Research & Commentary Results

Sultan Haitham bin Tariq al-Said arrived in Neom, Saudi Arabia, on July 11, 2021, in his first foreign trip since becoming the sultan of Oman on Jan. 11, 2020. At the start of his two-day visit to the kingdom he was met by King Salman and accompanied by a high-level Omani delegation. A slew of new agreements were signed across commerce, culture, and transport.

Oil and gas have long dominated trade and investment flows between Singapore and the Gulf. In the wake of two new projects — one in Singapore and the other in the United Arab Emirates — unveiled last month, this article considers whether Singapore and the Gulf are on the cusp of a new level and type of economic relations.

Around the world, leaders are scrambling to define their strategy for dealing with the inevitable U.S.-China cold war to come, and the Gulf is no exception. Considering the different objectives and perspectives that the region has in regard to the two superpowers, any misstep in forming alliances could be detrimental to its future.

When it comes to the Persian Gulf, saving the environment might seem like it would be the last item on the to-do lists of the region’s Iranian and Arab rivals. It is an urgent matter, however — and one that could help turn these foes into friends. The United States can play an important role in this: It has helped the region to resolve conflicts over water in the past, and it could do so again.

The leaders of the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states — Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar — signed a “solidarity and stability” agreement, dubbed the “al-Ula Statement” after the Saudi city in which it was inked, at their Jan. 5 summit meeting.

The mixed messages and pendulum swings in U.S. Gulf policy in recent years are rooted in and have further fueled deep questioning and a largely unresolved debate within the United States about America’s role in the region, and indeed in the world. Like the U.S., relations between the GCC and Iran are locked in confrontation. Breaking this impasse requires decisive U.S. reengagement in Gulf affairs led by vigorous, sustained diplomacy that promotes intra-GCC reconciliation and supports efforts aimed at tempering the Saudi-Iran strategic rivalry.

A look back at the year’s most important developments with analysis from Paul Salem, Alex Vatanka, Randa Slim, Gerald Feierstein, Gonul Tol, Jonathan M. Winer, Khaled Elgindy, Marvin G. Weinbaum, Mirette F. Mabrouk, Grace Wermenbol, Syed Mohammad Ali, Robert S. Ford, and Khaldoun Khelil.

Since Aug. 13, speculation has been rife that the Sultanate of Oman will soon follow the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) lead and formalize full-fledged ties with Israel. Yet, at least thus far, Muscat has refused to join the UAE, Bahrain, and now Sudan in normalizing relations with Tel Aviv. As a moderate Arab country, where tolerance is firmly embedded into the national ethos and the Ibadi sect of Islam, Oman appears to be maintaining a balanced position on the overall Arab trend toward normalizing relations with Israel. Muscat’s positive reaction to the Abraham Accords is not a major change in strategy and is more illustrative of Oman’s longstanding position on normalization.

The upcoming American presidential election is top of mind for the Arab Gulf states. This is no surprise as there is so much at stake for them. As the race enters its final critical week, all eyes are on who will occupy the White House for the next four years — and the Arab Gulf states have their preferences. America is still indispensable to Gulf security, but the Gulf is also becoming an indispensable regional partner for whoever wants to lead the world in the 21st century. Today both sides need each other more than ever before.

Last September, at the 74th session of the U.N. General Assembly, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani proposed the optimistically named “Hormuz Peace Endeavor” (HOPE). Over the past year, however, Iran’s plan has failed to gain any traction with the GCC states, even as the region’s security environment has fundamentally changed in ways that are detrimental to the Islamic Republic.

The issue of female (dis)empowerment in the Middle East lies at the very core of the Arab-Islamic world’s contemporary troubles. Most economists agree that significant levels of income inequality negatively impact economic growth and development, so why is it not commonly considered how significant inequality between genders might also diminish social and political outcomes? This essay explores this question of gender inequality and socio-political outcomes in the Sultanate of Oman and parses between the state, sect, and tribe to discuss the sources of reform and resistance to women’s empowerment.

Oman’s independent and creative foreign policy has been a boost to a region fraught with instability, but the combination of a new sultan and an adverse regional environment means Muscat’s trademark foreign policy may be diminished.

When the Saudi-led coalition launched military operations against the Houthi insurgents on March 26, 2015, all of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, except for Oman, joined the multinational force. As has become clear, each of the Arab Gulf sheikdoms has its own national interests and unique history of relations with Yemen and Yemeni factions, and these have shaped their changing perceptions of the war over the past five and a half years. Kuwait’s role in Yemen’s multidimensional conflict is a case in point.

Oman’s new ruler, Sultan Haitham, only has a short timeframe in which to aggressively diversify the country’s economy and reduce its dependency on hydrocarbon exports. This already difficult task is further complicated by the twin challenges of the global coronavirus pandemic and low oil prices, both of which limit the government’s fiscal room for maneuver. One obvious sector that Oman should consider expanding rapidly is its tourism industry.