US-Israel relations in the wake of October 7

Many Israelis feel that the Hamas onslaught of Oct. 7, in which more than 1,400 Israelis were killed, thousands injured, and over 200 taken hostage, will necessitate a profound conceptual change in Israel’s national security approach. This is a war that could continue for a protracted period, and, therefore, it is too early to assess the overall impact on Israel’s military thinking and its consequential diplomatic challenges. It will be necessary to establish in due time a Commission of Inquiry to fully investigate and recommend steps that need to be taken on a political, military, and intelligence level to address the responsibility for Israel’s systemic failure to prevent the Hamas attack, as admitted by senior defense officials. 

In the interim, however, the intensity of this crisis has already had a significant and dramatic impact on relations between the United States and Israel. President Joe Biden’s exceptional speech on Oct. 10, when he referred to the Hamas attack as a moment in which “pure and unadulterated evil is released on this world,” and his subsequent visit to Israel — still an active war zone — eight days later together were an outstanding expression of support and solidarity for Israel as well as a profound commitment that went beyond simple rhetoric. America’s posture in the region changed dramatically in a short time.  

US demonstrates its commitment 

In that first speech, the U.S. president announced a major reinforcement of America’s naval presence in the eastern Mediterranean, including the dispatch of the USS Gerald R. Ford Carrier Strike Group. Shortly thereafter, the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower Carrier Strike Group was deployed to the Persian Gulf. In addition, Secretary of State Antony Blinken spent many hours in discussions at the highest level with Israel’s Emergency War Cabinet and engaged in shuttle diplomacy aimed at freeing the hostages. In parallel, senior U.S. military officers were intensely engaged with their Israeli counterparts on an ongoing basis regarding the war and launched a massive operation to resupply Israel with vital military equipment, including Iron Dome air-defense missiles. The U.S. military attacked two targets in Syria associated with Iranian-backed militias and also intercepted Houthi cruise missiles and drones over the Red Sea that may have been aimed at Israel. These developments reflected the purest expression of the strategic partnership that has existed between Israel and the U.S. for more than five decades. 

One of the clear intentions behind the U.S. naval deployment was to send a strong message of deterrence to Hezbollah and Iran, pressuring them not to intervene and open another front with Israel in the north. The Biden administration is aware of the immense threats Israel faces simultaneously on multiple fronts (Gaza, the West Bank, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Syria, and Iran) and the critical need to preserve a credible deterrent posture along each of these axes. Israeli deterrence is like a chain that must be perceived as equally strong and unbroken in Tehran, Damascus, Beirut, and Gaza at the same time. Any perceived weakness or actual rupture in even one link in this chain could have broader repercussions. The American naval and air force presence in the region is, therefore, not a substitute for Israeli deterrence but rather a strong message to any other parties that seek to take advantage of the fighting around Gaza. President Biden’s Oct. 18 visit to Israel further bolstered this message not only for Israel’s enemies but also for its Arab neighbors, each of which retains a major interest in preserving strong ties with Washington.  

Some Israelis argue this considerable American support detracts from the traditional thinking that Israel must always be able to defend itself and deter its enemies independently. In fact, Israel has not abandoned its own deterrent power; any attempt by Israel’s regional rivals, particularly at this time, to militarily test the Israeli will to respond or America’s renewed commitment to regional security would invite a categorical response. 

Historical precedents 

This is not the first time that the U.S. has stood by Israel in a time of war. In the wake of the surprise Egyptian and Syrian attacks in 1973, America’s massive airlift to Israel was a major factor that enabled the latter to push back the assault on both fronts and convert the initial setback into to an impressive Israeli military victory. When Israel was hit by around 40 Iraqi missiles during the First Gulf War, in 1991, the Shamir government decided not to respond — not out of weakness but rather out of consideration for the clear American interest in this respect. This restraint was profoundly important to the U.S. because such a reaction would have affected the American conduct and handling of that war against Saddam Hussein. It resulted in two things: the U.S. military incorporated intended potential Israeli responses into American operational planning, and, on a deeper level, Israel’s restraint demonstrated that it could be relied upon as a strategic ally to the U.S. in times of crisis. In many ways this led to the subsequent enhancement of the strategic partnership between both countries during Yitzhak Rabin’s premiership, starting with President George H. W. Bush in 1992 and then with President Bill Clinton. The current intense military and intelligence consultations between the U.S. and Israel can, thus, be expected to similarly benefit both sides and be instrumental in maintaining the synchronization and coordination of their respective policies at a higher level as this war proceeds.  

