Read MEI’s weekly briefing featuring expert analysis of key regional developments for the week ahead.
On Nov. 30, the Islamic State announced that its leader, Abu al-Hassan al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi, had been killed in battle and that his successor, Abu al-Hussein al-Husseini al-Qurayshi, was now in place. Hours later, the United States military’s Central Command confirmed the death of Abu al-Hassan, adding that it had occurred in Daraa, in southern Syria, in mid-October at the hands of “the Free Syrian Army.”
The December 2020 Moroccan-Israeli normalization deal has evolved from a vehicle enabling Morocco to gain long-sought U.S. recognition of its claims on Western Sahara to a broader strategic partnership with Israel. But the relationship further strains relations with neighboring rival Algeria.
أطلقت المجموعات المحلية في مدينة درعا البلد ، وهي مجموعات عسكرية كانت تتبع للجيش السوري الحر، و بقيت في المحافظة بعد توقيع أتفاقية المصالحة مع النظام السوري برعاية روسية في يوليو / تموز عام 2018، عملية عسكرية واسعة على مجموعات هفو _ الحرفوش في أحياء طريق السد والمخيم داخل درعا البلد.
On Oct. 31, local units previously affiliated with the FSA launched a large-scale military operation against the al-Hafo-Harfoush group in the southern Syrian city of Daraa al-Balad. The operation followed a suicide bombing targeting the house of Ghassan al-Akram Abazid, a former FSA leader, that left four dead and several others wounded, on Oct. 28, in Daraa al-Balad. The attack was only the latest in a string of similar operations in southern Syria conducted by the group over the past year targeting military factions affiliated with the opposition.
Read MEI’s weekly briefing featuring expert analysis of key regional developments for the week ahead.
Sudan is geostrategically important to U.S. interests in both Africa and the Middle East. The country’s military rulers, Lt.-Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and his deputy Lt.-Gen. Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (also known as “Hemedti”), are banking on that fact as they seek to press the Biden administration to focus its Sudan policy on stability, rather than supporting calls for democracy.
Read MEI’s weekly briefing featuring expert analysis of key regional developments for the week ahead.
The Ukraine grain export deal, which Turkey helped mediate over the summer, was saved last week to much fanfare; but the central unaddressed issue remains lifting Russia’s illegal blockade of Ukrainian ports, so Ukraine can freely trade with the world.
The Turkish economy’s foreign exchange liquidity problem is getting worse. The current account balance has been in the red this year with a monthly deficit of around $5 billion. The government has so far managed to avoid a repeat of the December 2021 currency shock by restricting capital mobility, further tightening regulations in October 2022.
During the second week of October, unprecedented full-fledged military confrontations broke out in northern Syria between factions of the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA), with Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) subsequently intervening in support of some factions over others. Tukey’s weariness about the constantly deteriorating state of security in the north, resulting mainly from infighting among the SNA forces it backs, and its willingness to impose order on them, could explain its silence on HTS’s military aggression. For HTS, however, expanding its rule and settling scores with some SNA factions may be the main drivers behind its recent attacks.
The “national dialogue” that Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi called for more than five months ago has nearly concluded its lengthy preparatory stage, though the official launch has repeatedly been pushed back. It will be a rare chance for opposition parties to present alternative policies to those of the president. But whether the dialogue marks a genuine change in the regime’s authoritarian policies remains to be seen.
As protesters’ slogans and chants have made clear, the current protests are definitely not about the economy, but about opposition to the regime more broadly and its political and social oppression. Yet Iran’s economic problems have created an atmosphere that encouraged and fueled protesters’ anger and have done nothing to help the regime.
Lebanese crises have repeatedly made international news since October 2019, when the country witnessed the start of a popular revolution against a stagnant and corrupt political elite. Much less discussed but no less critical is the issue of water. The problem has been slumbering for years but has recently come to light along with other failings of the Lebanese government.
The jihadist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in Syria has dispatched its fighters from greater Idlib eastward, taking full control of Afrin city and at least 26 towns and villages to its southwest, most without a fight. This has placed many of its jihadist opponents back under HTS’s control. The dynamics of northwestern Syria are shifting, and the consequences look likely to be extremely significant.