Outside of the security risks brought about by war, the Israel-Hamas conflict has yet to result in major changes in the regional natural gas market.
Despite the Houthis’ geographical distance from Israel and perceived limited capabilities, the threat they represent is all too real and if underestimated, they have the potential to derail diplomatic efforts and destabilize the region, with potentially catastrophic consequences.
Modern Türkiye (the official spelling of Turkey since 2021) sprang like a phoenix from the ashes in 1923, overcoming daunting odds. Its predecessor, the Ottoman Empire, had foolishly joined the war with the Central Powers in 1914 and naively thought its Arab subjects would remain loyal, only to have been utterly defeated and then dismembered. A rebellion led by the empire’s most famous war hero and leader, Kemal Ataturk, overthrew the last sultan, rejected an unjust treaty to divide up the country and repelled the occupying Allies. He established a contemporary republic based on popular
Hamas’ violent and unexpected Oct. 7 attack on Israel has shaken a fragile regional order in the Middle East. Ankara and Tehran are worried that a stronger U.S. presence in the Middle East is detrimental to their regional interests. The war in Gaza might help close the ranks between Turkey and Iran, yet there are serious limitations to a sustainable alliance between the two countries.
What further diplomatic steps should the U.S. take to respond to the Israel-Hamas war and its broadening regional reverberations? MEI has asked a group of former U.S. ambassadors and senior government officials specializing in the region to weigh in.
For the better part of a decade, Turkey and the U.S. have been locked in what might be considered an unhappy marriage, marked by bitter misunderstandings and growing distrust. Some optimists had hoped that something of a reset might be possible, but recent events, both in Turkey’s ongoing conflict with the PKK and because of the ripple effects from Israel’s war with Hamas, likely mean that U.S.-Turkish relations, far from improving, will get colder yet in the months to come.
Read MEI’s weekly briefing featuring expert analysis of key regional developments for the week ahead.
China has long sought to brand itself as a “neutral” player and force for peace in the Middle East and elsewhere, willing and able to talk to “all sides.” Beijing’s nascent ambition to play the role of peacemaker and its potential to shape regional events was on display when it succeeded last March in brokering the détente between Riyadh and Tehran. The Israel-Hamas war offers no such low-hanging fruit. On the contrary, it poses a major test of China’s Middle East peace diplomacy — and an opportunity to examine some of our own, perhaps faulty assumptions.
Prigozhin’s coup was a serious warning sign that should prompt Turkey to cool ties with Russia and rebuild its relationship with the West. Yet today, Turkey and the West look at each other in terms of problems not solutions. While the political risks of reengagement are high for both sides, the potential rewards are well worth the effort needed to overcome them.
Hamas’ murderous raid on Oct. 7, resulting in the deaths of more than 1,300 Israelis, mostly civilians, may well turn out to be a consequential inflection point, having unleashed political and popular forces that could lead in a positive or, just as likely, extremely negative direction.
After several quiet months on the Turkish-Syrian border, tensions have escalated in recent days. Turkish forces have intensified their attacks against the SDF in northeastern Syria and targeted PKK hideouts along the Turkish-Iraqi border. This escalation is unfolding against the backdrop of the suicide blast in Turkey’s capital, Ankara, on Oct. 1 that targeted the Interior Ministry.
Expert regional analysis by MEI scholars and contributors.
Read MEI’s weekly briefing featuring expert analysis of key regional developments for the week ahead.
This report provides an interim assessment of the Biden administration’s overall Middle East strategy and examines the strategic opportunities and risks for U.S. policy in the broader region.
Since Turkey’s presidential election in May, western analysts have held out hope that Recep Tayyip Erdoğan will moderate his strongman style of rule. Feeding their optimism are several steps Erdoğan has taken, including appointing market-friendly technocrats to his economic team, replacing the hardline interior minister, dialling down anti-western rhetoric and voicing support for Sweden’s Nato membership. All these moves, however, are aimed at strengthening Erdoğan’s one-man rule, and the west is helping him.