Lebanon’s judicial independence and the end of impunity

The below article is part of the series "Seizing Lebanon's Moment," a joint initiative with the Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI). The contributors to this series — who comprise top scholars, policymakers, and professionals from Lebanon, Europe, and the United States — set out to identify Lebanon's critical problems and propose specific reforms aimed at practitioners and officials dedicated to helping the country recover from its deep, multi-year crisis. The series has been compiled in a report, whose findings aim to carry forward the constructive policy dialogue initiated during this year's Mediterranean Dialogues Conference.
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Judicial independence is at the core of any successful democracy, and for decades, this issue has been a matter of public concern in Lebanon. Article 20 of the Lebanese Constitution affirms the principle of judicial independence, explicitly stating that “the judges shall be independent in the exercise of their functions.” This principle is enshrined in several other legislative texts relative to the different branches of the judiciary, which in Lebanon include ordinary judicial courts, the State Council, and other specialized courts.

Articles 3 and 4 of the law on the judiciary and judicial organization (legislative decree no. 150 of 16/9/1983) state that the members of the Supreme Judicial Council bear responsibility for preserving the independence of the judiciary and that of the Council itself. Similarly, members of the State Council Bureau are responsible for preserving the body’s independence, as stated twice in Article 19 of the Lebanese State Council Law (law enacted by decree no. 10434 of 14/6/1975 and its amendments).

Even though key legislative texts recognize judicial independence, the public has long since lost trust in justice in Lebanon. Since the country attained independence in 1943, its judiciary has been constantly weakened by political interference and paralyzed by obstruction and intimidation. Challenges to judicial independence gradually worsened during the Lebanese Civil War (1975-2000), when state institutions collapsed and judicial authority was replaced by militia power. After the war, the Taif Agreement entrenched sectarian and political interference in the judiciary, while until the end of the Syrian occupation (1976-2005), judicial decisions and appointments were influenced by Damascus. These weaknesses became even more evident following the outbreak of the Lebanese financial crisis in 2019, when the judiciary was also forced to deal with budgetary restrictions.

At a time when a credible window of opportunity for change has opened in Lebanon, restoring judicial independence is both a necessity and a prerequisite to enable the judiciary to carry out its duties and end the impunity under which it has historically operated. This article examines the challenges facing Lebanon’s judiciary, from political interference to legal, financial, and institutional fragilities. It explores the reforms needed to make it function as a credible check on power and the steps required to ensure that justice in Lebanon is a guaranteed right accessible to everyone. Such a transformation will require several key changes, including curbing political interference through merit-based appointments, strengthening legal and institutional structures, and securing financial stability.

The many challenges to the independence of the judiciary

Lebanon’s judiciary faces deep-rooted challenges that have hampered its ability to function as an independent institution. Although the preamble of the constitution mentions the principle of separation of powers, in practice it is not upheld when it comes to the judiciary, with other branches of government often interfering in its work. These violations manifest themselves through political influence in appointments, obstruction in high-profile cases, and the lack of administrative and financial autonomy.

Political interference has long been a major obstacle to the functioning of the judiciary. Encroachment by politicians on appointments, transfers, and promotions, as well as political meddling in investigations, has led many to rightly perceive the judiciary as vulnerable to the interests of the powerful. One of the key issues in this sense is the current mechanism for appointing judges. The government appoints the most senior members of the judiciary — namely, the members of the Supreme Judicial Council, the first president, the general prosecutor of the Court of Cassation, the president of the State Council, the presidents of Chambers at the State Council, and the government commissioner to the State Council — directly based on the recommendation of the minister of justice. For their part, the president and general prosecutor of the Court of Accounts and the presidents of Chambers are appointed through the Council of Ministers upon the recommendation of the prime minister. By often exploiting these provisions in bad faith, the executive has time and again obstructed appointments and transfers, thus undermining the independence of the judiciary.

For example, in June 2020, the appointments drafted by the Supreme Judicial Council were blocked by the president and delayed by the minister of justice. It was not until the election of a new president and the formation of a new government that the decree on judicial appointments was finally issued on August 5, 2025, after a five-year delay.

In the judicial systems of other countries, judicial independence is more guaranteed and political influence from the executive branch is reduced. To build a more credible and independent judiciary, the appointment system in Lebanon must be reformed to bring it closer to international standards. This can be achieved by introducing peer-election for all or the majority of members of the Supreme Judicial Council responsible for appointments and transfers, and by giving judicial bodies real authority over this matter. For example, the current law on the judiciary and judicial organization stipulates that only one member of the Supreme Judicial Council can be elected by his or her peers, whereas the majority of the members are appointed by the executive branch. This is in stark contrast to what happens in other countries where the judiciary enjoys greater independence. In France, for example, members of the Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature are elected by their peers, while in Italy 16 out of the 27 members of the Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura are elected by fellow judges. Both systems reduce political interference, serving as a check against the dominance of the executive and sheltering judges from external pressure.

