The following testimony was delivered before the U.S. Helsinki Commission at a hearing titled, “At What Cost: The Human Toll of Turkey’s Policy at Home and Abroad,” on October 31, 2019.
The Trump administration inherited a number of complex problems in the Syrian file from its predecessors in the White House. In dealing with the Syrian crisis, the Obama administration had three main priorities: not disturbing Iran in Syria during the process of nuclear negotiations, working with Russia toward a ceasefire in various parts of Syria (without trusting that Russia could deliver or should have the upper hand), and, most importantly, carrying out a limited military intervention in the northeast to defeat ISIS — an issue it considered separately from the Syrian crisis.
Damascus’ position is marginally stronger, and it is unlikely to concede anything of substance in Geneva despite continued American control of Deir ez-Zor’s oilfields.
Russia is clear in its policy toward northeastern Syria: The future of the region will be determined through talks between the representatives of the Kurds, who traditionally live in the area, and Damascus.
While there is probably zero chance Prime Minister Khan will step down, efforts will persist in trying to delegitimize those in power because this is what Pakistan’s opposition parties seem best programmed to do.
While the Iranians would have preferred it if the Turks had not invaded Syria, it does not change their most immediate policy objective, which is the survival of the Assad regime. As long as the Russians keep the Turks away from Assad’s forces, Tehran will, at least in the short term, be able to manage the consequences of Ankara’s actions.
In a move that surprised no one, on Oct. 19 the Afghan election commission said it was unable to announce the preliminary results of the Sept. 28 presidential election as planned, due to delays in processing biometric data. Held amid political uncertainty, terrorist violence, and general skepticism, the September election was the fourth presidential contest in Afghanistan since 2001, when the brutal Taliban regime was toppled in the wake of the Sept. 11 terror attacks on the United States.
That some in Washington think another about-turn in policy allowing us to stay in negligible numbers, in a smaller piece of territory, would somehow enable us to sustain an anti-ISIS campaign and control Syria’s oil fields is nothing short of a fantasy.
To make his case for an expansive safe zone in northern Syria stretching to Iraqi border, Recep Tayyip Erdogan is meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Sochi. Putin might accept a limited Turkish presence in the area for now, but he is unlikely to agree to Turkey’s current plans.
Both Mr. Trump and Mr. Erdogan, each under mounting pressure at home, are trying to solve domestic challenges with a tragedy that will have long-term and unpredictable effects — none of them beneficial for the United States and any friends that remain.
For all of Prime Minister Imran Khan’s reputational gains abroad, it is Pakistan’s economy that will determine his political future.
With an estimated $1 trillion in natural resources and sitting astride an international crossroads of increasingly critical importance, Balochistan is becoming a stage on which the world’s powers are playing out their ambitions. China, the U.S., and India have all formulated Balochistan policies in the past few years, hoping to utilize the region to achieve wider international goals — and the three countries across which Balochistan is divided, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran, have been eager to use it as a bargaining chip for their own purposes.
While the Turkish military offensive against the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in northern Syria might, once again, bring Moscow and Tehran together tactically in support of Assad’s rule and Syrian sovereignty, the two powers have fundamentally different visions for the war-ravaged country’s future.
Turkey’s cross-border incursion into northeastern Syria has stirred up a hornet’s nest of instability and threats. If left unchecked, this latest “war within a war” will have deeply destabilizing consequences for many years.
In one fell swoop, the U.S. has found itself evacuating a third of the country; breaking away from a 100,000-strong partner we trained and equipped; and watching it surrender to the regime that we have stood against from day one. In the chaos that has ensued, ISIS prisoners have been let loose, hundreds of thousands of civilians have been displaced, and a once relatively stable northeastern Syria has been thrown into a potentially intractable pit of ethnic, sectarian, and political conflict. The consequences of America’s self-destruction in Syria will be felt for many, many years to come.