Gulf and Arabian Peninsula

President Theodore Roosevelt said, “Speak softly and carry a big stick; you will go far.”¹ Roosevelt used the image of the big stick to popularize his philosophy, but he offered a subtler interpretation in other venues. It represented a quiet threat that would only rarely need to be used if accompanied by steady diplomacy.

In recent years, Iraq has become one of the leading destinations for Chinese investments in the Middle East and a crucial link in Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative. To capitalize on its geostrategic location and central position within the Chinese BRI, Iraq is seeking to develop a sprawling new 54-square-kilometer port project, known as al-Faw Grand Port, which will reduce the country’s reliance on Arab Gulf ports and overland transit from Iran and Turkey. The project also underscores Iraq’s growing economic rivalry with neighboring Iran, as both countries seek to carve out a similar niche in handling regional transit traffic.

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The oil and gas sector has been the dominant driver of Qatar’s economy. Over the years, although that sector has remained the major focus of Qatari investments, the emphasis has increasingly shifted towards the expansion of the country’s gas production and LNG export capacity. While the construction boom ahead of the 2022 FIFA World Cup powered the Qatari economy in recent years, income generated by the expansion of the country’s LNG production and export capacity is likely to drive the economy for many years to come — both despite and partly because of the market turmoil caused by the fallout from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

Saudi Arabia has made it clear that it wants a defense pact with the United States in return for normalizing ties with Israel. However, that isn’t a price Washington is able or willing to accept, for both political and strategic reasons. But the conversation about improved U.S.-Saudi defense cooperation shouldn’t stop here. There’s plenty of room for achieving that objective without having to upgrade the relationship to a full-fledged alliance.

After an intense round of secret negotiations between Iranian and Saudi representatives, facilitated by Chinese mediation, Tehran and Riyadh announced in mid-March that they would resume diplomatic relations. It is unclear if the Saudi-Iranian détente will last, but at least for now, China’s role in resolving this diplomatic stalemate seems to indicate the beginning of a multi-faceted de-Westernization process in the region.

The conclusion of the China-brokered Saudi-Iranian détente on March 10, which aims to thaw long-standing enmity and manage competition between the two regional arch rivals, has multi-layered implications for Yemen.

Relations between Tehran and Baku have long had their ups and downs, but a recent series of events in late March have once again brought tensions to a boil. However, despite the mutual threat perceptions, the recurring tensions between the two countries have not gotten out of control and led to military conflict. In fact, over the past three decades, relations between Tehran and Baku have consistently followed a cycle of escalating and de-escalating tensions.

More than a year on from the beginning of the Ukraine war in February 2022, there is no more business as usual for Russia-Iran relations. While bilateral ties are still characterized by an intense focus on security and defense, the two sides are opening multiple new areas of cooperation as well. But what has motivated Moscow and Tehran to invest in strengthening their bilateral relations given all the potential risks and costs? Could conflicts of interest and competition put a crack in this burgeoning relationship? And what can the West do about it?

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The implications of the apparent rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran are likely to have significant consequences for vital neighboring regions like South Asia and other populous Muslim countries, including, notably, Pakistan.

The silence from Iran is deafening. Judging by social media reactions and media reports from Iran, few, if any, members of the Iranian public seem to care that, since 2011, the Israeli air force has attacked Iranian and Iranian-affiliated positions in Syria on more than a thousand occasions, reportedly killing a number of Iranian members of the IRGC.