Syria

In its final report, the congressionally-mandated Syria Study Group (SSG) provided a bleak but wholly realistic assessment of the state of the crisis in Syria. When it comes to policy prescriptions, however, the SSG falls short. Despite clearly identifying the “means and ends” gap as one of two core problems with U.S. policy in Syria, the “recommendations” suggested by the SSG differ little, if at all, from those already in place.

At a trilateral summit in Ankara earlier this week, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan sat back and ate treats as Iranian President Hassan Rouhani told the world that efforts to topple the Assad regime have failed. The scene was a stark reminder of how far Turkey’s Syria policy has shifted.

This week’s briefing on recent news and upcoming events in the region featuring Ruba Husari, Paul Salem, Gerald Feierstein, Amal Kandeel, Grace Wermenbol, Robert S. Ford, Charles Lister, and Gonul Tol.

One important dynamic that is not acknowledged enough is the intensifying competition between Russia and Iran to determine the future shape of Syria and their position in it. While the very real competitive dynamic between Moscow and Tehran will never transition to hostility, it is beginning to have a very real effect on the evolution of major aspects of the crisis — from active conflict theaters, to the structures of the state, control over resources, and the prospect of intra-state conflict on Syrian soil.

Over the past few weeks, my colleagues at MEI have debated whether the U.S. should stay in Syria or leave. Here I’d make a different argument: that it doesn’t really matter. The president has already made the decision to leave, and while his aides may have been able to slow roll the troop drawdown, the reality is that Donald Trump has made it clear the U.S. will not disburse any additional resources. Even within the 2020 Democratic field, not a single candidate has advocated increasing resources.

Unlike most other goods, the inflation-adjusted prices of oil and oil derivatives actually became cheaper in the years after the Syrian uprising and the loss of most of the country’s oil fields. Iran stepped in to fill the gap by shipping oil by sea through the Suez Canal. In recent months, however, these shipments seem to have ground to a halt, crippling regime-controlled areas. This paper examines several competing explanations for the slowdown in Iranian oil shipments, explores a range of possible responses for the Assad regime, and takes a closer look at the implications for the regime, its allies, and regular Syrians.

This week’s briefing on recent news and upcoming events in the region featuring Randa Slim, Gerald Feierstein, Alex Vatanka, Robert S. Ford, and Michael Sexton.

Debates about populism often lump Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan together with Donald Trump in the US, Vladimir Putin in Russia, and Viktor Orban in Hungary. All four are kindred spirits who have used the same tactics to gain and hold onto power. They stir up fear, divide societies, fuel social conflict, criminalize the opposition, and create internal and external enemies. On the issue of refugees, however, Erdogan has been the epitome of liberalism, setting him apart from his fellow populists.

While some changes may be in the offing, for now most signs suggest that regional leaders should expect neither new opportunities, nor new challenges, but more likely a broad continuity of existing EU policy toward the region.

Turkey and the US recently announced an agreement for establishing a safe zone in northern Syria to serve as a buffer between Turkey and the YPG, which is seen by Ankara as a terrorist group and by Washington as a partner in the fight against ISIS. MEI’s Gonul Tol and Charles Lister join host Alistair Taylor to discuss how this policy may impact dynamics on the ground.

Responding to Daniel Serwer’s “not so progressive case for withdrawing from Syria,” Charles Lister makes the case that the U.S. should remain in Syria — at the very least for long enough to secure conditions in which a realistic set of objectives could be achieved, including the existing counter-ISIS mission.

Over eight years ago, Syrian men, women, and children took to the streets, often holding hands or clutching roses, calling for political reform. Wahed, Wahed, Wahed, al-Shaab al-Suri Wahed, they chanted — “One, One, One, the Syrian People are One!” But the regime did not listen; instead, we were shot at, gassed, and later bombed. As regime violence escalated, the uprising gradually militarized and what had been a local movement driven by society soon became a vicious conflict driven in large part by foreign governments. Then came al-Qaeda, ISIS, and Hezbollah and soon enough, the lives, thoughts, and desires of ordinary Syrians mattered little.

The United States and Turkey have agreed on a way forward that may marginalize Kurdish forces.

Elizabeth Tsurkov has courageously put forward what she calls a progressive case for staying in Syria. I would regard myself as progressive but I’m not convinced, even if I would have supported many of her arguments in the past. In arguing for an indefinite presence in Syria, Tsurkov relies on the notion that staying gives the U.S. influence over Ankara and Moscow, serves as a counter to Tehran, and pressures the Assad regime, possibly even creating “internal fissures in its senior ranks” and causing “the Assad regime to institute reforms that would benefit all Syrians.” Those fissures and reforms have been desired for the past eight years but have not yet appeared. It would be easier to argue that withdrawal is more likely to cause them, and to pressure Ankara and Moscow into countering Tehran.

Ideally, the various sides of the Syrian civil war would seize the opportunity to reach an agreement. However, the Assad regime’s current intransigence and inability counter ISIS necessitate continued U.S. protection of northeastern Syria and efforts to stabilize it until such a deal can be made. This is not an ideal scenario, but the cost of a pullout at this stage will be immense.