كبير الباحثين ومدير برامج سوريا ومكافحة الإرهاب والتطرف
Read MEI’s weekly briefing featuring expert analysis of key regional developments for the week ahead.
Expert regional analysis by MEI scholars and contributors.
Jordan is going full speed ahead in normalizing relations with the Syrian regime, 10 years after it suspended political and economic ties with its northern neighbor in the wake of the eruption of the Syrian uprising. On Oct. 3, and in the first public contact between Abdullah and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad since 2011, Amman announced that the king had received a call from Assad. Talks focused on bilateral relations and ways to strengthen cooperation. The king stressed Jordan’s support for efforts to back Syrian territorial integrity, sovereignty, and unity. Jordan had allowed the Syrian embassy to remain open in Amman and kept a skeleton staff at its embassy in Damascus.
يجتمع الرؤساء الروسي والتركي والإيراني يوم الأربعاء 29 سبتمبر/أيلول في مدينة سوتشي الروسية لمناقشة الوضع في سوريا. وكما كان الحال في الاجتماعات السابقة، من المرجح أن يتصدر الوضع في شمال غرب سوريا جدول الأعمال. على الرغم من أن منطقة إدلب الكبرى ظلت من الناحية التقنية خاضعة لوقف إطلاق النار الذي اتفقت عليه روسيا وتركيا في مارس/آذار 2020، إلا أن الطائرات الروسية والمدفعية السورية ارتكبت انتهاكات قاتلة ومتكررة منذ ذلك الحين.
Read MEI’s weekly briefing featuring expert analysis of key regional developments for the week ahead.
After 40 years, Syria once again has dual military rule, where the president and his brother are the highest authorities. In the early 1980s, Rifaat al-Assad, the brother of Hafez al-Assad, was the commander of the Defense Companies and the strong man in Syria in the military, security, and even civilian spheres, while Hafez was in a coma. Today, we see this scenario echoed with the control of Maher al-Assad, Bashar al-Assad’s brother, over the Fourth Division, which has become an elite military unit due to strong Iranian support and its control over various territories of the country.
بعد أربعين عاما، تتجدد ثناية الحكم العسكري في سوريا بين الرئيس وشقيقه، ففي مطلع الثمانينات كان رفعت الأسد (شقيق حافظ الأسد)، قائد سرايا الدفاع الرجل القوي في سوريا على المستوى العسكري والأمني بل حتى على المستوى المدني، بينما كان حافظ الأسد يشكو من الغيبوبة – آنذاك-.
كبيرة الباحثين، مديرة برنامج مصر
Egypt is currently the fastest-growing Arab exporter of liquefied natural gas (LNG), according to a report released by the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries on Aug. 16. The report showed that Egypt exported around 1.4 million tons of LNG in the second quarter of 2021, having not exported any LNG during the same period in 2020.
Read MEI’s weekly briefing featuring expert analysis of key regional developments for the week ahead.
Tokyo’s long-standing, quiet diplomacy has built trust Washington lacks.
After decades of soul searching to define itself as a state, Egypt is building its own civilization-state and seeks to join an emerging club of nations that center historical and cultural tradition in their policy and governance structures and reject the West’s cultural dominance. The civilization-state is the prism through which Western capitals should view and understand Egypt’s domestic and foreign policy moves.
The viability of Eastern Mediterranean natural gas resources has long been a source of debate for reasons including cost considerations, market demand, and regional geopolitical tensions. The past couple of years have further complicated the debate, introducing new questions about the role of these resources in supporting post-pandemic economic recovery or helping more advanced markets achieve net-zero policies by replacing coal and other fuel sources (a particularly relevant topic of debate given Europe and Asia are key export targets for East Med gas).
It took the Taliban just three and a half months to undermine a 20-year international effort to build a competent Afghan military. The Afghanistan National Army (ANA) collapsed once it was clear the U.S. was pulling out ground troops and ceasing air support operations after two decades of training and sustainment that cost the American taxpayer approximately $83 billion. When required to stand alone, against a Taliban force, the ANA failed unequivocally. Building the ANA as a mirror image of the U.S. military was strategically and operationally flawed. If they are designed to fight like the U.S. but cannot fight in the absence of U.S. forces, they are ineffective. What lessons should we learn from this and how could our approach be different in the future?