Will Damascus-SDF negotiations lead to agreement or escalation?

It is becoming apparent that negotiations between the new leadership in Damascus and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) face significant obstacles due to disagreements over military structure and administrative demands. These issues reflect the difficulty of reaching a mutual understanding between the two parties. As these challenges persist, there is growing talk of a potential military escalation in eastern Syria, amid residents’ fears and international mediation efforts to contain the crisis and achieve progress in the negotiations.

Following the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad’s regime by Syrian armed opposition forces led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) on Dec. 8, the new administration managed within days to establish control over two-thirds of the country. However, eastern Syria remains under SDF control, as clashes have intensified between the group and Turkey-backed factions in the north.

Direct negotiations

Both the new Damascus administration and the SDF initially seemed uninterested in escalating tensions. Positive signals were sent, as seen in statements by Ahmed al-Sharaa, leader of HTS and de facto head of the Syrian state, and Mazloum Abdi, commander of the SDF. Following a visit to Syria by US Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Barbara Leaf in December, direct negotiations began in Damascus on Dec. 30, during which an SDF delegation led by Abdi met with al-Sharaa and both sides presented their demands.

According to an advisor to the Damascus administration who is familiar with the negotiations and spoke to the author on the condition of anonymity, the meeting was positive. Al-Sharaa presented a roadmap for resolving the eastern Syria issue and emphasized the need for the new government to extend its control over Syrian territory by deploying its forces in all parts of the country. The state also demanded the removal of non-Syrian Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) fighters from Syrian territory. Furthermore, Damascus pledged to integrate individual members or professional units of the SDF into the new Syrian army based on merit, explicitly rejecting the idea of integrating the SDF as a unified bloc or through a quota system.

In return, Damascus expressed willingness to accommodate Kurdish self-administration institutions by restructuring them to align with other government bodies. The state also committed to ensuring the return of all displaced persons, especially Kurdish residents of Afrin, and to addressing the historical injustices faced by the Kurdish community by granting them full citizenship rights equal to all other Syrians. However, Damascus asserted that the SDF does not exclusively represent the Kurdish community but includes other groups as well. Damascus also offered to mediate between the SDF and Turkey to resolve the situation of Turkish fighters wishing to return to their country. Regarding the issue of Islamic State (ISIS) prisoners held at makeshift facilities in the northeast, the source mentioned that the administration expressed readiness to take custody of the detainees, transfer them to secure areas, and assume full responsibility for them.

Similarly, Majed al-Karo and other members of the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC), the political wing of the SDF, characterized the initial meeting as positive in discussions with the author. The SDF presented its demands, including the necessity of integrating the SDF as a unified bloc into the new Syrian army, administrative decentralization for SDF-controlled areas, and readiness to hand over oil fields, provided revenues are equally distributed across all Syrian regions. The meeting concluded with an agreement to form follow-up committees.

After the meeting, Abdi publicly reaffirmed his forces’ commitment to the unity of the Syrian land and people and expressed support for extending the authority of the state across all of the country’s territory. Abdi expressed the SDF’s willingness to integrate its forces and institutions with those of the state based on a partnership rather than quotas. He emphasized that natural resources belong to all Syrians and that the SDF is prepared to place them under Damascus's control for equitable distribution to achieve stability and prosperity for Syrians. He stressed the need for a jointly agreed roadmap with Damascus to implement the integration and restructuring process quickly and effectively.

However, Abdi rejected the idea of dissolving the SDF in favor of integrating it as a single entity into the Syrian army, warning that dissolution could create a dangerous security vacuum in border areas. He called for the establishment of a joint military committee to study the mechanism of integration. Abdi also emphasized the importance of Kurdish unity and peaceful dialogue with Damascus to guarantee the rights of the Kurdish people within a unified Syrian state. At the same time, he called for the adoption of administrative decentralization to grant broad powers to all ethnic and religious components and stressed the need to end Turkish attacks, which have caused humanitarian tragedies and mass displacement. He highlighted the importance of a continued US presence to ensure stability and counter the threat of ISIS.

A week after his meeting with al-Sharaa, Abdi made a rare visit to the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, where he met Kurdish leader Masoud Barzani. The visit aimed to unify the Kurdish position in Syria with support from the region's leadership, emphasizing that Kurdish parties should determine their fate peacefully. Barzani called for the withdrawal of PKK fighters from Syria and an agreement with Damascus to guarantee Kurdish rights. Abdi and Barzani also discussed forming a joint Kurdish delegation to strengthen unity and address challenges.

