The alternative to regime change: Changing the regime’s behavior
After Iraq, Libya, and Afghanistan, can we learn to deal differently with Iran?
After Iraq, Libya, and Afghanistan, can we learn to deal differently with Iran?
Israel’s full-blown war against Iran threatens to upend regional dynamics and Turkey’s careful balancing act. The conflict presents both immediate threats and long-term strategic risks for Turkey.
Near-term progress in a renewed nuclear agreement between the United States and Iran could add further downward pressure to a delicate oil market, potentially heralding more fiscal pain for Gulf oil producers and complicating US energy strategy.
Following seven years of diplomatic deadlock, Washington and Tehran have resumed nuclear negotiations — and for the first time in years, there are signs of real momentum.
Alex Vatanka, MEI Senior Fellow and author of The Battle of the Ayatollahs in Iran, joins hosts Alistair Taylor and Matthew Czekaj to analyze the current round of talks, the technical issues under discussion, and the political stakes on both sides. He explores Iran’s economic and domestic pressures, US red lines, and the role of key players like Israel, China, and Oman in shaping the negotiations.
It is no surprise that both Iran and the United States have approached their first diplomatic engagement in four years with wariness. There are plenty of reasons to be skeptical about the probability of the negotiations culminating in a deal. But it would be a mistake to assume that the conditions in 2025 are the same as existed in 2015. Time is not on the Iranians’ side now and changes afoot in the Middle East and the broader global community give Iran an incentive to move toward an agreement, assuming that Washington is sincere and realistic in its negotiations with Tehran.
The MENA Energy Recap is a quarterly review of key energy developments that took place in the Middle East and North Africa region from January to March 2025 and what they signal for the months ahead. The Recap views these developments through the lenses of policy and strategy, energy security, and markets.
President Donald Trump is focused on realizing two transformative breakthroughs that his predecessors failed to accomplish: an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict, centered on a tripartite US-Saudi-Israeli deal, and an agreement between the US and Iran. Both would be historic achievements. So far, however, progress in each case has proven difficult and plodding.
Iran is accumulating enough near-weapons-grade enriched uranium to build a nuclear weapon within weeks or months, not years. President Donald Trump, having withdrawn the United States in 2018 from the nuclear deal that would have postponed that possibility, is now appealing for negotiations with Tehran. But in the Middle East, the nuclear question does not concern only Iran.
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has sought to position Turkey as an energy hub, connecting gas producers to its east and south and markets to the west. Turkey’s geographical position and infrastructure give it an advantage. But becoming an energy center also requires Ankara to dust off a long-abandoned foreign policy approach: “zero problems with neighbors” and the West. Amid changing regional dynamics, Ankara sees an opportunity to achieve that and revive its plans to become an energy hub.
With the signing of a presidential memorandum on Feb. 4, the administration of Donald Trump has returned to a “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran, but circumstances have changed drastically since the policy of intensified sanctions was originally crafted during his first term. Regional geopolitics will present the White House with a new set of variables, while changes in the petroleum markets will affect how the administration approaches sanctions on oil exports.
Nearly three years on, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has reshaped trade and investment in the energy sector, leading to an increase in Gulf imports of Russian oil and a sharp rise in the region’s hydrocarbon exports to Europe as well as further fueling the growth of Gulf investment in renewable energy projects located in and targeting the continent.
The Middle East and North Africa has the potential to become the world’s largest renewable energy-producing region. Compared to the immense scale of its resources, renewable energy is virtually untapped at present. This study maps the emerging regional trends in renewable energy development and MENA renewable energy supply chains across North Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, and the Levant. The most successful MENA nations in developing their renewable energy resources to date are doing so through the establishment of green energy ecosystems, in which the development of utility-scale renewable energy infrastructure is coordinated with that of robust offtake markets and the establishment of commercially viable storage and transportation mechanisms to service them.
Morocco is a regional leader in renewable energy development. The country’s success stems from its multi-faceted green energy ecosystem that is giving rise to international renewable energy export supply chains based on production of green hydrogen, in the form of green am-monia, as well as phosphates, other minerals and metals, fertilizers, agri-food products, and electric vehicles. As rising green industrial manufacturing and green agricultural production are becoming drivers of long-term, private sector employment, a synergy is emerging between Mo-rocco’s efforts to expand its already significant renewable energy sector and its objective of in-creasing the number of women and young people engaged in formal employment.
Within the next 25 years, the Middle East and North Africa will be a global leader in renewable energy production and a hub for international renewable energy supply chains. Morocco, the UAE, and Jordan are spearheading the regional trend to develop green energy ecosystems in which renewable energy is used, in part or entirely, to power the manufacture of intermediate and finished goods for export.
There is currently a discrepancy between the strategic objectives and enabling conditions for solar power in the Gulf and the level of actual deployment. Despite the region’s considerable promise as a potential global leaders in solar power, including one of the world’s highest levels of solar irradiance and strong supporting operating conditions, renewable power accounted for only 2% of generation capacity in 2022.