Through the vehicle of defense reform, the Biden administration has an opportunity to engage the Saudis on critical national security matters while safeguarding U.S. strategic interests and honoring American values.
The U.S. is disengaging from the Middle East as it shifts its focus elsewhere, a move widely perceived within the region as a sign of a coming American departure. Many in Israel were concerned that this would strengthen Iran and its influence in the region. Instead, it is Israel that has emerged stronger.
With the recent announcement of the Jafurah Field, a massive unconventional, non-associated gas play, Saudi Arabia is looking to enter the global gas sector. The field’s estimated reserves, while substantial, are insufficient to meet current domestic needs and, in the future, displace dirty heavy fuel oil used in power generation and satisfy international export goals. The kingdom thus faces difficult decisions regarding the allocation of the Jafurah gas — to either domestic or international markets — and both options have significant challenges.
The Arab Gulf states appear to be following a common template in responding to the global transition toward an energy system in which renewables play an increasingly central role. They are publicizing renewable energy targets, decarbonizing upstream and downstream oil and gas operations, commissioning renewable energy projects, and improving energy efficiency, among other strategies. A closer look, however, reveals differences in how they have deployed solar and wind power capacity.
في 24 يناير/كانون الأول، أصدرت القيادة المركزية الأمريكية (CENTCOM) بيانًا أكدت فيه أن “القوات الأمريكية في قاعدة الظفرة الجوية، بالقرب من أبو ظبي في دولة الإمارات العربية المتحدة، اعترضت صاروخيين متجهين للداخل بالاستعانة بعدة صواريخ باتريوت اعتراضية بالتزامن مع جهود القوات المسلحة الإماراتية في الساعات الأولى من صباح 24 يناير 2022. نجحت الجهود المشتركة في منع كلا الصاروخين من إصابة القاعدة.
Gulf oil producers do not envisage a post-2050 world devoid of hydrocarbons, even though two of the region’s biggest producers, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, have committed to net-zero carbon emissions by 2050 and 2060, respectively. Reconciling their future environmental commitments with their current reliance on hydrocarbons is going to be an arduous and expensive journey that starts with decarbonizing their oil and gas production to reduce their carbon footprint and increasing their domestic green energy production. With demand for oil and gas forecast to continue post-2050 — albeit at lower levels than now — their net-zero target does not equate to zero oil and gas production. Instead, their transition will differ from that of other countries and will happen at a different pace.
Saudi Arabia has undergone tremendous social change in recent years, but it has struggled to make good on some of its more ambitious financial goals. Much of the promised foreign direct investment has yet to arrive, and the kingdom’s growth agenda has drained its foreign reserves. Most of Mohammed bin Salman’s more eye-catching promises, including futuristic urban megaprojects, remain unfinished.
What these attacks and many others in the region have in common is Iran’s irrefutable involvement. They may have different local contexts and their perpetrators, all loyal to Iran, may have different motivations, but every single one of those attacks was possible only because Iran provided either the weapons or the know-how to assemble and use them.
Long-simmering economic and political tensions between the U.S. and China have continued to spill over into the technology sector, where the two superpowers have made this ever-more vital industry the site of a new Cold War. The acrimony looks poised to only get worse moving forward, potentially leading to a tech decoupling, and 5G is at the heart of it. Some third parties have sought to find a way to navigate this divide and the dilemma is particularly acute for the Gulf states. As they seek to balance their relationships with both Washington and Beijing, several have chosen to stake out their own territory by building an Open Radio Access Network (RAN). This initiative could be a potential solution to the current conundrum that would give states 5G sovereignty in an era of great power competition, with a digital twist.
إن استراتيجية المملكة العربية السعودية لزيادة محفظتها من الأصول النظيفة والمتجددة قد تم تعزيزها في عام 2021، حيث شهدت المملكة العديد من عمليات تمويل المشاريع في قطاع الطاقة الشمسية وأطلقت صندوق البنية التحتية الوطني لتنويع اقتصادها.
Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Iran have been the main competitors in a struggle over who — and in what manner — should act as the patron of Muslims in the Balkans. These three countries are very different in terms of their historical footprint, economic and political presence, and local networks. What they share, however, is the use of Islam to exert soft power. This paper will discuss how they are seeking to wield influence, how regional actors respond to their overtures, and whether these three countries are meeting their objectives in the region.
Saudi Arabia’s leviathan sovereign wealth fund, the Public Investment Fund (PIF), has recently sold a 5% stake in the Saudi Telecom Company (STC). The firm is the largest and most profitable in the regional telecoms sector. The 3.2B USD sale, completed in early Dec. 2021, is yet another step in Riyadh’s privatization drive as part of its Vision 2030 agenda, and highlights the growing role of the Kingdom’s domestic financial sector.
Saudi Arabia’s strategy to push through its portfolio of clean and renewables assets was further strengthened in 2021 as the kingdom witnessed several project financings in the solar sector and launched the National Infrastructure Fund (NIF) to diversify its economy.
The events of recent months, including a series of critical statements by international players about the reluctance of OPEC+ to raise output beyond its established quotas, have clearly demonstrated the changing realities in the oil market. In addition to global uncertainty, the dynamics between Saudi Arabia, Russia, and the U.S., as well as the actions of Asian oil consumers, have become other key factors shaping the cartel’s behavior.
As the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) work to transform from hydrocarbons-driven to data-driven economies, they will need to make significant and well-planned invest-ments in digital infrastructure, particularly when it comes to the complex issue of data govern-ance. They must take the lead in establishing regulatory and legal frameworks aligned with international standards in terms of data gathering, processing, and storing procedures. This report highlights the existing laws and regulations that govern data protection in the GCC while addressing their potential and limitations, along with the similarities and differences between the GCC’s legislative frameworks and the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation, and the impact of the GCC’s current data protection laws on individuals, the private sector, regulators, and governments.