Research & Commentary Results

After achieving respectable growth in 2021, the GCC member states now face the risk of monetary (over) tightening due to the need to follow the U.S Federal Reserve’s interest rate adjustments. These increases are not warranted, however, as the GCC economies currently face relatively moderate inflation. Instead, they should use the available fiscal space to mitigate the negative fallout of monetary tightening and make greater use of PPPs for future infrastructure development.

At the Jeddah summit in mid-July, President Joe Biden declared that “America is back,” a message that was welcomed by Saudi Arabia and Gulf media outlets. But Washington cannot maintain its influence and develop robust relationships in the Middle East without sustained American interest and effort, which have been oscillating with every change in administration.

The U.N.-sponsored truce of April 2022 is the longest pause in fighting Yemen has experienced since the Houthi armed rebellion broke out in September 2014 and the Saudi-led coalition forces intervened six months later. But although there is strong external interest in both extending and expanding the truce given the scale of turmoil in the global arena, credible progress remains lacking, while serious obstacles persist.

Power-sharing arrangements remain a paradoxical phenomenon. As a powerful tool to stop the guns of conflict, they tend to kill the ingredients for peace by preventing politics from changing. Three countries with such arrangements have recently held elections in which outcomes have — ostensibly — led to such political change. Change, however, has yet to materialize and so far the elections have brought more of a perennial companion of power-sharing arrangements: political gridlock.

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The last few years have seen a lot of consolidation in Gulf financial sectors. Not only do these mergers create economic benefits, the merged entities also become potent tools for economic development. The mega-funds and other major financial institutions are part of a trend where Gulf political elites sidestep ossified bureaucracies and instead centralize power in private entities over which they have even more control.

Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has surrounded himself with those who would indulge him and pose little threat. His circle comprises younger, less experienced but presumably loyal princes in key ministerial positions as well as a few select, savvy, experienced older half-brothers and uncles loyal to his father. There are also several notable royal holdovers from smaller family branches, the odd competent technocrat, and a cadre of minions from across the military and security agencies.

Despite U.S. President Joe Biden’s meandering efforts to explain his about-face on Saudi Arabia—visiting the country this week after having dubbed it a “pariah” on the campaign trail—there remains much apprehension about his trip on both ends of the political spectrum. Progressives and human rights advocates worry the president will sacrifice U.S. values for short-term Faustian bargains in an attempt to secure cheap oil and expand Arab-Israeli normalization. Republicans and realists, who favor an interest-driven approach to foreign policy, aren’t sure there is enough to be gained by Washington on these fronts to justify a presidential visit.

Industry analysts widely agree that OPEC+ production levels are currently well below the members’ authorized quotas and that any production increases will mainly be met by Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The challenges facing the group are daunting, but if met, seven major OPEC countries could feasibly raise crude oil production while utilizing existing infrastructure, significantly narrowing the global demand-supply gap.

Mid-term election success will tempt the American president to go for quick wins, but he must enter into talks with an eye on the global demand for energy

When gaming out the country’s likely political trajectory, most fellow Saudi watchers I know agree that the likelihood of the kingdom imploding is slight, but were that to come to pass, the consequences for the U.S. and the rest of the world would be enormous. Yet Saudi Arabia has managed to negotiate several turbulent events in its recent history with a rather remarkable lack of destabilization. And it’s most likely to continue along that trend, even in the face of what could be more storms to come.

تهدف هذه الورقة البحثية إلى مقاربة النفوذ الإيراني داخل المجتمع الشيعي في السعودية من خلال التركيز على أتباع مرجعية المرشد الأعلى والمعروفين بـ “خط الإمام” والجناح العسكري المنسوب للتيار والمعروف دوليًا بـ “حزب الله الحجاز” أو “حزب الله السعودي” والذي تتوجه له أصابع الاتهام بتنفيذ تفجير الخبر ١٩٩٦.

Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, Saudi Arabia has been concerned about the potential influence of Iran’s supreme leader among its Shi’a population, especially since Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Khamenei took on the title of Vali-ye faqih, or “guardian-jurist.” Such concern is understandable given that the two countries are both neighbors and rivals: Khamenei is a marj’a, the highest-ranking Shi’a religious authority, but he is also the commander-in-chief of the Iranian Armed Forces. This paper aims to investigate the Iranian influence within the Shi’a community in Saudi Arabia by focusing on the followers of the supreme leader’s marj’aiyyah, known as “Khat al-Imam,” and its military wing, “Hezbollah Al-Hejaz,” often held responsible for carrying out the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing.

Since the launch of Vision 2030 six years ago, Saudi Arabia has made considerable progress in reducing the labor-cost gap between national and foreign workers in the private sector. While the total unemployment rate has declined recently among nationals, it remains high at 11%. Drawing on evidence from Bahrain’s experience with labor market reform, this can be significantly reduced through policies designed to bridge the cost gap between citizens and foreign labor in the private sector.

The considerable financial shortfall experienced by the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) over the past couple of years has measurably affected its morale, readiness, and operational capacity. There couldn’t be a worse time for the LAF to potentially fall apart. A series of monumental challenges await Lebanon now that the parliamentary elections are over, all of which demand a modicum of stability that only the LAF can provide.