The eastern Mediterranean has become an increasingly important focus for Turkey’s foreign and security policy, but the interlocking of new issues like energy politics and sovereignty rights with old problems like Cyprus has created significant challenges for Ankara.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan finds himself in a tough spot with Russia as tensions in Syria have escalated dramatically. In a rare direct military confrontation between Turkish and Syrian regime forces, 14 Turkish soldiers and over 100 regime troops were killed in two separate clashes in Idlib over the past 10 days.
The Black Sea is a very important region for NATO, and has not received the attention it deserves; a separate focused NATO strategy and support for countries in the Black Sea would send a message that the Alliance takes the region seriously.
Turkey’s blossoming relationship with Russia has not only raised eyebrows in Washington and Western European capitals, it has also caused a great deal of discomfort in countries like Georgia that have borne the brunt of Russian aggression. A few recent scattered signals from Ankara, however, might comfort Turkey’s northeastern neighbor.
With its clash with Syrian forces on Feb. 3, Turkey is being forced to realize that it has very limited leverage over its foreign policy priorities.
In 2016 the Turkish parliament voted to revoke parliamentary immunity and initiated the ruling Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) political purge of MPs with the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP). Despite the introduction of a new assembly in 2018, Turkey’s October invasion of northeast Syria provided ample incentives for the launch of new investigations into HDP members protesting the operation. The targeting of the HDP has set new legal and political precedents that could undermine the political capacity of the opposition coalition as a whole and create ideological divisions over the so-called “Kurdish Question.” This report records documented arrests of HDP MPs from June 2016 to January 2018 in order to identify prominent trends and waves of arrests that correspond to political and legal events.
The escalating tensions between Turkey and Russia over Idlib did not come as a surprise to many outside the Turkish capital.
Over the past several weeks geopolitical experts have been talking a lot about what the surprise U.S. drone attack on Iranian Gen. Qassem Soleimani, head of the IRGC – Quds Force, on Jan. 3 means for the Middle East and relations between the major powers. What has received considerably less attention, however, is what Soleimani’s killing means for the South Caucasus, a region whose small size belies its strategic importance.
As neighboring regions, the South Caucasus and the Middle East are inextricably intertwined — so much so that the former is sometimes even considered part of the Greater Middle East. While geographical proximity is the strongest driver of interconnectivity between the two regions, geopolitics, business ties, and energy interests also link countries from the South Caucasus and the Middle East and form the basis for important bilateral and regional relationships.
The passing of Sultan Qaboos bin Said al-Said on Jan. 10 truly marks the end of an era.
The Berlin Conference on Libya will be a crucial test of whether Europe can act on its ambitions.
On Jan. 8, Turkey inaugurated the TurkStream natural gas pipeline from Russia, seemingly deepening Ankara’s ties with Moscow. However, a fuller analysis of Turkey’s current energy policies and consumption trends indicate a dramatic shift westward, away from Russia and Iran.
The announcement of Sultan Qaboos bin Said al-Said’s passing on Jan. 10 marked the end of an era. Now that the Arab world lost its longest-serving leader, none of the Gulf states has a ruler that was on the throne when the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was established in 1981. Most Omanis have never known another leader and this transition period, marked by three days of mourning, is an emotional time for those in the sultanate.
It is increasingly the case that the Russian-Turkish decisions on Idlib or Syria need to be understood as part of a broader Russian-Turkish partnership.
Thus far, the reaction to Soleimani’s assassination among the Gulf states has been cautious.