The Syrian regime recently announced that it had arrested over 2,000 people in Damascus on drug-related charges during the first half of 2024. Investigative reports confirm that Syria's drug market continues to grow in terms of production, distribution, and consumption levels. However, the relatively small amount of drugs confiscated suggests the regime is focusing on arresting users and street-level pushers rather than going after the major producers and traffickers.
Additionally, the regime has a history of inflating drug-related arrest figures to gain political favor with Arab states, which prioritize anti-drug efforts in their normalization process with Bashar al-Assad. Therefore, it is unwise to take the regime's figures at face value in the absence of credible verification mechanisms. Even if the numbers are accurate, not all detainees remain in jail due to widespread corruption. This highlights how the Syrian regime manipulates drug crackdowns to serve multiple agendas while ensuring the flow of illicit drugs continues uninterrupted.
Drug war façade
Since Syria’s return to the Arab League in May of last year, the Assad regime has frequently claimed to be cracking down on traffickers to highlight its efforts to rein in the drug trade within and through Syria. These claims have intensified in recent months following sharp criticism from Gulf states and Jordan, which have condemned Syria's failure to stop the smuggling of Captagon into their territories.
Notably, the regime’s minister of interior capitalized on the International Day against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking on June 26 to praise the ministry’s efforts. He stated that the government had dismantled numerous drug trafficking networks, seized large quantities of drugs, and arrested many dealers, confiscating narcotics hidden using sophisticated methods.
Nevertheless, the regime has a longstanding pattern of exaggerating drug-related arrest figures to distract from the significant role its networks have played in transforming Syria into a narco-state. Reports suggests the inflation of arrest numbers is a tactic to magnify the purported success of its anti-drug operations. For example, in September 2022, Brig. Gen. Nidal Jreij, the director of the Syrian Drug Control Department, claimed that the regime's counter-narcotics efforts in the first nine months of that year resulted in the arrest of 851,621 individuals on drug-related charges — nearly 15% of Syria's adult population.
Beyond the headline number, however, the regime did not provide details on the locations of the arrests, the profiles of those detained, the quantities of drugs seized, or the legal proceedings that followed. This lack of transparency further undermines the credibility of these figures. Additionally, monitoring reports from the Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA) reveal that only 343 people were reportedly arrested on drug-related charges during the same period — a massive discrepancy.
In addition, some of the anti-drug campaigns announced by the regime seem to be mere media stunts, yielding few, if any, significant arrests. For instance, a high-profile security campaign announced last July, following a meeting in Amman aimed at coordinating anti-drug efforts between Syrian army and security offices and their Jordanian counterparts, reportedly failed to result in the arrest of any drug dealers.
Token arrests
Even if some of the regime's claims are accurate, they do not necessarily indicate that Assad is committed to dismantling the drug production and trafficking networks operating within and through Syrian territory. Analysts argue that the regime is primarily focused on inflating arrest statistics by targeting drug consumers and low-level pushers in large numbers, aiming to demonstrate cooperation with Arab states following Syria's readmission to the Arab League.
For example, the regime reported that its arrests in Damascus during the first half of this year resulted in the seizure of approximately 164 kg of hashish, 130,000 Captagon pills, 97 grams of crystal meth, 36 grams of heroin, and 67 grams of marijuana. These quantities pale in comparison to the scale of cross-border drug interceptions from Syria. For instance, Jordan reportedly intercepted 16 million Captagon pills and 3,400 kg of hashish coming from Syria since the beginning of this year. This strongly suggests that the regime is going after regular drug users and low-level pushers rather than targeting major producers and traffickers, who have made Syria the largest Captagon producer in the world.
In stark contrast, the regime continues to provide protection to well-known narcotics kingpins like Samer Kamal al-Assad, Wassim al-Assad, and Noah Zeiter, allowing them to operate freely in areas under its control. The regime's role in the drug trade extends even further as well. A field study published in September 2023 by the Syrian organization Etana revealed that around 80% of the drug network in Suwayda is either directly or indirectly affiliated with Syrian Military Intelligence. In Daraa, it is estimated that the regime controls nearly two-thirds of the overall drug network.
Ulterior motives
These smoke-and-mirror tactics should not come as a surprise, as the Syrian regime has been exploiting crackdowns on drug dealers to serve multiple agendas. Last year, the Syrian regime agreed to tackle drug trafficking across its borders with Jordan and Iraq in exchange for readmission to the Arab League. However, the regime’s failure to fulfill its promises has led to increased criticism from Arab states, especially Jordan, and has negatively impacted normalization efforts. As a result, the regime conducts these minor drug-related crackdowns to create the illusion of action, aiming to ease tensions with neighboring countries.
Detention for extortion has become increasingly prevalent in Syria in recent years, and drug-related arrests do not seem to be excluded from this scheme. Even if the some of these arrests are not motivated by extortion, the widespread corruption inside the regime’s security and judicial structures typically allows those detained on drug charges to buy their freedom. The example of Ahmed al-Sheikha, a prominent drug dealer from Suwayda, illustrates how the regime hits more than one bird with one stone. Ahmed was detained on April 10, ahead of a scheduled meeting with the Arab Liaison Committee in Baghdad on May 7, where drug trafficking from Syria was a key agenda item. Nonetheless, open-source data indicates that he managed to secure his release a few weeks later after paying over $80,000 in bribes.
Beyond scoring political points and engaging in extortion, the Syrian regime uses detention to assert its authority over illicit trade within regime-controlled networks and intimidate those who do not comply with its demands. This is particularly evident when regime-linked drug dealers are involved in the crackdowns. For instance, in May 2023, security forces raided the al-Salem compound in Kharab al-Shahm, owned by known drug dealer Hamad Mahawish al-Khalidi, resulting in two arrests. During the same week, the regime raided a farm near Maaraba village owned by suspected drug trafficker Rafi Ruwais, leading to two more arrests. These operations were orchestrated by military-security units under the command of Imad Abu Zreik, who has been sanctioned by the US for his involvement in drug trafficking.
Maintaining the flow of drugs
Even as Damascus has pretended to crack down on smuggling, regime-sponsored drug networks have continued to expand. Recent on-the-ground monitoring by the Syrian organization Etana has revealed a notable surge in cross-border smuggling attempts from Syria, with the numbers more than tripling since the previous smuggling season, typically occurring between October and March. In the 2024 season, Etana documented 282 smuggling attempts, a significant increase from the 108 recorded in the previous season.
Moreover, the regime-affiliated drug networks have strategically invested in expanding their reach within the domestic market. An extensive investigation by Syria TV showcased how the network, spearheaded by the Fourth Division, under the command of Maher al-Assad, Bashar al-Assad’s brother, has established a sophisticated infrastructure near Damascus to optimize production and distribution. The investigation identified three suspected industrial-scale Captagon production facilities in the area, collectively manufacturing an estimated 20 million pills per month for both local consumption and international trade.
Despite its pretenses, the Assad regime continues to serve as the main supplier of Captagon. This fact is evident in its superficial drug crackdowns, which serve as more of a cover for its operations than a genuine attempt to tackle the issue. As a result, the data and actions reported from these initiatives lack credibility and must undergo thorough independent evaluation. Accepting these figures at face value perpetuates the regime's deceptive tactics and fails to tackle the root of Syria's growing narcotics problem.
Dr. Haid Haid is a Syrian columnist and a consulting fellow with the Middle East and North Africa program at Chatham House.
Photo by JOSEPH EID/AFP via Getty Images
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