Israel’s “main weapon — the fear of us.” Evidently, Tehran is following the same logic.

Iran might use threats or actions that appear risky or irrational — such as large-scale missile attacks — as a form of strategic bluffing to pressure Israel. The uncertainty over whether Iran is bluffing or is genuinely willing to escalate makes it harder for Israel to predict Tehran’s next move, raising the stakes. Meanwhile, Israel’s responses signal that it is not easily swayed by threats, yet its leadership must also calculate the risk of overcommitting in an unpredictable situation. Both sides consequently engage in a constant balancing act between appearing rational and controlled while leaving enough uncertainty to keep the other side off balance.

Nonetheless, the imbalance between the two countries also plays a critical role in shaping their strategic postures. Israel, despite being vulnerable to missile strikes and other asymmetric threats, enjoys extensive and high-level access to military and financial support from the US, a nuclear state (the ultimate deterrence). This significantly enhances its deterrent capabilities and ensures that Israel is able to endure a long period of back-and-forth attacks. Iran’s access to military resources, by contrast, is much more limited, and the country also has to deal with various internal challenges, including economic difficulties. As a result, Iran is unlikely to wait long before acting to counter or deter the threat from Israel.

This imbalance brings us to the broader deterrence dilemma of what happens when one side cannot endure more pain in a decisive and prolonged confrontation. Cornering Iran, ultimately, would cause Tehran to perceive itself as existentially threatened. Such a perception could conceivably cause Tehran to go nuclear in an effort to reassert a balance of power wherein the risk of mutually assured destruction would prevent either side from fully committing to all-out war with the other.

Pushed to the brink: Iran’s path to nuclear deterrence

According to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran, as a latent nuclear state, is capable of producing weapons-grade uranium sufficient to arm several nuclear weapons within weeks. Additionally, Iran has demonstrated that its advanced missiles can reach Israel. These developments pose a greater concern to Israel, and mere acts of sabotage or technical operations targeting Iran would be ineffective against this threat. While Israel’s recent intelligence operations, such as the pager and radio explosions in Lebanon and targeted assassinations of leadership in Tehran and Beirut, may appear impressive, they have been counterproductive, pushing Iran closer to developing a nuclear weapon.

In a 2015 speech to the US Congress, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu cautioned that a diplomatic agreement would not prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. The Obama administration nonetheless proceeded with what became popularly known as the Iran nuclear deal — officially, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). However, the Trump administration’s later withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018, fully encouraged by Israel, led Iran to increase its uranium enrichment from 3.67% to 20%. And in response to the assassination of nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh in 2020, Iran increased its uranium enrichment to over 60% purity. Recent regional tensions suggest Iran is expanding its stockpile, with mounting pressure bringing it closer to achieving a nuclear weapon.

Tehran had all along used its nuclear program as leverage in negotiations with Washington and the West, though without significant success in achieving its ultimate goal of the removal of sanctions. The collapse of the JCPOA following the unilateral withdrawal of the US from the agreement led Iran to enhance its nuclear capabilities to the degree of becoming a latent nuclear state, i.e., a state with the capability to develop a nuclear arsenal quickly if faced with a significant threat to its existence. By preserving the capacity to swiftly create nuclear weapons without actually producing them, Iran is able to maintain that it adheres to the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. However, Iran recently has faced increasing military threats from both Israel and the US. Indeed, Israel’s strategy appears to be to directly involve the US in a war against Iran. If further pushed, Tehran’s deterrence strategy may shift from being a latent nuclear state to, eventually, openly becoming a nuclear power.

Indeed, several Iranian officials have recently suggested that, if further cornered, Iran may alter its nuclear policies. Thirty-nine Iranian members of parliament have called on the Supreme National Security Council to review Iran’s defense doctrine regarding the production of nuclear weapons. Moreover, Sayyid Hassan Khomeini, the grandson of Ayatollah Khomeini, in a recent and rare national TV appearance, emphasized the necessity of elevating Iran’s military deterrence. This statement was particularly significant given that Iranian conservatives have marginalized him for years, and his current stance appears to reflect a call for national unity.

Cornered Iran: A shift toward survival

Neither Israel nor the US has a clear political strategy to address such a security dilemma. Since 2018, US-Israeli efforts have primarily focused on economic pressure, sabotage actions, and assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists or officials, none of which has stopped Iran’s progress toward a nuclear weapon.

Constant pressure to contain Iran or dismantle its political system has left Tehran with no option but to become a paranuclear state, now close to becoming an openly declared nuclear state. Given Iran’s internal and external vulnerabilities, Tehran may see pursuing full nuclear capability as the only path to survival. This would permanently alter the regional balance of power, a development that poses serious concerns not only for Israel and the West but also for the entire region.

Weakening Iran by force is not a viable strategy. Attacking multiple nuclear program sites will not deter Tehran, nor will bombings lead to regime change. Iran’s nuclear and missile technology is too advanced to be disrupted via military action. Unlike the US and Israel, Iran views this as a fight for survival, which compels the state to use every means at its disposal if pushed to the brink. Any miscalculation could have long-enduring consequences for all parties involved.

Israel and the US must tread carefully. Their previous miscalculations, such as withdrawal from the JCPOA, assassinations, and sabotage, had the likely unintended effect of driving Iran to become a paranuclear state; additional steps of this kind could lead it to become an actual nuclear power. A non-military solution is still an option, and if Iran is assured that its survival is not at risk, it may choose to maintain the current status quo. But if pushed further by external pressures, it may shift its strategy and fully pursue nuclear arms. This outcome would have profound and irreversible effects on the Middle East’s evolving security architecture.

Alam Saleh is a Senior Lecturer in International Relations at Australian National University. You can follow him on X @alamsaleh1.

Zakiyeh Yazdanshenas is an assistant professor in Global Studies at the University of Tehran and a senior research fellow at the Center for Scientific Research and Middle East Strategic Studies in Tehran. You can follow her on X @YzdZakiyeh.

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