Research & Commentary Results

مجرد ظهور العلامات الأولى للأزمة الصحية الناجمة عن فيروس كورونا المستجد في شمال إفريقيا، اتخذ المغرب إجراءات سريعة وحاسمة، حيث نفذ تدابير صحية واقتصادية وأمنية واجتماعية بدءا من نهاية فبراير 2020. تفسر هذه الإجراءات إلى حد كبير تصور المواطنين الإيجابي لتعامل الدولة مع هذا الوضع الصعب، وهو تحد لم يسبق له مثيل منذ الربيع العربي في 2011.

As soon as the first signs of the health crisis caused by COVID-19 appeared in North Africa, Morocco took swift and decisive action, implementing health, economic, security, and social measures at the end of February 2020. These actions explain the largely positive perception among Moroccans of the state’s handling of this difficult situation, a challenge unlike any since the Arab Spring in 2011.
The findings of the fourth part of the Arab Barometer survey’s sixth wave, carried out in May 2021, confirm that the spread of COVID-19 (43% of respondents) and the economic situation (33%) are still the main challenges for Moroccans.

The formation of a new government in Lebanon — after more than a year of political deadlock and amid an economic crisis of dizzying severity — is a positive development. The scale of Lebanon’s economic challenges, however, requires a new government capable of breaking with its predecessors’ deliberate inaction. It necessitates strong and genuine political leadership, will, and action to tackle the country’s many pressing challenges, especially in its dysfunctional energy sector.

The latest round of public opinion surveys conducted by Arab Barometer confirms that the deterioration of the economy — or more specifically a continuing collapse in living standards — has been at the forefront of people’s minds in Tunisia.

After 40 years, Syria once again has dual military rule, where the president and his brother are the highest authorities. In the early 1980s, Rifaat al-Assad, the brother of Hafez al-Assad, was the commander of the Defense Companies and the strong man in Syria in the military, security, and even civilian spheres, while Hafez was in a coma. Today, we see this scenario echoed with the control of Maher al-Assad, Bashar al-Assad’s brother, over the Fourth Division, which has become an elite military unit due to strong Iranian support and its control over various territories of the country.

بعد أربعين عاما، تتجدد ثناية الحكم العسكري في سوريا بين الرئيس وشقيقه، ففي مطلع الثمانينات كان رفعت الأسد (شقيق حافظ الأسد)، قائد سرايا الدفاع الرجل القوي في سوريا على المستوى العسكري والأمني بل حتى على المستوى المدني، بينما كان حافظ الأسد يشكو من الغيبوبة – آنذاك-.

While much of the discourse surrounding the Iron Dome controversy is mired in hysterics and hyperbole, some have put forward a more rational case for providing additional funding for it. One of the standard arguments advanced in recent days is that Iron Dome is crucial not only for saving Israeli lives but is equally important (perhaps even more so) for saving Palestinian lives. This claim has been echoed by numerous American and Israeli analysts and even Members of Congress, and seems to have been accepted by a number of journalists as well. But is it actually true?

For Iran, Washington’s Afghanistan fiasco has been touted as confirmation that U.S. policy in the Islamic world is doomed to fail. The immediate geopolitical and ideological gains, however, could be overshadowed by the potential challenges that a Taliban-ruled Afghanistan may pose for Iran’s security and regional interests in the long run.

Egypt is currently the fastest-growing Arab exporter of liquefied natural gas (LNG), according to a report released by the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries on Aug. 16. The report showed that Egypt exported around 1.4 million tons of LNG in the second quarter of 2021, having not exported any LNG during the same period in 2020.

China’s recent multi-sectoral engagements in Turkey suggest that the Black Sea region’s significance is on the rise in Beijing, and under President Erdoğan, Turkey has consistently sought its favor and investment.

OPEC+ oil producers are unlikely to step back from their plans to increase production, as both the short-term market forecasts and long-term expectations of structural changes in the global oil market are forcing producers to focus more on market share expansion.

Right now, Afghanistan is on the cusp of an economic collapse, not some Chinese investment bonanza. Its immediate challenges are existential. And until economic, political, and security conditions stabilize, and legal and regulatory frameworks for investments are in place, Afghanistan’s connectivity and mineral wealth dreams will remain just that.

Though aware of the weaknesses of the former Afghan government, none of the Central Asian governments seemed prepared for the rapidity and decisiveness of the Taliban victory. Not unreasonably, Central Asians fear that it will spur the growth of regional terrorism and extremism, either through direct Taliban sponsorship or inspiration. The five Central Asian states backed the anti-Taliban opposition in the 1990s and then the U.S.-led NATO military campaign in Afghanistan after 2001. Presently, the Central Asian governments are eschewing policies that could antagonize the new regime while looking for indications whether the Taliban have genuinely turned over a new leaf and renounced international terrorism. If they have, then some Central Asian countries seem open to economic and perhaps other cooperation. If not, Central Asians will likely rely on Russia for enhanced security support.

The viability of Eastern Mediterranean natural gas resources has long been a source of debate for reasons including cost considerations, market demand, and regional geopolitical tensions. The past couple of years have further complicated the debate, introducing new questions about the role of these resources in supporting post-pandemic economic recovery or helping more advanced markets achieve net-zero policies by replacing coal and other fuel sources (a particularly relevant topic of debate given Europe and Asia are key export targets for East Med gas).

It took the Taliban just three and a half months to undermine a 20-year international effort to build a competent Afghan military. The Afghanistan National Army (ANA) collapsed once it was clear the U.S. was pulling out ground troops and ceasing air support operations after two decades of training and sustainment that cost the American taxpayer approximately $83 billion. When required to stand alone, against a Taliban force, the ANA failed unequivocally. Building the ANA as a mirror image of the U.S. military was strategically and operationally flawed. If they are designed to fight like the U.S. but cannot fight in the absence of U.S. forces, they are ineffective. What lessons should we learn from this and how could our approach be different in the future?