Research & Commentary Results

Countries across the region face similar climate risks and impacts, but tensions and socio-economic challenges have hampered regional collaboration and collective efforts to tackle climate change. One way to address this problem and to circumvent poor policy coordination is through technical research and knowledge-sharing.

A senior Chinese military delegation landed in Iran for a visit in late April. The readouts from Tehran were rather dull, but there is more to this visit than meets the eye. While a new “axis” may not necessarily be forming, there are troubling trendlines that Western policymakers need to counter.

The Dorra Gas Field, located in shallow waters offshore in the northern Arabian Gulf, lies at the junction of competing territorial claims by Kuwait, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. With the growing gas demand in these countries, any production will be absorbed into the domestic network and the impact of production on the global gas and LNG market will be insignificant. However, the development of the field, if it occurs, may serve as a bellwether for regional relations.

Making the most of Iran’s reserves will require it to develop shared fields like Dorra/Arash, a gas field located offshore in the northern Gulf, where Iran must vie with competing claims from neighboring Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. In the past, Iran has often neglected its joint gas fields as a result of sanctions and focused instead on meeting its rapidly growing domestic needs through exploiting non-shared fields, but the country says this must change going forward.

Efforts to restore confidence between the U.S. and the Arab Gulf states took a first step with the recent formation of a new naval task force, known as the Combined Maritime Forces-153 (CMF-153), to improve maritime security in the Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb, and the Gulf of Aden, including the hotspot of Yemen. Established in mid-April, the new task force intends to target weapons smuggling for Ansar Allah, as the Houthi militias are officially known, as well as human trafficking and the drug trade.

Iran began the new fiscal year on March 21, 2022 having recorded an estimated GDP growth rate of about 4% over the previous year, but CPI has grown by 35% year-on-year. While GDP growth could be the result of the stabilization of the economy after several years of recession, a steady rate of high inflation is alarming for Iran’s economy.

در جمهوری اسلامی ایران, این فرضیه وجود دارد که حمایت از سازمان حزب الله در لبنان, امنیت و قدرت بازدارندگی ایران را افزایش داده است.  در عین حال, شواهد و قرائنی وجود دارند که نتایج انان برعکس این فرضیه را نشان می دهند.

Since late September 2021, Tehran and Baku have engaged in a process of de-escalation, largely focused on economic cooperation and regional transportation links. Such efforts should be welcomed, but underlying geopolitical tensions, especially the Iranian-Turkish competition for influence in the South Caucasus, can still derail them at any moment.

As the U.S. administration considers whether to remove Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a foreign terrorist organization, understanding its nature, development, and ideology is essential to making an informed decision. There is much about it that differentiates it from a conventional armed force. One fundamental aspect of its ideology that until now has been overlooked is the doctrine of Mahdism.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has turned into the largest testing ground for ballistic and cruise missiles in modern warfare. Militaries around the world are watching carefully, and Iran is certainly no exception. With its military doctrine heavily dependent on ballistic missile forces, Iran has a particular interest in the war in Ukraine and is taking notes on Russia’s use of missiles.

Read MEI’s weekly briefing featuring expert analysis of key regional developments for the week ahead.

On March 25, 2022, President Joe Biden announced an agreement committing the U.S. LNG industry to supply an additional 15 bcm of LNG to Europe through the remainder of the year. The agreement also envisions U.S. LNG increasing supply to Europe to 50 bcm through 2030, equating to approximately one-third of the EU’s gas imports from Russia in 2021.

In recent remarks, the Israel Defense Forces’ (IDF) Chief of Staff Aviv Kochavi announced preparations for a potential upcoming military operation, foreshadowing a possible move against Iran. Kochavi’s announcement came shortly after Israel and the foreign ministers of four Arab nations — Morocco, Egypt, the UAE, and Bahrain — along with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, met at the Negev Summit in the Israeli desert to lay the foundation for a strategic military alliance to deter “Iran and its associated militias,” as Israeli Foreign Minister Yair Lapid put it.

Since the beginning of his presidency, Raisi has called for increasing cooperation with Africa. Contrary to popular perception, this is not part of a hegemonic project to further expand Iranian influence in Africa. Rather, it constitutes an effort to reset relations with the continent after his predecessor spent eight years neglecting it.

The global response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has focused new attention on friction between the United States and its traditional partners in the Gulf and reinforced skepticism regarding the United States’ status as the dominant international partner in the region. It’s time for both sides to identify a realistic way forward that sheds outdated notions of mutual obligation without becoming merely transactional.