Research & Commentary Results

Over the coming decades, the worsening effects of climate change will increasingly displace many millions of vulnerable people in the Middle East and North Africa, and many of these refugees will attempt to relocate to the Global North. To avert such a monumental looming problem requires pragmatic solutions and their swift implementation.

Egyptian fish farmers are facing mounting pressures: Year after year, their fish are getting smaller and less healthy, their production decreases, and they are forced to take out loans they are later unable to pay back. The Egyptian government’s recent efforts to invest heavily in aquaculture, though intended to address future food shortages, may only worsen the position of local fish farmers in the Nile Delta by exacerbating the effects of urbanization and climate change while undercutting prices.

When Saudi Arabia suddenly announced in early April that it would reduce its oil production by 500,000 bpd, followed shortly thereafter by several other OPEC+ members, bringing the total cut to 1.1 million bpd, Japan was greatly concerned. In spite of Japan’s serious efforts to work toward a carbon-neutral society, the country is still heavily dependent on oil, the overwhelming majority of which comes from the Persian Gulf.

Last week’s spring meetings of the IMF and World Bank in Washington, D.C., were an important occasion for financial and economic leaders from the MENA region to meet with their counterparts from these IFIs and major bilateral donor countries. At the same time, they serve as a lead up to the important Annual Meetings that will be held in Marrakech, Morocco, in the fall — the first time they will be hosted by an Arab or African country.

The World Bank’s MENA regional economic update released on April 6, 2023 is one that may herald a sharp divide, both within the region, with its uneven economic trajectory and obstacles to human capital development, and globally, as a cleavage between energy exporters and importers.

In the Middle East, the Gulf states — working together and on their own — are looking to achieve new scientific and commercial breakthroughs in various areas of the space industry. These ambitions carry major geopolitical implications with them, as an ever-growing number of spacefaring countries negotiate a sensitive and increasingly high-powered sector.

It is clear that the era of US hegemony in the Gulf, and the Middle East more broadly, is over. What is less certain is what security system will replace it and whether it will better serve regional security and US interests.

The Gulf is becoming a more crowded geopolitical space than ever, with external powers such as China, Russia and India increasing their involvement in the region to safeguard their economic interests, while local powers, most notably Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar, are rising and pursuing a more independent foreign policy course.

The development of small-scale LNG and the domestic deployment of LNG as a transport and power-generation fuel could help to lower Saudi Arabia’s carbon footprint as well as improve air quality by reducing vehicle exhaust.

President Theodore Roosevelt said, “Speak softly and carry a big stick; you will go far.”¹ Roosevelt used the image of the big stick to popularize his philosophy, but he offered a subtler interpretation in other venues. It represented a quiet threat that would only rarely need to be used if accompanied by steady diplomacy.

In recent years, Iraq has become one of the leading destinations for Chinese investments in the Middle East and a crucial link in Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative. To capitalize on its geostrategic location and central position within the Chinese BRI, Iraq is seeking to develop a sprawling new 54-square-kilometer port project, known as al-Faw Grand Port, which will reduce the country’s reliance on Arab Gulf ports and overland transit from Iran and Turkey. The project also underscores Iraq’s growing economic rivalry with neighboring Iran, as both countries seek to carve out a similar niche in handling regional transit traffic.

The oil and gas sector has been the dominant driver of Qatar’s economy. Over the years, although that sector has remained the major focus of Qatari investments, the emphasis has increasingly shifted towards the expansion of the country’s gas production and LNG export capacity. While the construction boom ahead of the 2022 FIFA World Cup powered the Qatari economy in recent years, income generated by the expansion of the country’s LNG production and export capacity is likely to drive the economy for many years to come — both despite and partly because of the market turmoil caused by the fallout from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

Saudi Arabia has made it clear that it wants a defense pact with the United States in return for normalizing ties with Israel. However, that isn’t a price Washington is able or willing to accept, for both political and strategic reasons. But the conversation about improved U.S.-Saudi defense cooperation shouldn’t stop here. There’s plenty of room for achieving that objective without having to upgrade the relationship to a full-fledged alliance.

The conclusion of the China-brokered Saudi-Iranian détente on March 10, which aims to thaw long-standing enmity and manage competition between the two regional arch rivals, has multi-layered implications for Yemen.

Ukraine’s partners, led by the United States and spread over the globe, have increasingly responded to Russia’s full-scale invasion of February 2022 with a dizzying array of financial, humanitarian, and military assistance. Unfortunately, the way in which the U.S. and Ukraine’s other partners have provided military assistance over the last year — that is, by delivering a wide range of equipment, ammunition, and training — significantly undermines the longer-term objective of developing a sustainable system via which Ukraine can generate combat power in the coming years to overcome Russian aggression.

More than a year on from the beginning of the Ukraine war in February 2022, there is no more business as usual for Russia-Iran relations. While bilateral ties are still characterized by an intense focus on security and defense, the two sides are opening multiple new areas of cooperation as well. But what has motivated Moscow and Tehran to invest in strengthening their bilateral relations given all the potential risks and costs? Could conflicts of interest and competition put a crack in this burgeoning relationship? And what can the West do about it?