In response to suggestions that Barzani’s initiative was failing, a senior official from the Kurdish National Council who asked not to be identified noted that the SDF faces two options: separating itself from the PKK and integrating with the Syrian army with international and regional support, or rejecting these terms and risking confrontation with Damascus, loss of international support, and Turkish attacks amid international consensus on Syria's unity.

In recent days, developments have become more complicated, with continued clashes occurring around the Tishrin Dam in the governorate of Aleppo, resulting in hundreds of casualties. The PKK has tied its withdrawal from Syria to guarantees of SDF control over the eastern part of the country and an end to Turkish threats. Meanwhile, Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad Hassan al-Shibani, who was speaking from Ankara, adopted an escalatory tone, claiming the presence of the SDF in northern and eastern Syria was “no longer justified.” He stressed the need to dissolve the SDF and reassess institutions established in recent years. Syria’s defense minister, Murhaf Abu Qasra, explicitly rejected integrating the SDF as a military bloc into the army, adding several days later that while the government was open to talks with the SDF about dismantling, “if we have to use force, we will be ready.”

A government source told the author that Damascus was displeased with Abdi’s statements, interpreting them as a tacit rejection of the government's proposals and attributing them to the significant pressure Abdi faced from the Iran-allied PKK. Damascus regarded Abdi’s position as negative and not conducive to continuing the negotiations, and considered it an indication of weak leadership and a lack of independence. Damascus also accused Iran of seeking to derail the talks through its ties with the PKK and exerting pressure on the SDF leadership to reject the proposals. Subsequently, the PKK reportedly carried out four car bomb attacks in Manbij, Tell Rifaat, and Deir Jamal in Aleppo’s countryside in late December and early January, coinciding with security incidents in Syria’s coastal areas. These events followed threats by Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi to spread chaos in Syria.

Escalating tensions

During this period, SDF-controlled areas witnessed escalating security tensions, including significant defections among Arab SDF members, protests against SDF security dominance, forced conscription of youth, and arrests of anti-SDF activists in Raqqa, Deir ez-Zor, and Hasakah. According to media reports and activists in the area, the PKK-affiliated “Revolutionary Youth” imposed large taxes on shop owners and forced employees of the self-administered areas to participate in mandatory demonstrations supporting the SDF. They also imposed SDF curricula on Arab and Syriac populations by force and closed government institutions affiliated with Damascus.

Residents of northern Syria fear a Turkish military escalation similar to what occurred in Afrin, Ras al-Ayn, and Manbij, leading to mass displacement, the destruction of infrastructure, and the involvement of Turkish-backed factions known for widespread human rights violations in areas previously under their control.

Council Member al-Karo emphasized the SDF’s desire for negotiations to continue through specialized committees in which both sides make concessions to achieve a solution that satisfies Syrians without external interference, particularly from Turkey. While Reuters reported the negotiations were continuing under international mediation, a government source denied this in a conversation with the author, stating that the Syrian government had decided to suspend the talks and had moved military reinforcements to eastern Syria in preparation for various scenarios. He added that Damascus remains open to dialogue if the SDF, led by Abdi, returns to negotiations and demonstrates seriousness in making decisions independently from the PKK and its Iranian supporters, based on Syrian sovereignty as outlined in the Damascus meeting. In an interview with a Turkish TV channel on Jan. 23, al-Sharaa held out the potential for further talks with the SDF, saying, “We are considering negotiating and sitting down with them. Our goal is to find a middle ground.” 

The gap between the parties remains wide, with the HTS rejecting the idea of a unified SDF within the army and the SDF refusing to dissolve. The issue of integrating self-administration institutions into the new state institutions is largely procedural and undisputed, while political matters are being left to the as yet unscheduled national conference, which will define the new governance structure through a constitutional declaration representing all Syrians.

Potential outcomes

The direct negotiations appear stalled, but all indications point to the fate of the SDF and eastern Syria being contingent on regional and international agreements. Everyone awaits the new US administration’s stance on the Middle East and Syria in particular, as Turkey exerted significant pressure to achieve gains and impose facts on the ground ahead of Donald Trump’s inauguration and any subsequent policy actions. Meanwhile, the SDF seems to be stalling in the hope of gaining international support to relieve Turkish pressure. However, internal challenges may force the Kurds to resolve this issue quickly. Amid this escalation, potential outcomes include:

1. Successful negotiations: In this scenario, a compromise between the Damascus government and the SDF achieves stability in the region without establishing a special federal system. This would allow Damascus to assert sovereignty, particularly over borders and oil fields, while granting military and administrative positions to the SDF in the new structure. This scenario would also enable joint administrative and security control over eastern Syria, satisfying the SDF, Syrian Kurds, and the Arab tribes in the region. However, the chances of this scenario succeeding appear slim, given the challenges of removing PKK fighters, continued Turkish pressure on Damascus, and the necessity of international cooperation to ensure stability in eastern Syria and pave the way for a national conference, army restructuring, and economic revitalization.