Political interference in judicial appointments can also undermine judges’ impartiality when handling certain cases and issuing rulings. Appointments based on political loyalty and sectarian affiliation can compromise the judiciary’s independence since judges may face indirect pressure to align their decisions with the stances of those who contributed to their appointment. This was evident in the investigations related to the 2020 Beirut port explosion or even the cases concerning banks and key figures in the financial sector after the 2019 economic meltdown. In both instances, judges faced political interference coupled with legal obstacles. In the case of the Beirut port explosion, all political parties sought to exploit the tragedy to score points against their opponents. Some even resorted to legal provisions with the aim of entirely obstructing the investigation, and more specifically to Article 125 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which automatically suspends an investigation when a judge is legally challenged.

Aside from the lack of administrative autonomy and political interference, the judiciary in Lebanon faces another key challenge that compromises its ability to operate effectively and independently: the lack of adequate financial resources. After all, financial autonomy is an important pillar of judicial independence. Today, the judiciary does not have access to a flow of dedicated and dependable income, leaving courts underfunded and judges underpaid. Particularly since 2019, resources have been severely strained amid budget cuts; judges saw their salaries depreciate significantly, with many earning at some point less than $150 per month. A temporary financial support scheme was introduced only through the judiciary’s mutual fund, rather than through a stable budget granted by the state treasury. This fund, which is financed through litigant fees and donations, supports the judges’ welfare by offering them health coverage, educational assistance for their children, retirement benefits, and other forms of financial aid. During the crisis, it played a crucial role in helping judges cope with salary reductions, thus preserving their personal economic independence. But the economic meltdown also had a big impact on working conditions. Inadequate provision of electricity and the lack of basic office supplies led to numerous delays in delivering justice. Further, many courthouses still operate without adequate information technology (IT) infrastructure due to lack of funds.

When compared with other countries in the Middle East, Lebanon's judiciary appears relatively safer, with fewer incidents of assassination or physical violence. The most notable cases occurred in 1994 and 1999, where several judges were assassinated in Saida. In response to these incidents, judges in Lebanon, especially those handling high-profile or sensitive cases, are typically provided with security measures. Since then, no other similar cases have been reported. Yet, due to the challenges discussed above, Lebanon’s judiciary remains far from free of external pressure when conducting investigations.

A promising step to guarantee judicial independence

In 2017, the International Court of Justice called on the Lebanese authorities to implement reforms to ensure the independence of the judiciary. As a result, the first draft reform of the judiciary law was introduced to parliament in 2018. Several draft laws have followed since, all with the same objective. Yet, it was not until July 31, 2025, that the parliament finally voted to adopt a draft law on the independence of the ordinary judicial courts.

The new law on the judiciary and judicial organization represents a crucial step toward the enshrinement of the principle of judicial independence in Lebanon. First, it grants members of the Supreme Judicial Courts broader powers and guarantees in appointments and transfers, while limiting political interference in this regard. Second, it provides judges with safeguards in the exercise of their functions and frees them from consequences that may result from carrying out their duties by protecting them from arbitrary dismissal and enshrining their rights to freedom of expression.

This reform introduces several changes to the law on the judiciary and judicial organization. It affirms that judges are independent in carrying out their duties and explicitly states that this independence must be preserved in practice and in appearance, without intimidation or pressure. In this regard, Article 53 sets out safeguards for this principle by protecting judges from political appointments, arbitrary transfers, or dismissals except in certain cases stated in the law. It grants judges rights and freedoms equal to those of all citizens, and it compels the state to protect them and their families, providing compensation for interference in their judicial work.

As for the transfer of judges, Article 80 of the new law states that the mechanism adopted is based on objective criteria and includes an evaluation of all judges every two years. It also gives them the opportunity to apply and compete for the positions they wish to hold (Article 79). This new evaluation procedure encourages judges to improve their performance in order to secure desired positions. Even though the appointment mechanisms remain unchanged, preserving executive involvement in this matter, the parliament was careful to introduce certain restrictions in this regard. The law explicitly adopts the principle of permanence of judicial appointments, stating that a judge cannot be transferred during the four-year period specified by the law without their consent (Article 77).

In addition, the Supreme Judicial Council now has the final say regarding transfers. It approves judicial transfers and appointments based on objective criteria. Tasked with proposing the judicial transfers, the Council presents transfer plans to the minister of justice, who then formalizes the decision by issuing a formal decree. In the event of a disagreement between the minister and the Supreme Judicial Council, a joint session of both parties is convened. At this point, if the disagreement persists, the Supreme Judicial Council will vote and reach a decision with a majority of seven, which the minister is then called to enforce by issuing a final decree. In all cases, the decisions of the Supreme Judicial Council are enforceable without the need for a decree if the Council insists on its proposed format, or if after a 45-day period, the Ministry of Justice has still not issued the relevant decree. This is in significant contrast to the previous system, where judicial transfers were often obstructed simply by delaying the issuing of decrees.

