Research & Commentary Results

Earlier this week, Georgian law enforcement arrested United National Movement (UNM) party chairman Nika Melia on charges of inciting violence during anti-government demonstrations in 2019. The arrest has left many outraged and is the latest event to deepen political divisions in the country. There are valid arguments as to how the government could have handled Melia’s arrest better. But more important is what’s at stake for the future of Georgia – both domestically and as a member of the international community.

There have been some Iranian advances in building relations with Black Sea states over the last 30 years. However, Tehran’s wavering commitment to deeper ties with its northern neighbors, with the exception of Russia, has considerably reduced the potential footprint Iran could have otherwise had in the Black Sea region. Tehran’s ongoing standoff with the United States, its ideologically driven preoccupation to make advances in the Arab world, and a gradual but clear submission to Russian hegemony has meant that the Black Sea region is a policy matter of secondary importance to decision-makers in Tehran.

Throughout 2020, the geopolitics between the Middle East and its northern frontier have converged further. Russia, Turkey, and Iran not only compete for influence (as states and through non-state actors) in core countries of the Middle East and North Africa like Syria, Iraq, Libya, Egypt and beyond in the Gulf. They also happen to be the three former imperial powers in the Caucasus – the crucial link between the Black and Caspian Seas on the seam of Europe, the Middle East, and Central Asia.

Iran’s attempts to achieve cyber dominance both within the MENA region and around the world have been well documented, particularly its efforts to spread pro-Iranian messaging and “tell Iran’s story.” This strategy is shaped by the challenging international context facing Tehran, which is suffering economically under U.S. sanctions and largely constrained from purchasing weapons under a recently expired U.N. arms embargo.

Ongoing conflicts in Syria, Libya, and Yemen are expected to continue to destabilize the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) in 2021. However, technology will likely add another layer of complexity to these conflicts and reshape the region throughout the 2020s. When the Arab Spring began a decade ago, the biggest challenge facing long-standing Arab autocrats was grappling with the power of social media and the rise of online political opposition by tech-savvy millennial activists. In the 2020s, however, regional governments are now facing a new set of emerging technologies that will shape not only domestic politics but also regional geopolitical dynamics. These advancing technologies include: drone, cyber, and space technologies.

When it comes to Turkey-NATO ties, Ankara is regarded as more of a problem than an ally these days. Not only did it purchase a Russian S-400 air defense system, but its gunboat diplomacy in the eastern Mediterranean also raised the specter of military conflict between NATO allies when Greek and Turkish naval flotillas steamed directly toward each other this past summer. There is one region, however, where Turkey can help NATO efforts: the Black Sea.

Paul Goble, Gonul Tol, and Alex Vatanka join host Alistair Taylor to discuss the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the role of Russia, Turkey, and Iran in the South Caucasus.

Amidst the pandemic and global economic hardships, Georgia has had an eventful beginning to the year, scoring a long-awaited victory against Russia. On 21 Jan., 2021, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) announced its verdict on the interstate case brought by Georgia against Russia, holding Moscow responsible for breaching six articles of the European Convention of Human Rights.

Iran was caught off guard by the July 2020 round of conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Tehran was even more alarmed by the proactive role Moscow and Ankara played during and in the aftermath of the six-week war that ended with the Russian-brokered ceasefire on November 10. In fear of being kept on the sidelines, Iran’s Foreign Minister Javad Zarif embarked on a regional tour last month to Azerbaijan, Armenia, Russia, Georgia and Turkey.

Following a tumultuous period in Washington, during which the Capitol was stormed by rioters and Donald Trump became the first president to be impeached twice, many in the United States and around the world were left feeling concerned and unsettled.As a Georgian who has seen the U.S. play a transformative role in building my country’s young democracy, the attack on Capitol Hill was something I could never have anticipated. My fear stemmed not from feeling unsafe in downtown DC, but rather from the consequences of U.S. instability and fragility on those countries that rely on its support to build democratic institutions and adopt western values.

The Biden Administration has a firm foundation upon which to build in Eastern Europe. As part of its focus on great power competition in the region, the Trump Administration sharply increased funding for the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI), covering costs for U.S. troops in Europe and security support for strategic allies, while repositioning some U.S. forces in Europe to the eastern flank. We have made important steps to support our strategic allies in Eastern Europe, but this administration needs to stay the course and increase its focus and commitment to the Black Sea region. Russia must understand the costs of their adventurism in order to prevent further reckless behavior.

In the aftermath of the second Nagorno-Karabakh war, bolstered by Turkey’s growing influence in the South Caucasus, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan proposed the controversial idea of establishing a six-country regional cooperation platform. Speaking from the Azerbaijani capital Baku, where he was attending victory celebrations, Erdogan noted that new opportunities for regional cooperation are possible for the Caucasus region. Turkey’s leader envisages a platform that would bring Turkey, Russia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Georgia, and Armenia together. In his words, it would provide a win-win opportunity for all sides, including Armenia, which could use the platform as a first positive step toward establishing bilateral relations with Turkey. 

Georgia’s Western future became a central part of U.S. foreign policy last week. During his confirmation hearing, Secretary of State Antony Blinken reiterated that Georgia should join NATO as soon as it meets the criteria. Blinken’s remarks are timely. Georgia faces increasing Russian political pressure and military presence, exacerbated by the recent second Nagorno Karabakh war. At the same time, and following a decade of stalemate, there have been significant breakthroughs in the cases brought by Georgia against Russia in front of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and the International Criminal Court (ICC). With Georgia’s Western path resurfacing on the international agenda, Eastern European countries will be watching to see if the Biden Administration’s foreign policy can make a difference to regional security.

باحث ومدير برنامج الفضاء الإلكتروني بمعهد الشرق الأوسط

In 1906, the South Caucasus’ first energy pipeline was completed, connecting Baku on the Caspian Sea with Batumi on the Black Sea. More than 115 years later, this pipeline, measuring a mere eight inches in diameter and transporting kerosene, has been replaced with a modern network of natural gas and oil pipelines connecting the heart of Asia with Europe. With proper investment and the correct policies, even more oil, gas, and other goods will be flowing from the Caspian region to Europe and global markets.