2. Failed negotiations and escalating conflict: This scenario entails an escalation of military conflict in the north, pitting Turkey and its factions and the national army against the SDF. This would result in significant civilian casualties and extensive damage to infrastructure, further polarizing ethnic groups and potentially leading to a civil war in Jazira, the northeastern region of the country, especially with growing tensions between Arab tribes and the SDF due to practices among PKK-affiliated groups. Such instability might also allow ISIS to increase its activities and result in the release or escape of ISIS detainees from prisons. Damascus, on the other hand, could face severe destabilization in the south and coastal areas due to its focus on battles in the east, opening the door for increased Iranian intervention and further destabilizing the Middle East.

3. Protracted stalemate and tactical escalation: In this scenario, the Damascus administration might resort to limited military operations at key contact points, coinciding with Turkish escalations in the north. This strategy would aim to pressure the SDF into engaging more seriously in negotiations and to appease Arab tribes, some of whose members have joined the new Syrian army and HTS. However, this prolonged stalemate could lead to long-term security crises. The SDF might attempt to replicate the tactics it used in 2019 following Turkey’s Operation Peace Spring against the Kurdish fighters in northern Syria, when it promised to withdraw PKK fighters and proposed to deploy government forces along the border under Russian mediation. However, this tactic may not be as effective this time around due to a lack of sufficient room for maneuver, the absence of Russian influence, and the possibility of a sudden agreement between the Trump administration and Ankara.

US-SDF relations

The relationship between the United States and the SDF primarily revolves around the shared goal of preventing an ISIS resurgence and ensuring stability in the region. The Trump administration should push for steps to improve relations between the SDF and the Damascus administration to prevent a return to conflict in Syria and in the wider region. Initial elements of this approach could include lifting certain sanctions and removing rewards offered for the capture of Ahmed al-Sharaa, with the potential future removal of HTS from terrorist lists, contingent on changes in the Syrian administration’s political behavior.

In this context, Washington should pressure both Damascus and the SDF to demonstrate greater flexibility in negotiations to reach an agreement that prevents the return of ISIS, secures Kurdish rights, integrates the SDF leadership into national institutions, rebuilds the national army, and ensures Syria’s unity. Additionally, pressure must be applied on the SDF to adhere to national standards, sever its ties with the PKK, ease restrictions on civilians, and halt human rights violations. In return, Damascus must provide genuine guarantees to protect the rights of Kurds and Arab tribes. Progress on this issue could inspire actors in other areas, such as Daraa, Suwayda, and northern Syria, to resolve their conflicts and move toward similar settlements.

Regarding the status of US forces in eastern Syria and the Tanf base near the border with Jordan, a resolution that safeguards Washington’s interests and maintains a regional balance while respecting the sovereignty of the new government must be found. The Trump administration could call for a conditional withdrawal contingent on achieving sustainable stability in Syria or legalize the US presence through an agreement with the Damascus administration, similar to the arrangement in Iraq following the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime.

Regionally, the administration should coordinate with Turkey to ensure the removal of PKK fighters from Syria and respect for the sovereignty of the Syrian state. At the same time, coordination is needed to address the issue of ISIS detainees by transferring their responsibility to Damascus and establishing a special court under the supervision of an international coalition. Furthermore, there is an urgent need to launch a comprehensive program to counter extremist ideologies to ensure ISIS does not resurge. Finally, the United States must work toward a strategic partnership with the new Syrian administration as part of a regional alliance that includes Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey, aimed at combating terrorism and preventing Iran from once again expanding its influence in Syria.

Conclusion

The negotiations between Damascus and the SDF are at a critical juncture, facing challenges related to the divergent demands of both parties, regional and international pressures, and the looming threat of military escalation. The future of eastern Syria hinges on the formation of international agreements capable of achieving lasting stability within the context of complex security challenges, fears of ISIS resurgence, and potential military escalations. While the US strives to maintain its presence and ensure regional stability, the success of these efforts depends on the ability of key players to find common ground and implement viable solutions. With the current stalemate persisting, the region stands at a crossroads between a comprehensive political settlement and an escalated conflict that could exacerbate the already dire situation.

Samer al-Ahmed is a Syrian journalist and researcher who focuses on developments in northeastern Syria. He holds a master’s degree in international relations and has written multiple reports and research papers for Arab and international centers. You can follow him on Twitter @sameralahmadnq.

Photo by Delil Souleiman/AFP via Getty Images