With its clash with Syrian forces on Feb. 3, Turkey is being forced to realize that it has very limited leverage over its foreign policy priorities.
The Bab el-Mandeb Strait (“Gate of Tears” in Arabic) forms a vital strategic link in the maritime trade route between the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean via the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. On one side of the narrow strait lies the Arabian Peninsula. On the other is the Horn of Africa, a fragile region that has been plagued for decades by high levels of violence and instability within and across borders, and which in recent years has served as a launching pad for terrorism, piracy, human trafficking, and smuggling operations.
Although Moscow continues to reap the benefits of its Syrian campaign, it is increasingly faced with diminishing returns. Despite its greater geopolitical involvement in the country, the Kremlin has so far failed to extract major economic dividends and may soon face increased competition from Tehran. With Syria’s future clouded in uncertainty and the unresolved issue of the Idlib region hanging like the sword of Damocles over any potential political settlement, Russia is now trying to bring the Libyan conflict into the equation as well.
In the aftermath of the Berlin conference, there is little sign that Hifter is backing off on his efforts to take Tripoli by force.
The Berlin Conference on Libya will be a crucial test of whether Europe can act on its ambitions.
MEI experts Robert S. Ford, Fatima Abo Alasrar, and Emad Badi join host Alistair Taylor to survey what lies ahead for the Middle East in 2020, with particular attention to Iran, Syria, Yemen, Libya, Iraq and Algeria.
It is increasingly the case that the Russian-Turkish decisions on Idlib or Syria need to be understood as part of a broader Russian-Turkish partnership.
Trump has taken such a forward-leaning and aggressive position now that he has set himself, and the U.S., in a conflict trap that he might not be able to defuse.
The UK’s impending exit from the EU will present a new chapter for British interests in and posture toward the region. If the UK is to find a trade-off for loss of diplomatic and economic heft, it will need to re-prioritize its engagement efforts. Policy continuity toward Morocco and Tunisia appears inevitable; Algeria, in contrast, promises great opportunity for an evolving relationship.
Strong U.S. leadership could still make a difference to counter the threats arising from the ongoing proxy war, but the Trump White House appears mainly to have other things on its mind.
The question as 2019 ends is whether foreign forces supporting the conflict will rethink their commitment to military victory and instead work to secure political solutions through compromise.
On Nov. 27 the GNA signed an MoU with Turkey seeking to create a shared maritime boundary in the Mediterranean Sea between southwestern Turkey and northeastern Libya. In an overt quid pro quo, this maritime agreement was signed along with a separate MoU to expand security and military cooperation. Thus, it seems clear that Turkey was only able to persuade the GNA to agree to the maritime deal in exchange for increased security support for the GNA-aligned forces fighting the self-styled LNA in Tripoli.
The 12-country Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF), which held its latest meeting in Equatorial Guinea on Nov. 28, has never had OPEC’s ability to control energy prices, but that is likely to change as liquefied natural gas (LNG) transforms the gas market from a regional to a global one.
The Nov. 1 seizure by Malta of two 2000-cubic-foot containers full of Libyan currency printed by the Russian state printer, Goznak, that was intended for delivery to Libya’s non-internationally recognized eastern government, highlights the continuing importance of the economic aspects of Libya’s ongoing civil war.
The crux of today’s Libya problem in international foreign policy lies in an underappreciated UN misstep in the most important international treaty concerning Libya, the 2015 Skhirat Agreement, and the decision to vest sovereignty in the heads of independent and semi-independent sub-state institutions like the Central Bank of Libya. The negative implications of this decision must now be addressed and it is time to move onto something new, after Skhirat.