The new law also restructured the mechanism for the appointment of Supreme Judicial Council members, expanding the number of elected members from two to four. Four seats remain filled automatically by top judicial officials: the president of the Court of Cassation, the public prosecutor at the Court of Cassation, the head of the Judicial Inspection Authority, and the president of the Judicial Studies Institute. These eight members together choose the final two. This method reduces the government’s influence on the process, restricting its role to the selection of ex-officio members from a shortlist of three candidates proposed by the Council itself (Article 2). By expanding peer-election, the reform strengthens the Council’s autonomy and therefore reduces the executive’s control over it. As such, this reform constitutes an initial step toward ensuring that key appointments are dictated by merit rather than politics.

Lastly, the new law reinforces the principle of the independence of the Judicial Inspection Authority, a formal oversight body within the judiciary, by restricting the supervision of the minister of justice over it and limiting the government’s power to select its members to the list of candidates proposed by the Supreme Judicial Council (Article 123).

To date, this new law has not been published in the Official Gazette and consequently has not yet entered into force. Instead, it was returned by the president to parliament for a second review on September 5, 2025, to address formal, material, and substantial errors that would make this new law inapplicable. This review of the law represents a chance to address some of its weaknesses and provides an opportunity to enshrine judicial independence as a key value of the Lebanese state.

Missing pieces of the puzzle

The new law still lacks some of key elements necessary to exert judicial independence and does not reform another key pillar of the Lebanese judicial system: the administrative judiciary. First, for the Lebanese State Council, the law continues to give the government authority over the appointment of chamber presidents, following the recommendation of the minister of justice. Although appointments are made after the approval of the State Council Bureau, the law still does not give the Bureau any final say regarding this matter, in contrast to the authority given to Supreme Judicial Council in the new law. This leaves the appointment mechanisms vulnerable to political obstruction. A legislative reform could help to address this issue and guarantee further judicial independence by stipulating a time limit for issuing the decree. With such a provision, if the decree is not issued within the set timeframe, the appointments would take effect, similarly to the amendment introduced to the new law on the judiciary and judicial organization.

Reform of the Court of Accounts, another key pillar of the Lebanese judicial system, is also pressing and should not be put on the backburner. Importantly, the law regulating this body (legislative decree no. 118 of 12/6/1959) does not mention the principle of judicial independence even once. Currently, the president, the public prosecutor, and the presidents of the different chambers of the Court of Accounts are all appointed by a decree of the Council of Ministers upon the recommendation of the prime minister. The appointment mechanism for the presidents of the court’s chambers should be reformed to require at least the opinion of the Council of the Court of Accounts prior to the appointment, thereby guaranteeing the independence of its judges.

At both the State Council and the Court of Accounts, members of the Bureau and the Council should be given the opportunity to suggest names of competent colleagues to preside over these institutions. This would grant them a bigger role in the process and limit the government’s monopoly over appointment mechanisms. These appointments should also be made based on objective criteria and should be limited to individuals who belong to the institution they have been nominated to preside over, instead of members of other bodies, as is sometimes done when judges from the ordinary judiciary are appointed to preside over the State Council or the Court of Accounts.

As for financial independence, none of the three branches of the judiciary has the financial autonomy to set its own budget. The budgets of the civil and administrative judiciaries are incorporated in the Ministry of Justice’s budget, whereas the Court of Accounts’ budget is allocated under the prime minister’s office. Ideally, all three court branches should be independent in financial matters, and courts should be given sufficient funds to exercise their duties autonomously and efficiently, free from the interference of the executive branch. Thus, each branch of the judiciary should have a budget separate from the one allocated to the Ministry of Justice or the prime minister’s office. One potential step toward financial independence could be to prescribe a minimum threshold determined by the Supreme Judicial Council, the State Council’s Bureau, and the Court of Account’s Council, below which the budget of each branch cannot be set. In the current context, this would safeguard the effective functioning of the courts.

The sole paradox regarding this matter is that the president of the State Council and the president of the Court of Accounts exercise the same spending powers granted to the minister, unlike the ordinary judicial courts where the minister of justice retains this authority. To resolve this discrepancy, the president of the Supreme Judicial Council should be given the same authority held by the president of the State Council and the president of the Court of Accounts.

To sum up, the amendments introduced by the new law constitute a crucial, if incomplete, step toward guaranteeing judicial independence in Lebanon. Though the reforms are important, the new law does not address certain key restrictions. The majority of the Supreme Judicial Council’s members are still not elected, financial independence has yet to be secured, and judges lack the right to challenge decisions of the Supreme Judicial Council before the State Council. Further, some legal provisions remain vague or unclear. The decision of the president to return the law to parliament represents an opportunity to strengthen its provisions and advance toward genuine judicial independence. However, regardless of the number or extent of the reforms introduced, the independence of the judiciary ultimately depends on each judge embodying this principle. As such, independence first stems from within.

Mira Messelmani currently serves as a judge on Lebanon’s State Council. She holds a bachelor’s degree in law from the Lebanese University and completed her studies in political science at the American University of Beirut. She pursued a master’s degree in public law at the University of Rennes 1 in France.

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