Research & Commentary Results

Abdelmadjid Tebboune’s rise to the presidency was supposed to bring a degree of predictability to Algeria’s military rulers. But since he was pronounced the winner of the presidential election in December 2019, the regime has entered a new phase of uncertainty. The COVID-19 pandemic, continued dissent, political volatility, and deepening economic malaise have affected the ruling oligarchy’s calculations. Two years after the start of Algeria’s popular uprising, known as the Hirak movement, the country is stuck in the same impasse it has faced since 2019.

Five years ago, President Barack Obama characterized the failure “to plan for the day after” the U.S. intervention in Libya as his worst foreign policy mistake. Certainly, the aftermath of the decision to provide support for the Feb. 17, 2011 uprising, which ended 42 years of Moammar Gadhafi’s erratic and dictatorial rule, hasn’t been happy. Libya’s past decade has featured recurrent civil war, state collapse, terrorism, militias, and warlords, together with competing foreign interventions despite the continuing U.N. arms embargo.

“يَدعي عبد الحميد الدبيبة أنه شعبوي وصل لمنصب سياسي لأنه أتى من خارج الأوساط السياسية، وأن مؤهلاته هي وعوده القائمة على ما أسماه تجفيف مستنقع الفساد. ولكن الحقيقة أن هذه مجرد شعارات.

Read MEI’s weekly briefing featuring expert analysis of key regional developments for the week ahead.

Femicide and other gender-based violence are turning into a real public-health crisis in Algeria. Recent killings have sparked outrage and many Algerians have expressed their anger on social media over this dangerous trend of violence against women, with the hashtag #WeLostOneOfUs trending on Twitter. In Algiers, Béjaïa, Constantine, and Oran, hundreds of women defied pandemic lockdown restrictions to protest and voice their anger over the increase in femicides in the country and the state’s inertia.

Given the host of challenges that Algeria currently faces and consistent with past efforts to diversify its foreign relations, Algeria could seek to deepen its relationship with China — a rising global power with deep pockets and an expanding footprint in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region and a country with which Algeria has already established a comprehensive strategic partnership. Yet, even under a scenario in which Beijing answers the call, it should not be assumed that the scale and contours of Chinese engagement will fundamentally change, will consist mainly of predatory economic activities and malign influences, or can rescue Algeria from structural problems of its own making.

The Middle East is in turmoil, with civil wars raging in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Libya. COVID-19 is now an additional factor on top of the violence and monumental international support tasks, all of which require a sustained commitment. The effects of the deadly COVID-19 pandemic highlight the need for more robust international stabilization efforts to achieve long-term peace and self-sufficiency in the Middle East.

This calendar lists key dates in the MENA region in 2021, broken down by month. It is subject to change and will be updated over the course of the year.

The political turmoil that has plagued the region since the Arab Spring uprisings in 2011, most notably the ongoing conflict in Libya, has made it difficult for China to realize its aim of incorporating the Maghreb into the BRI framework. This article discusses China’s efforts to protect and promote its economic interests in Libya, thereby advancing its prospects for extending the BRI to the region.

The recent exchange of quid pro quos between the U.S. and Morocco has been handled well by both sides, despite the ritual carping to be expected from opponents of the quid and the quo.

Alongside a stalled economy and a messy political transition, the decade since the 2011 revolution has left Tunisia with an intermittent yet ferocious terrorism problem. The frequency of terrorist attacks highlights the dangers posed by an uncertain political environment, widespread economic problems, and regional instability. But the fact that they have become less deadly over time also seems to underline the improvements that successive governments have made to Tunisia’s security apparatus.

A look back at the year’s most important developments with analysis from Paul Salem, Alex Vatanka, Randa Slim, Gerald Feierstein, Gonul Tol, Jonathan M. Winer, Khaled Elgindy, Marvin G. Weinbaum, Mirette F. Mabrouk, Grace Wermenbol, Syed Mohammad Ali, Robert S. Ford, and Khaldoun Khelil.

Artists Asim Ahmed, Reem Aljeally, and Jamila Rizgalla join guest host Lyne Sneige to discuss the challenges facing artists across the region during the global pandemic. Their works are featured in MEI’s first ever open call exhibition, titled “Art in Isolation: Creativity in the Time of Covid-19,” which is on display at the MEI Art Gallery until January 29. The pieces can also be viewed and are for sale online.

Five months after the elimination of Abdel Malek Droukdel, aka Abu Musab Abdel Wadud, the leader of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), by the French army in the Malian city of Talhandak, AQIM appointed a new emir on Nov. 21. His name is Yazid Mebarek, aka Abu Ubayda Yusef al-Annabi, a 51-year-old Algerian and a jihad veteran.

It’s difficult to look at the Middle East and consider its future optimistically. Much of the analysis of the region centers on crisis and collapse. There is plenty of both, fueled by wars and civil conflicts, poverty, extremism, and more. Given the human toll, focusing on all this is natural. It is also necessary if solutions to deeply rooted problems are ever to be developed, leading to a better future.A related risk is becoming blinded to “weak signals” — early indicators of what could become features of potential alternative futures. Weak signals are developments that are emerging outside the dominant norms and trends of today. In the Middle East, probably the most dominant norm is the inability of governments throughout the region to provide security and prosperity for their citizens. The COVID-19 pandemic is making this even more apparent, and markedly worse. It is not just the obvious failed states — as Steven Cook recently observed, “sometimes state failure is a more chronic condition.” But in the midst of this — and fueled by it — there is evidence of activities at the local level to create what is missing. Could these be signals of a future different than the one it is so easy to expect for the region?