Implications of Hamas attacks for American regional policies 

Beyond the strong level of American support, there were other elements to President Biden’s speech that should be borne in mind. This Hamas mega-terror attack re-ignited a broader American concern that the war against ISIS and jihadist terrorism is still a very real threat to regional stability. It also directly threatened the American interest in promoting a solution to the Palestinian problem. Hamas threatens moderate secular Palestinians, who need no reminder of the militant group’s brutal seizure of Gaza in 2007 from the Palestinian Authority (PA). Hamas, then and now, presents an existential challenge to the PA in Ramallah and has rejected any possible two-state solution that the U.S. seeks. This could have severe consequences for American interests in the Middle East, considering the recent policy to expand the Abraham Accords to include Saudi Arabia. The expansion of the Abraham Accords and normalization between Israel and additional Arab states is a crucial U.S. interest. It is also a joint interest of Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran to undermine that normalization.  

Another related concern in the Biden administration’s approach was the cautionary need for Israel to react to the Hamas onslaught, like all democratic countries, in accordance with international law. The sitting U.S. president’s personal friendship toward Israel and its leaders has been consistent and steadfast over the years, and he is fully aware of the harsh dilemmas Israel faces in feeling the need to respond immediately and decisively to terrorism, especially when confronting an enemy that uses its own people as human shields and embeds rocket launchers in civilian areas. This predicament and Israel’s need to respond to this form of terrorism by Hamas and Hezbollah has, at times, given rise to much criticism in the international arena. Indeed, the explosion near the al-Ahli Arab Hospital — which U.S. intelligence connected to a Palestinian Islamic Jihad rocket that crashed within seconds of being launched — initially triggered a media outcry against Israel, without any factual basis. One may readily assume that against this background, Biden’s visit to Israel was also meant to reinforce the need to be sensitive to Palestinian civilian casualties in the process of targeting Hamas leaders and continue humanitarian aid to Palestinian civilians in Gaza as appropriate.  

A shared experience and realignment of priorities 

A further important factor shaping the close dialogue between the two countries is that America possesses its own experience of having to respond to an unprecedented terrorist atrocity, the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks. For Israel, this is a time when heightened and charged emotions and profound anger are natural, but they should not be the basis for deciding an appropriate military response given the danger of collateral damage to civilians on the other side. Thus, Biden pointedly noted, “while you feel that rage, don’t be consumed by it,” and admitted that after 9/11, the U.S. sought justice but “also made mistakes.”  

Throughout its history, Israel has at times won the war on the battlefield but lost the battle for public opinion in the diplomatic arena. In these circumstances, the ongoing consultations with the U.S. could provide an important opportunity to weigh without haste the different dangers and risks of potential responses between two close allies. After all, Osama bin Laden was killed almost 10 years after 9/11; Hamas will also not disappear overnight. We should not forget that over 30 American citizens were killed by Hamas in this attack and several taken hostage to Gaza. Joint consultation with America and other key allies like Germany is the correct and appropriate course of action. Sadly, this war will not be over soon, and freeing the hostages will remain the highest and most essential priority that will necessitate ongoing and frequent consultations. These will also be needed with respect to any potential escalation with Hezbollah and Iran in the north.  

