Research & Commentary Results

On April 30, roughly a week after the Southern Transitional Council (STC) declared self-administration in Aden, a military confrontation broke out on the remote Yemeni island of Socotra between members of the STC and government forces. After just a few days, the situation was diffused when the island’s governor and the STC asked the Saudis to intervene. Although an agreement was reached quickly, it is likely to be fragile because the causes of the conflict are not entirely local. The island of Socotra is simply too important to multiple international players that are not willing to let it easily slip outside their sphere of influence.

It’s difficult to overstate the importance of the Canal to the international shipping trade, but it’s importance to Egypt economy is even greater still.

The tensions between the two sides are unlikely to ease anytime soon.

With its territory under increasing pressure, its finances dwindling, and manpower more challenged than ever, HTS’s ability to balance its extremism with controlled uses of pragmatism is under strain. Internally, its leadership is bitterly divided over decisions of the past, present, and future and externally, its rivals and enemies all appear to be conspiring against it. In an attempt to protect internal cohesion, HTS has become determinedly self-assertive in recent weeks, pursuing unpopular policies such as trading with the regime and lashing out at those brave enough to express their dissatisfaction. In response to HTS aggressions, a wider array of opposition voices — both moderate and Islamist — are declaring loudly that HTS now represents a threat to their revolution.

Even before the coronavirus upended life around the world, Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan was already grappling with a host of problems. Then COVID-19 hit the country. Many argue the virus will exacerbate Erdogan’s problems but where others see a problem, Turkey’s president sees an opportunity. He is using the crisis to undercut the opposition, distribute government contracts to his loyalists, and punish his critics. Erdogan is relying on the virus to score foreign policy points as well. Sending medical aid to its neighbors and beyond helps assert Turkey’s leadership and improves its shattered image. The coronavirus likewise provides an excuse to remove a long-time irritant in Ankara’s ties with Washington and perhaps end its isolation in the region.

Climbing unemployment is a major specter for Egypt.

The April 20 Netanyahu-Gantz agreement legitimized the possibility of an Israeli law that will act as a unilateral annexation of parts of the West Bank to start as early as July 1, based on the controversial Trump Middle East plan. Articles 28 and 29 of the deal condition such annexation on the “consent of the Trump administration” and note that such a move would only be possible if the annexation preserves “the security and strategic interests of the state of Israel including the need to keep regional stability, keep existing peace agreements, and pursue future peace agreements.”

There is certainly no shortage of writings on Turkey today regarding that country’s “drift” away from its Western orientation. Some who espouse this argument frame the consequences in terms of Turkey’s increased ties to China. While Turkey itself has launched an “Asia Anew” policy, the outsized focus on this and other alleged signs of Turkey’s “drift from the West” distracts from the very palpable effects of its adventurism in the Middle East, North Africa, and Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey’s increasingly reckless foreign policy is on full display — from weaponizing refugees to extort the European Union to exporting mercenary Jihadist fighters to Libya. These are hardly the actions of a responsible regional power, much less a key member of the NATO alliance. 

The amendments have been designed to provide relief on both the individual and corporate levels.

This is not the time to hang out the “Mission Accomplished” banner for the MFO. At a nominal cost to the U.S. in money and manpower, for nearly 40 years, the mission has been a phenomenal success. At a time when the U.S. commitment to the region is being viewed with increasing skepticism, the MFO is a prime example of U.S. capacity to organize and lead a multinational effort to support regional security and stability.

President Recip Tayyip Erdogan has sought to dramatically reorient Turkey’s role and relationships in the region. Gradually at first but then abruptly, he has pivoted from the Republic’s historical status as a key member of the transatlantic alliance towards new partnerships – including Russia. Erdogan has consistently aimed for freedom in executing his foreign policy agenda, of which energy concerns are pivotal. It remains to be seen whether this hard-sought autonomy will be limited or expanded by Turkey’s domestic energy needs and its prime position as a hydrocarbon transit state.

Egypt’s three top sources of foreign revenue — tourism, remittances, and the Suez Canal — are likely to be hard hit by the crisis.

US support for the Black Sea and the Middle East has been through several phases in recent years, with President Donald Trump’s generals having the biggest impact on policy change. While there has been increased engagement in the region, much more is needed from the US – as well as NATO and the EU – to ensure Black Sea security.

Gonul Tol and Alex Vatanka join host Alistair Taylor to discuss how the coronavirus pandemic is affecting Iran, one of the first countries hit by the outbreak, and Turkey, where it arrived later but has since spread rapidly.

The Sinai-based Multinational Force & Observers (MFO) will soon celebrate its 41st anniversary. Like most of what the MFO does, recognition will be low key and understated. The MFO has always operated under the radar, but this may soon be changing.