US President Joe Biden will meet with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu during his visit to Washington this week. Their discussions, undoubtedly, will focus on ending the conflict, releasing the hostages, and expanding humanitarian assistance to the Gaza Strip. However, the meeting also provides an opportunity to double down on considerations of what a “day after” might look like and how best to promote moderate Palestinian voices in the effort to rebuild Gaza.
A number of plans have been proffered for addressing the post-conflict environment. One oft-cited proposal calls for “regional and non-regional states to implement a Multinational Authority to temporarily administer Gaza.” However, the willingness of countries in the region to participate in such an effort remains questionable, absent the setting of a timeline for the establishment of a Palestinian state, which Israel continues to resist. Further, given the perception of 21st century colonialism that would accompany such an effort, obtaining formal international sanction through the United Nations would be difficult. Hence, an extensive international civilian administration, as opposed to the imperative of some form of international security force, should be considered only if there are no viable Palestinian options.
One alternative is the Palestinian Authority (PA). However, since 2007, Gaza has been under the de facto control of Hamas. The PA, meanwhile, is widely seen as corrupt, inept, and incapable of responding to the immediate needs of the population. According to public opinion surveys, a majority of Gazan Palestinians does not want to see the PA, in its current form, resume control of the strip. A reconciliation agreement between Fatah and Hamas negotiated in Beijing notwithstanding, Palestinians remain skeptical that the PA could form a new consensus government that would obtain the requisite credibility in the timeframe necessary to serve as an effective interlocutor and coordinator for meeting the immediate needs of Gaza’s population.
For its part, Israel has floated the idea of establishing administrative “bubbles” that would be governed by local Palestinian leaders who have been vetted and deemed free of taint from Hamas. However, local leaders would likely be wary of working with the Israelis, given their fears of being deemed collaborators by other Palestinians and risking the ire of Hamas and other militias still operating in Gaza.
A third option is for well-respected and non-partisan Palestinian leaders in Gaza to self-organize an interim Provincial Council. This body would operate under a purposely narrow agenda of establishing priorities for the immediate post-conflict period and designating an Interim Transitional Executive (ITE) of five-to-nine members to respond to the immediate needs of the population and to interact with external stakeholders. Broader political and national issues would remain within the domain of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), including who should be represented as members within the organization and what posture to take with respect to future negotiations with Israel.
Who would convene the Provincial Council? Ideally, it would be a “local” notable, who has the requisite stature and credibility, willingness to step to the fore, adeptness to solicit representation by relevant groups, and ability to set the terms for participation. Alternatively, the PA could designate the council convener, while eschewing involvement in the selection of its members and control of its operations. The PA’s incentives to support such an effort would be to marginalize Hamas and provide the PA time to reestablish its credibility and relevance with the population in Gaza.
Who would serve on such a council? Prior to Oct. 7, Gaza had a multitude of civil society organizations, professional associations, private-sector groupings, universities, and other institutions, whose leaders were well-qualified and broadly representative of Gazan society. To ensure the independence of the council and to allay concerns that it would be subject to Hamas control, the convener would have to insist that no one from the military wings of any Palestinian faction will participate in the Provincial Council and that members of the council commit, in writing, to focus exclusively on the prospective recovery and reconstruction of Gaza.
How would the Interim Transition Executive relate to the PA? The ITE would coordinate with a PA-designated liaison to reinforce the validity of existing Palestinian institutional structures. However, during this interim period, the ITE would be responsible for engaging with external actors, supervising the implementation of early recovery and longer-term projects, as well as establishing effective mechanisms for transparency and accountability. This bifurcated structure would provide the PA with the opportunity to undertake necessary and long-promised internal political reforms, while not slowing down the essential economic rebuilding of Gaza that should begin as soon as possible.
To facilitate the ITE’s work, the PA could detail to the ITE Gazan employees who have remained on the PA payroll since 2007 and who have been properly vetted. PA agencies that have operated in Gaza since 2007, such as the Palestinian Water Authority, would continue to function as before, although they would have to seek support for their reconstruction needs through the ITE.
While there is broad agreement that elections are not immediately feasible, the populations of Gaza and the West Bank need assurances that elections will take place within a reasonable horizon and with the consent of all major factions. This imperative is particularly true in Gaza, where more than 60 percent of those 18 and over have never participated in any election. Hence, to further emphasize the ITE’s interim status and to expedite creating the conditions for credible elections, the ITE would actively support the work of the Palestinian Central Elections Commission. And once elections occur, the ITE would dissolve.
At present, this approach for empowering the Gazan population has not gained much traction. Understandably, most Gazans are preoccupied with ensuring the safety and well-being of their families and friends amidst the constant shelling, displacement, search for food, medicine, and shelter that has been the reality since Oct. 7. And the fear of Hamas’ retaliation against anyone proffering an independent political stance cannot be ignored.
Yet under the anticipated quiet of a cease-fire — once another one is finally negotiated — President Biden should encourage Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, and the international community to incentivize a Gaza-centric effort that would take advantage of the formidable experience of Gaza’s civil society institutions and not be seen as operating under the thumb of Israel, the Palestinian Authority, or an international body.
Larry Garber, a former senior USAID policy official during the Clinton and Obama administrations, served as the USAID mission director to the West Bank and Gaza and as an election observer to the Palestinian presidential elections, legislative elections, and to the West Bank municipal elections.
MAHMUD HAMS/AFP via Getty Images
The Middle East Institute (MEI) is an independent, non-partisan, non-for-profit, educational organization. It does not engage in advocacy and its scholars’ opinions are their own. MEI welcomes financial donations, but retains sole editorial control over its work and its publications reflect only the authors’ views. For a listing of MEI donors, please click here.