It cannot be ignored that the relations between the present Israeli government and the Biden administration were strained in recent months prior to Oct. 7 in view of the judicial overhaul controversy, which created an unprecedented split in Israeli society. This bilateral tension also stemmed from the ruling coalition’s declared policy to extend Israeli sovereignty and control in the West Bank. This had a negative impact on Israeli relations with the U.S. administration and delayed a meeting between President Biden and Prime Minister Netanyahu, until they met on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in September. The disunity in Israel could have been a factor that clouded regional perceptions of the country, weakening its deterrence and contributing to Hamas’ decision to carry out this brazen attack. One may speculate that if the contentious push by the government to revamp the judiciary had any role in undermining Israel’s national security and deterrence, this war will be a key factor in taking the judicial overhaul off the table for good. 

Implications of US’s backing for Israel’s future actions 

While Israel will continue to make its own sovereign decisions regarding core security interests, the massive American backing will clearly impact Israeli policy choices and options in several key areas.

The first area will be with respect to the Palestinians. It can be safely assumed that while the U.S. will continue to support Israel’s war effort, it will not abandon the political horizon of the two-state solution, which requires the ultimate political defeat of Hamas. The U.S. will also continue to emphasize the need to provide major humanitarian assistance to the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank. This will necessitate much restraint in how the present coalition in Israel relates generally to the Palestinian issue and especially to extending sovereignty or settlements in the West Bank. It would also demand an Israeli shift with respect to supporting the PA as a crucial alternative to Hamas in any “day after” scenario. Israel will have to take some tough but essential decisions regarding a viable political solution to the Palestinian issue. This will remain a highly controversial and divisive issue for the present coalition government. 

Second, as President Biden stated, the war will only strengthen his commitment to work for Israel’s greater integration with its neighbors. This attack by Hamas clearly complicates the pursuit of a U.S.-Saudi bilateral agreement and normalization with Israel, but it has in no way negated the deeper motivations underlying this potential breakthrough and may even have strengthened them. The Oct. 7 Hamas attack depended on massive Iranian assistance in terms of military hardware, financing, and training; the same is true for Hezbollah to be able to continue to threaten Israel from the north. Iran is an agent of instability and a direct threat to not only Israel but also Saudi Arabia and other moderate Arab states. The preservation and expansion of the Abraham Accords as well as Israel’s relations with Egypt and Jordan are a crucial part of any future stable security architecture of the Middle East, which Iran cannot be permitted to derail. 

Third, the dramatic demonstration of support and solidarity by President Biden will long be remembered as one of the outstanding moments in the Israeli-American strategic partnership. It will also end any impression that a U.S. president from the Democratic Party is inherently less supportive of Israel than his or her Republican counterpart. It is important that the relations between the two countries once again become relations between two peoples based on the principle of bipartisanship on both sides. 

Fourth, even before Oct. 7, during consultations on a possible Saudi Arabia deal, the possibility of an Israeli-American alliance had been mentioned. Over the years, America has had an evolving strategic relationship with Israel, in contrast to its more formal alliances with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Japan, and South Korea. This partnership has been shaped by military engagements of both countries in the region, mutual interests, and shared values that have lately received greater emphasis. Israel has always sought closer cooperation with America on all levels and across the entire spectrum of bilateral relations, but the importance of Israel being able to rely on its own independent deterrent power and freedom of action remains vital. As stated at the outset, the attacks of Oct. 7 will necessitate a major review of Israel’s national security, and a changing reality could produce a still greater convergence of American and Israeli interests. This in turn could constitute a different basis for considering a more formal alliance.  

Finally, this renewed spirit of intense cooperation and consultation will hopefully provide greater policy coordination between the U.S. and Israel in contending with the threat of a nuclear Iran, which cannot be ignored at this crucial moment. Iran’s nuclear program continues to push forward, and Tehran clearly hopes that the war in Gaza and the crisis it has precipitated will shift international attention away from its advancing nuclear ambitions. For Israel as well as the U.S., this is a time for strategic multitasking.  

Amb. (ret.) Jeremy Issacharoff is a former Vice-Director General of the Israeli Foreign Ministry responsible for Strategic Affairs. He has served as Israel’s Ambassador to Germany and Deputy Ambassador to the United States.

Photo by BRENDAN SMIALOWSKI/AFP via Getty Images