Research & Commentary Results

In his second term in office, President Donald Trump faces a Middle East undergoing multifaceted upheaval and an Islamic Republic of Iran currently in its weakest and most isolated position since the founding of the regime in 1979. Yet far from permanently subdued, Tehran continues to move closer to building a nuclear weapon, and it is trying to preserve its regional network of proxies and non-state allies. Trump now faces an important strategic choice on Iran policy. This report analyzes three overarching dynamics: the shifting strategic landscape across the Middle East in 2023-24; the impact of these shifts on Iran and its Axis of Resistance network; and Iran’s current position and standing at home and in the region. It concludes with a series of strategic-level recommendations for the new administration.

It is becoming apparent that negotiations between the new leadership in Damascus and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) face significant obstacles due to disagreements over military structure and administrative demands. These issues reflect the difficulty of reaching a mutual understanding between the two parties. As these challenges persist, there is growing talk of a potential military escalation in eastern Syria, amid residents’ fears and international mediation efforts to contain the crisis and achieve progress in the negotiations.

Syria’s first post-Assad protests broke out on Dec. 25 after a video claiming to show the destruction of an Alawite shrine spread rapidly across Facebook. The video was quickly debunked as several weeks old, the shrine only partially damaged, and the damage occurring during the capture of Aleppo city rather than in an act of sectarian vandalism. But those first hours were enough to stir up the widespread fears lingering just below the surface among Syria’s Alawite minority, bringing many Alawites (as well as Sunnis) to the streets to denounce sectarianism.

A very different Middle East will greet President-elect Trump this month compared to the region he experienced during his first term. However, there are opportunities to advance American interests for a more stable and less conflictual Middle East, which might not require the kind of intense US commitment we have seen over the last quarter-century.

More than a year has passed since the horrific attacks that took the lives of 1,200 innocent Israeli citizens on Oct. 7, 2023, a devasting day that led to many more devasting days in Gaza, where tens of thousands of innocent people have died and countless more have experienced suffering on an industrial scale. All hopes that the war might soon wind down are fading, as the conflict has expanded regionally and internationally and attention has been diverted to a hot cease-fire in Lebanon and the dramatic events unfolding in Syria. Saudi Arabia can help support a credible path to peace.

Under former President Bashar al-Assad’s regime, the Syrian security sector kept meticulous records of their crimes. The international community must now step up to help Syria’s new authorities secure and protect the documents, provide information to the loved ones of those who suffered in Assad’s prisons, and pursue justice.

On Dec. 8, 2024, Bashar al-Assad’s regime fell. This is a fact, but it woefully understates the enormity, speed, and consequences of what has transpired. The brutal dictatorship that ruled Syria for more than 50 years disintegrated in fewer than 10 days. Celebrations erupted across public squares, thousands of Syrian refugees lined up at the borders of Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon eager to return, and the release of political prisoners fueled hope for a new era after decades of despotism and conflict. However, concerns about Syria’s political future and territorial integrity quickly surfaced.

Half a century of rule by the Assad family in Syria collapsed astonishingly quickly after insurgents burst out of a rebel-held enclave and took Damascus in a matter of days. For Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, however, it was not fast enough. He has been waiting for this moment since the Syrian uprising in 2011 and is determined to reap the benefits of Bashar al-Assad’s ousting ahead of Turkey’s 2028 elections.

For nearly 14 years, Bashar al-Assad’s regime pursued a maniacal campaign of brutality against its own people, in order to suppress opposition through terror and mass killing. Beginning very early on, Assad’s military and security apparatus embraced what they called an “Assad or we burn the country” approach – but in truth, it was more Assad and we burn the country.

Read MEI’s weekly briefing featuring expert analysis of key regional developments for the week ahead.

On Dec. 8, President Bashar al-Assad fled Syria, bringing an end to nearly 54 years of his family’s rule and sending millions of Syrians at home and abroad into a state of euphoria and relief. Over a dramatic 12 days, an armed opposition offensive that had begun west of Aleppo on Nov. 27 triggered the precipitous crumbling of regime front lines, one after the other. As rebels began to advance south, Syrians across the country began to rise up. By the night of Dec. 7, Assad’s defeat had been sealed.

There is currently a discrepancy between the strategic objectives and enabling conditions for solar power in the Gulf and the level of actual deployment. Despite the region’s considerable promise as a potential global leaders in solar power, including one of the world’s highest levels of solar irradiance and strong supporting operating conditions, renewable power accounted for only 2% of generation capacity in 2022.

The hydrocarbon-rich Gulf states are located in the heart of the global sunbelt, endowing them with some of the greatest solar resources in the world. Peak load hours in these countries also align well with daily and seasonal solar radiation levels. Nevertheless, actual deployment of renewable power, including solar, is among the lowest in the world, even though output has increased significantly over the past five years. This paper analyzes why solar power has seen some success in a few states, while in others there has been little momentum.

Over the past week, the future of Bashar al-Assad’s regime has been placed squarely into question.

A coalition of armed opposition factions has gone on the offensive in northern Syria, capturing some 250 cities, towns, and villages and more than doubling the territory under its control. Syria’s second-largest city of Aleppo was captured in 24 hours, as Syrian regime front lines collapsed one after the other. After nearly five years of territorial lines of control being frozen across the country, these are dramatic, game-changing developments.

In only six days, a broad coalition of advancing opposition forces coordinated by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham has captured all of Idlib province, almost all of Aleppo province, and a sizeable stretch of northern Hama — a humiliating defeat for Bashar al-Assad and illustrative of the fragility of regime rule in Syria.