The following testimony was delivered before the U.S. Helsinki Commission at a hearing titled, “At What Cost: The Human Toll of Turkey’s Policy at Home and Abroad,” on October 31, 2019.
The Trump administration inherited a number of complex problems in the Syrian file from its predecessors in the White House. In dealing with the Syrian crisis, the Obama administration had three main priorities: not disturbing Iran in Syria during the process of nuclear negotiations, working with Russia toward a ceasefire in various parts of Syria (without trusting that Russia could deliver or should have the upper hand), and, most importantly, carrying out a limited military intervention in the northeast to defeat ISIS — an issue it considered separately from the Syrian crisis.
Damascus’ position is marginally stronger, and it is unlikely to concede anything of substance in Geneva despite continued American control of Deir ez-Zor’s oilfields.
Had America’s posture in Syria not been so uncertain, and if President Trump had not effectively green-lighted a Turkish incursion into the northeast, we would have a much better chance of capitalizing on Baghdadi’s death.
Russia is clear in its policy toward northeastern Syria: The future of the region will be determined through talks between the representatives of the Kurds, who traditionally live in the area, and Damascus.
The launch of Turkey’s military incursion into northern Syria on Oct. 9 represents an existential threat for the Autonomous Administration in Northeast Syria (AANES) and Kurdish parties in Syria as a whole, prompting Kurdish political factions, both within Syria and abroad, to reevaluate their survival strategies and alliances. This report explores the various political factions within the Kurdish coalitions in Syria as they functioned under the AANES and the major rifts between them. Even under these dire circumstances Kurdish political factions in Syria have responded to the Turkish invasion independently.
While the Iranians would have preferred it if the Turks had not invaded Syria, it does not change their most immediate policy objective, which is the survival of the Assad regime. As long as the Russians keep the Turks away from Assad’s forces, Tehran will, at least in the short term, be able to manage the consequences of Ankara’s actions.
Deep political, familial, and religious ties have allowed Druze communities across the Levant to remain largely unified against external threats, but eight years of violence in Syria and a coordinated campaign by the regime and its allies now threaten to destabilize regional Druze politics and erode the sect’s political and military power. An Iranian-backed campaign by Hezbollah to incite inter-Druze violence in Lebanon has curtailed this unity, laying the groundwork for Hezbollah to expand into Syria’s Suwayda province with impunity.
That some in Washington think another about-turn in policy allowing us to stay in negligible numbers, in a smaller piece of territory, would somehow enable us to sustain an anti-ISIS campaign and control Syria’s oil fields is nothing short of a fantasy.
To make his case for an expansive safe zone in northern Syria stretching to Iraqi border, Recep Tayyip Erdogan is meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Sochi. Putin might accept a limited Turkish presence in the area for now, but he is unlikely to agree to Turkey’s current plans.
Both Mr. Trump and Mr. Erdogan, each under mounting pressure at home, are trying to solve domestic challenges with a tragedy that will have long-term and unpredictable effects — none of them beneficial for the United States and any friends that remain.
The news of Donald Trump’s sellout to Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan hit Israel like a lightning storm. Trump has managed to do the unthinkable: unite all Israelis around a geopolitical cause.
The team of researchers from the Syrian Association for Citizen’s Dignity worked for months under extremely challenging conditions to document the security situation of returnees and those living in areas covered by “reconciliation agreements” in parts of Syria under the control of the regime of Bashar al-Assad. The results of that research are stark and the main conclusion is that it is not safe for displaced Syrians to return to Assad-held areas.
They won’t make up for backing out of Syria and failing to stand up to Iran.
While the Turkish military offensive against the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in northern Syria might, once again, bring Moscow and Tehran together tactically in support of Assad’s rule and Syrian sovereignty, the two powers have fundamentally different visions for the war-ravaged country’s future.